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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to review the period between 
the election of Lincoln and the beginning of the Civil War, 
especially in regard to the influence Fort Sumter was to play 
in the actual commencement of hostilities. 
EVen in the colonial days there had been a reluctance to 
enter into a strong central Union, although such a Union had 
been requi~ed by the strongest necessity of self-interest and 
self-preservation. The old Articles of Confederation had 
demonstrated the reluctance on the part of the States to yield 
their sovereignty to a central Government. Although the new 
Constitution of 1789 had remedied the governmental weaknesses 
of the old Articles of Confederation, the States still held 
to the idea of separate and independent sovereignty. The idea 
that a State had the right to withdraw from the Union, upon 
what might be considered just cause, was by no means an 
exclusively Southern doctrine. The importance given such 
doctrine by John C. Calhoun in the nullification crisis of 
1832, and the recourse to it by the South to meet the anti-
slavery challenge of the Northern abolitionists, had tended 
to make the right of secession a Southern doctrine. 
After many threats by the South that secession would be 
resorted to to protect the ffpeculiar institutionff of slavery, 
and after the untiring efforts of Southern radicals since 1850 
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in 1860 to test whether the Union was a "rope of sand" or a 
"chain of steel". The election ot Lincoln, the candidate ot 
the anti-slavery North, although perfectly 1ega1and regular, 
was seized upon as cause for secession by the pro-slavery 
South. It mattered little that Lincoln and the Republicans 
would be powerless to harm the "peouliar institution" with a 
Demooratio Congress. Revolutions are not amenable to 10gio 
and cold reason. 
South Carolina was to lead the secession parade. Between 
the eleotion ot Lincoln and his inauguration, six other 
cotton States followed. As each State seceded it took over, 
it it had the power, the Federal property and forts within 
its limits. By March 4, 1861, all the Federal torts in the 
South had been taken except Fort Sumter and two or three more. 
It seems strange that while all the other forts were taken 
with little or no excitement, the question of South Carolina's 
taking over Fort Sumter was to be accompanied by such resl'stanoe 
on the part of the Federal Government, and was finally to bring 
on aotua1 hostilities. 
Both Buohanan and Lincoln were reluctant 'to believe'that 
the secession movement was in dead earnest. They hoped to the 
e.nd that some remedy short of 'war might be found. States were 
permitted to leave the Union by their own declaration an4 
enter into a Southern Confederacy. Seemingly they were inde-
pendent, although a recognition of independenoe had been remote 
fromthe thoughts of both Buchanan and Lincoln. No outstanding 
coercive measures had been directed against the seceding States 





effect of coercion on the doubtful border slave States# which 
still clung uneasily to the Union. How long was the Federal 
Government to remain inactive and conciliatory? 
It was the question of holding or surrendering Fort Sumter, 
in Charleston harbor, which was to bring an end to·the period 
of inaction and the hope for a peaceful restoration of the 
Union. It will be the purpose of this study to trace the story 
of Fort Sumter under Presidents Buchanan and Lincoln# and to 
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BUCHANAN FACES THE SECESSION MOVEMENT 
It is perhaps unfortunate, with respect to James Buchanan's 
place in history, that he was elected in 1856. In that year, 
before he had secured the nomination, he had written to a friend 
words that events were to make prophetic. Said Buchanan: 
I had hoped for the nomination in 1844, again in 1848, and 
even in 1852, but now I would hesitate to take it. Before 
many years the Abolitionists will bring war up£n the land. 
It may come during the next Presidential term. 
, 
The opposition party and its anti-slavery principles over which 
Buchanan triUmphed were to help drive him into a close affilia-
tion with the extreme pro-slavery wing of the Southern Democratic 
party. In 1856 the new Republican party, whose fundamental 
program was opposition to the further spread of slavery, entered 
its first oandidate for the Presidency, John C. Fremont. The 
imposing total of votes polled by the Republicans inspired fear 
among the ranks of the pro-slavery elements of the South 
especially, and the new party became a menace and a challenge 
to the South. It was but natural that Buchanan should consider 
himself the champion of the pro-slavery elements of the Democratic 
party and the South. He owed his election to these groups and 
his personal leanings were already on the pro-slavery side. 
As early as 1851 Buchanan, in a letter to Isaac Toucey, 
in which he discussed his chances for the Presidency, presaged 
his eventual championship of the pro-slavery cause. Said 
Buchanan in 1851: 
1. Auchampaugh, Philip Gerald, James Buchanan and His Cabinet 
on the Eve of Secession, p. 30. Privately P~inted, Lancaster 
Press, Lancaster, Pa., 1926. 
T 
" 
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I was never a favorite in New England and I presume that 
my opinions on th~ slavery question have rendered me less 
so than formerly. 
But in 1856 the anti-slavery movement had spread beyond the 
New England borders, increasing Buchanan's chances of being 
"less a favorite than formerly". In 1856 Buchanan had said 
privately and publicly that his mission would be to destroy 
sectionalism everywhere, and bring baok the good old times. 
To his mind, and to many of those of conservative leanings, 
his election had saved the Union¥ 
'-':>,"--
To support this view, Horace 
6 
Greeley has left the story-of a convention of Southern Governors 
at Raleigh, N. C., in October, 1856, called at the invitation 
of Governor Wise of Virginia. The gathering was kept secret at 
the time, but it was afterward proclaimed by Governor Wise that, 
had Fremont been elected, he would have marched at the head of 
twenty thousand men to Washington, and taken possession of the 
Capitol, preventing by force Fremont's inauguration at that 
place.4 
It may be that the election of Buchanan in 1856 prevented 
a secession movement then, but the accentuation of the slavery 
issued during his administration was to have the opposite effect. 
During his administration he was to alienate further the anti-
slavery North by his Kansas policy, and even to drive from him 
the majority of Northern Democrats when he split with Douglas. 
Douglas broke with Buchanan because of the latter's extremely 
pro-slavery policy in Kansas. Thus, when secession came upon 
him, Buchanan had unfortunately set the stage for Northern 
2. rifSmP. 19 
3.uc paugh,~. oi t., p. 31 
4. areeley, Horace, The American Conflict, p. 329, Hartford, 
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suspicion and condemnation of his every action in his sincere 
desire to save the Union and avert civil war. Strangely 
enough, the pro-slavery advances made during Buchanan's 
administration were not to W07k to the disadvantage of the 
nascent anti-slavery Republican party, but to the discomfiture 
of the Democratic party of which Buchanan was the leader. 
The intensification of the issue had caused the Democratic 
party to disintegrate into two factions, instead of welding 
7 
the party into ami11tant phalanx to meet the menace of the 
anti-slavery Republicans. The moderate pro-slavery Northern 
group was led by Stephen A. Douglas, the extreme pro-slaverr 
Souhhern wing by John C. Breckinridge. The Southern Union group, 
largely recruited from the ranks of the former American party, 
was led by John Bell of Tennessee. Abraham Lincoln was nomi-
nated over the most outstanding leader of the Republican party, 
William H. Seward, to lead the new party in what might be called 
the most important election ot our history, that ot 1860. The 
Democrats, in their split over the slavery issue, had given 
the Republicans a decided advantage. Because of these condi-
tions, Lincoln was to become a minority President. 
Now what role was Buchanan to play in this momentous 
election of 1860? It was not to be expected that he would 
throw his support to Douglas, who had injured his prestige and 
that of the party by his defection over the Kansas issue. It 
was only consistent with his nast record and pro-Southern 
sympathies that he should throw his influence on the side ot 
the Breckinridge or extreme Southern pro-slavery party.l In a 
5. Curtis, George Ticknor, Life of James Buchanan, Vol. 2, 
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campaign speech from the White House Buchanan declared that 
neither of the Democratic conventions was regular, and there-
fore every Democrat was at liberty to vote as he thought 
proper, but that for himself he preferred the Breckinridge 
ticket. One plank of that platform called for the "immediate 
annexation of Cuba" as a means of protecting the Southern' 
interests in the national government. 6 
President Buchanan's attitude as between the North and 
8 
South was illustrated in the above speech. He said, speaking 
of the right of the South to carry slavery into the territories, 
which right had been affirmed by the Dred Scott decision: 
The people of the Southern States can never abandon this 
great principle of State equality in the Union without self-
degradation. Never without an acknowledgment that they are 
inferior in this respect to their sister States. Whilst it 
is vital to them to preserve their equality, the Northern 
States surrender nothing by admitting this principle. In 
doing this they only yield obedience to the Constitution 
of their country as expounded by the Supreme Court of the 
United States. While for the North it is comparatively a 
mere abstraction, with the sout~ it is a question of co-equal 
State sovereignty in the Union. 
While President Buchanan was thus defending the cause of 
the South in her grievances against the North, Governor 
W. H. Gist of South Carolina, on October 25, 1860, was 
addressing a circular letter to several governors of the cotton 
States, feeling them out as to the probable action of their 
States in the event of Lincoln's election, and hinting for 
some definite promise of support if South Carolina should 
6. Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, A Histor7, vol. 2, p. 282 
New York, The Century Co., 1~04. -- --
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secede alone. 8 Said Governor Gist, "If no other state takes 
the lead, South Carolina will secede (in my opinion) alone, 
if she has any assurance that she will soon be followed by 
another or other States".9 Even earlier, on the 9th of 
August6 18606 W. W. Boyce 6 a member of Congress fram South 
Carolina6 in a speech at Winsboro, was saying that if Lincoln 
was elected, he thought that the Southern States should with-
draw from the Union, as many as would 6 and if no other6 South 
Carolina alone.lO From all the actions and utterances of 
the leading politicians in the State, as well as from the 
reactions of the people, there could be little doubt that 
Lincoln's election would set the stage for the 1mmediate se-
cession of South Carolina. ll South Carolina was the logical 
State to take the lead in the movement of secession. Calhoun's 
doctrines, producing the Nullification Ordinance of 1832, had 
prepared the minds of the people for seceSSion, and when the 
slavery crisis of 1850 was at its height, South Carolina was 
9 
ready for secession. Now the smouldering fires of secessionism, 
allayed by the Compromise of 1850, were blown to white heat 
by the threat of Victory of an anti-slavery party. , 
From the nomination of Lincoln until his election on 
November 66 1860'6 the central theme of discussion in the 
political circles of South Carolina had been the policy to be 
8. Nicolay and Ray, ~.~. vol. 2, pp. 306, 307 
9 • .!.2!£, p. 307 
10. Crawford, Samuel Wylie 6 The Genesis of the Civil War, p. 14 
11. Rhodes, James Ford, History of the Unltea States, 1~50-l896, 
vol. 3, p. 2, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1920. 
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pursued by the State in the event of Lincoln's success. 
Captain Abner Doubleday, stationed at Fort Moultrie in 
Charleston harbor, has said that Charleston, at that period, 
10 
was far from being a pleasant place for a loyal man. Almost 
every.public assemblage was tinctured with treasonable 
sentiments, and toasts against the flag were always warmly 
applauded. As early as July there was much talk of secession, 
accompanied with constant drilling, and threats of taking the 
forts in Charleston harbor as soon as a spearation should occur12 
Radical propaganda had actually made the Southern masses believe 
that the election of Lincoln would bring the appointment of 
such men as John Brown and Hinton Helper to United States offices 
in the South, and that every official bureau would become a 
hot-bed of conspiracy, and a hatching-place of negro insurrectionst3 
After the news of Lincoln's election was known, a South Carolina 
diarist recorded the remark of a.common citizen at a railway 
station, to the effect that, "Now that the Black Republicans 
have the power I suppose they will Brown us all".14 
Therefore it is not surprising that on the evening of 
November 6, the day of the election, the crowd that had gathered 
in Charleston to await eagerly the news of the result, broke 
forth in cheers for a Southern Confederacy.15 The seriousness 
of the situation, and the firmness of purpose rumong the leaders 
of that city was emphasized on November 7, by the refusal of 
12. Doubleday, Abner, Reminiscences of Forts Sumter and Moultrie, 
p. 14, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1876. 
13. Burgess, John W., The Civil War and the Constitution, vol. 1, 
p. 10. 
14. Randall, J. G., The Civil War and Reconstruction, p. 184 
New York, D. C. Heath and Co., 1937. 









the Grand Jury or the United States District Court to per£or.m 
the duties or their office.16 On the same day, the Hon. 
A. G. Magrath, the Judge or the court, rose in his place and 
rormal1y resigned his of rice with the £ollowing serious 
pronouncement: 
11 
For the last time I have, as a judge of the United States, 
administered the laws or the United States within the limits 
of South Carolina. So £ar as I am concerned the Temple or 
of JUstice, raised under the Constitution of the United 
States, is now closed. Ir it shall never again be opened, 
I thank God that its doors have been closed before its 
altar has been desecrated with sacrifices to tyranny.17 
On the 5th of November, 1860, the day berore the election, 
the South Carolina Legislature had met, earlier than usual in 
order to be ready to take steps ror ruture action in the 
event o£ Lincoln's e1ection.18 On the 12th or November the 
Legislature passed an aot oa11ing ror a convention or the 
people to vote on secession, appointing the 6th day of December 
for the election or the delegates to it, and the 17th or 
November £or the meeting or the -convention.19 Threats of 
disunion had been heard ever since the very beginning or the 
Federal Government, through the period of Jerfersonian expan-
sion and the War of 1812, the nu111.f'ioation episode or 1832, 
and the slavery orises or 1850 and 1856. Now they were on 
their way toward realization through the instrumentality of' 
16. Crawford, 2£. £!!. p. 12 
17. Crawford, 22. cit. p. 13 
18. Burgess, 22. oIt; p. 78 







the State of South Carolina. 20 The paramount question of 
the hour was naturally how the national peril was to be 
averted, and in partioular, how President Buohanan, his Cabinet 
and Congress would propose to deal with it. 
Buchanan's position was indeed unenviable. He not only 
sympathized with the South generally, but also had at least 
one ardent seoessionist in his Cabinet. All the Cabinet 
members were pro-slavery in sentiment. As originally oon-
stituted, the Cabinet had been made up of tour Southern men and 
three Northern men. From the South Buchanan had seleoted 
Howell Cobb of Georgia for the Treasury, John B. Floyd of 
Virginia for Secretary of War, Jacob Thompson of Mississippi 
tor the Interior, and Aaron V. Brown of Tennessee for Post-
master-General •. ~ F~om the North there were Lewis Cass of M.z"eJ,ij!K; 
Secre.td y~ #1:/ Sidf~ I :z $8ilC. rouce'1 Dr CaNNet!.{ ,.(!~ fe~yeftt,., ofW,~ 
Navy, and Jeremiah S. Black ot Pennsylvania, Attorney-General. 2l 
This membership had remained the same up to the seoession orisis, 
except for the re1;!loval by death of the Postmaster-General, 
Brown. In Brown's place Buchanan had appointed a Kentuckian, 
Joseph Holt. 22 
Cobb, the Secretary of the Treasury, had been working for 
the secession of his State, Georgia, before he resigned his 
post, and even betore South Carolina passed her ordinance ot 
secession. There is some truth in the oharge that Buchanan 
had profited by the secession movement as a pOlit1~1ari, and 
20. Nicolay and Hay, .2l!. £!i. vol. 2, pp'. 296, 297. 
21. Blaine, James G., Twenty Years of Congress, 1861, 1881, 
volume 1, p. 124, Norwich, Conn., The Henry Bill Publishing 
Co., 1884. 
22. Buchanan, James, Mr. Buchanan's Administration on the Eve 
of The Rebellion. p. 110, New York, D. Appleton Co., 1866. 
j 
/, 
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when disunion actually oame, he was powerless to oppose it, 
because he was disarmed by. his own words and acts. The 
disunionists were his partisans, friends and counselors. 23 
It is also true that there was not in President Buchanan's 
Cabinet a single sympathizer with the Northern anti-slavery 
attitude, that all were pro-Southern before the question of 
reinforcing the forts in Charleston harbor became an issue, 
and a minority were outright advocates of secession 'as the 
only Southern remedy.24 In the early sta,as of the South 
Carolina rebellion President Buchanan was regularly calling 
in, for conference and advice, the Assistant-Secretary of 
Stata, W. H. Trescot, the only South Carolinian really close 
to the administration. 25 
On November 7, lS60, an administration newspaper, the 
"Constitution", which was receiving the Government patronage, 
declared in an editorial: 
We can understand the effect that will be produced in 
every Southern mind when he reads the news that he is now 
called on to decide for himself, his children, and his 
children's children, whether he will submit tamely to the 
rule of one elected on account of his hostility to him and 
his, or whether he will make a struggle to defend his rights, 
his inheritanoe and his honor.26 
On reading this editorial, Horatio King, then First Assistant 
Postmaster-General, was so infuriated that on the same day he 
addressed a letter to President Buchanan, deploring the spirit 
23. Nicolay and Hay, 2R. ill. vol. 2, p. 336. 
24. Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine, 
XV, 1933 p. 90. No author given. Article: "Secession and 
Coercionb• (Attorney-General Black's Correspondence). 
$ . • $ 
13 
25. Hunt, Gaillard, ed., If Narrative and Letter of William 
Henry Trescot", American Historical ReView, XIII, 1905,pp. 531,532. 
26. Quoted by Horation !lng, in his Turning on the Ligqt, p. 25 
Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1895. 
of this editorial, protesting against men holding office 
~der the administration parading the streets of Washington 
with disunion cockades on their hats, and calling on the 
President to use his power to check the "dread spirit ot 
disunion here in our midst".27 
A letter from Mr. King to John A. Dix, later Buchanan's 
Secretary of the Treasury, gives such evidence of the fears 
entertained by loyal Union Democrats of Buchanan's course 
of action, that the following extract will be quoted: 
I have good reason to believe that the President is beset 
by secessionists, who are almost exclusively occupying his 
attention; and it is tMportant that the true friends of the 
Union should do all in their power to strengthen his hands. 
Why will you not write or come to see him, and get all the 
strong men of your city to do the same? I cannot call 
names, but rest assured what I tell you is true. The course 
of the "Constitution" is infamous, but the President, I 
presume, has no means of controlling it. Pray let him hear 
from you all in a most decided manner on this subj~ct. Let 
him know how much the paper and suspioions of disunion 
influences near him are injuring h1m. 28 
Whatever may be said of President Buchanan's methods and 
motives in his efforts to check the tide of disunion, there 
is little doubt that he was believed to be dominated 1n his 
course at the outset by pro-Southern and disunionist advisers. 
This was not only the belief of the victorious Republicans 
of the North, but in as emphatic degree that of the South.29 
Floyd, B~chanan's Secretary of War until he broke with the 
President on the issue of the reinforcement of the federal 
forts in Charleston harbor, has left a rather apt analysis ot 
Buchanan's support of the South, modified by his Northern 
27. Ibid, p. 25. 
28. King, Horatio, ~. cit. p. 25 
29. Channing, Edwara; A~story of the United States, vol. 6, 
p. 281, New York, The Macmillan Co e , 1936. 
14 
background. The New York Herald, January 17, 1861, carried 
a speech wh1ch Floyd made after h1s res1gnat1on from the 
Cabinet, 1n wh1ch he spoke of Buchanan thus: 
Let me come aga1n to the support 1n justice of what I 
be11eve to be that good old man. Was there s1nce God made 
this earth a man ever placed in so difficult a position 
as the President of the United States was placed in? Had 
he not been true to you? Had his administration not been 
faithful to the South? Had it not been honest and faithful 
to the whole Union, because it was dist1nctly and fearlessly 
constitutional? I do not come here to censure, gentlemen, 
but I will say, because it is due to the truth of h1story, 
that in that terrific conflict 1n wh1ch he was engaged, he 
was not as well susta1ned b7 the South as he deserved to be. 
Perhaps 1t was 1ntended that this present catastrophe 
should be prec1p1tated upon the country. If they had taken 
a different course this doubtless would not have come. But 
it is not 1n human nature to be as true to another as to the 
mother that· gave you suck. Mr. Buchanan could not cO~B to 
the support of the South as a son of the South would. 
Now the most 1mmed1ate specific problem to be dealt w1th 
in the 1nc1pient stages of the South Caro11na secess10n 
movement, w1th reference both to the success of the movement 
on the part of South Caro11na, and the abi11ty of the nat10nal 
government to cope with 1t, was that of the nat10nal property 
in Charleston and Charleston harbor. The nat10nal property 
with1n the terr1torial l1mits of South Caro11na consisted of 
the forts 1n the harbor and a large arsenal w1th1n the c1ty 
lim1ts, not to ment10n the post-off1ce and customs house 1n 
the c1ty. There were three forts, Castle P1nckney, Moultr1e, 
and Sumter. These had been ceded to the United states by 
South Carolina 1n 1805.31 Next to the success of secession 
itself, the possess1on of these forts by the State, and the 
pre~ntion of their being strengthened by reinforcements on 
30. Auchampaugh, 2£. ill. p. 19 






the part of the nat1.onal government, was the most anxlous 
concern of the South Carolina authorltles. 32 And the 
questlon of these same forts was to be also the chief cause of 
anxiety to Buchanan for the remainder of his term of Office. 
On November 7, the day after Lincoln's election, Buchanan 
called in his Secretary of War to find out the truth of 
falslty of a rumo~ to the effect that the forts had been 
assaulted and carried by the South Carolinians.33 On November 
26, W. H. Trescot, in a letter to Governor Gist of South 
Carolina, stated that the President feared the forts were in 
danger of an assault by the South Carolinians, even before 
the passage of the ordinance of secession, and Governor Gist, 
in his reply of November 29', declared that he had found great 
difficulty in restraining the people of Charleston from 
seizing the forts. 34 Thus, at the beginning of the rebellion, 
the status of the forts in Charleston harbor was a chief 
concern to both parties in the conflict. 
One of the first instances of the President's attention 
16 
being called to the desirability of strengthening the garrisons 
of the Southern forts was in the memorandum of General Scott. 
On October 29, several days before the election of Lincoln, 
General Scott, Chlef of Staff of the army, addressed to the 
President a paper entitled "Vlews suggested by the imminent 
danger of a disruption of the Union by the secession of one or 
more of the Southern States~35 In these views, in addition to 
32. ~, p. 31 
33. Auchampaugh, .Q.E. ill. p. 130 
34. Crawford, 22. ~. pp. 30, 31. 
35. Buchanan, James, Mr. Buchanan's Administration on the Eve 
of The Rebellion, pp. 287, 288, 289, 290, New York, ~. 





a rather strange opinion that rather than have a civil war 
all its horrors, it might be preferable to let the Union be 
divided into about four confederacies, General Scott went on 
17 
to say that all the Southarn forts in danger of Southern 
aggression should be so garrisoned as to "make any'attempt to 
take anyone of them, by surprise or coup de main, ridiculous".36 
"From the impracticable nature of the 'views', and their strange 
and inconsistent character", said Buchanan, "the President 
dismissed them from his mind without further consideration". 
In defense of his action the President argued that from 
Scott's own estimate there were only five companies, or about 
four hundred men available for reinforcement, and to have 
distributed these among nine forts would have been a confession 
of weakness instead of strength. That it would have done 
nothing to prevent secession, but much to provoke it. Besides 
he had no power, under the laws, to add to this force by 
calling forth the militia or accepting the services of volun-
teers. Most of the small regular army was beyond reach on 
the remote frontiers. 37 Buchanan's explanation of his action 
on General Scott's proposal gives us the key to his policy 
at that time. Said Buchanan: 
Under these circumstances it became the plain duty ot 
the President,destitute as he was of military force, not 
only to refrain from any act which might provoke or 
encourage the cotton States into secession, but to smooth 
the way for such a compromise as had in times' past happily 
averted danger from the Union. There was gggd reason to 
hope that· this might still be accomplished. 
35. ~, p. 289. 
37. Curtis, ~. £!!. vol. 2, p. 313 
38. Buchanan, ~. ill. p. 104 






Even if he had had at his 1nnnediate disposal sufficient troops 
to garrison the Southern torts, as he did have enough to 
garrison those in Charleston, he would not at this time have 
sent 'them. H~ firmly believed that an inorease in the troops 
at the forts would be viewed by the South as an attempt at 
coercion and lead other cotton States to call seoession oon-
ventions.40 
There was evidenoe of the danger of encouraging other 
cotton States into secession by the President's adoption of 
an aggressive policy. On October 5, 1860, Governor Gist of 
South Carolina addressed a letter to several Governors of 
cotton States, asking them for their views as to the aotion 
of their States in the event of a Black Republican victory.41 
The majority of replies stated that, above all else, an 
attempt at coercion would be resisted; that such coercion 
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would probably result in concerted action of the cotton States.42 
Buchanan's confidenoe that another compromise could be made is 
justified by Rhodes, who believes that if Crittenden's com-
promise bad been submitted to the people, it would have been 
accepted by both the North and South.43 Yet,.a few weeks 
later, the policy pursued by Buchanan at this time was condemned 
by his Secretary of State as the ttfatal errortt of the adminis-
tratlon.44 
Floyd, the Secretary of War, has left a record of what must 
40. Curtis, 22. ~. vol. 2, p. 300. 
41.' Nicolay and Hay, 2£. cit. vol. 2, pp. 306-314. 
42. Ibid -
43. RnOdes, ~. cit. vol. 3, pp. 149, 150. 
44. Black, C. F.;-Essa~s and Speeches of J. S. Blac!, p. 15 




have been the first Cabinet meeting called by Buchanan after 
the election of Lincoln. The President called the meeting on 
November 9, and said that the business before the Cabinet 
was the most important since his induction into office. The 
President asked the opinion of the Cabinet on his suggestion 
t~t a general convention of the States should be called, for 
the purpose of effecting a compromise of the #angry disputes" 
between the North and South.45 According to Floyd, the 
President said that if this were done, and the North should 
refuse a compromise, the South would be justified before the 
whole world for refusing to remain in a Confederacy where 
her rights were so shamefully violated. Buchanan recognized 
the "alar.ming condition" of the country, and promised that he 
would not "shrink from his duty". The majority of the Cabinet 
were for a convention. Cass, the Secretary of State, deplored 
Southern injuries, favored a convention and coercionj secession 
he held illegal. Black, then the Attorney-General, was for a 
convention, coercion, and reinforcements to Charleston. Cobb, 
the Secretary of the Treasury, was hopeless upon the future 
of the Union. Holt, then Postmaster-General, did not advise 
a convention, because in case it failed he thought it would 
accelerate secession. Thompson, Secretary of Interior, was 
for a convention. He was opposed to coercion, which he be-
lieved would drive his State to direct action. Toucey, 
Secretary of the Navy,' was for a convention, and believed that 
retaliatory State measures would bring the Northern fanatics to 















their senses. Floyd described himself as opposed to secession 
and rashness. He believed the Republicans would be powerless 
to do anything and was tor a convention.46 This statement of 
Cabinet opinions agrees substantially with that of the 
Assistant Secretary of State, W. H. Trescot, who wrote his 
;q; 44 $ &$ 
record in February, 1861, only a few weeks after his resignation.47 
A probable error in Floyd's account is the view of Black on 
coercion. At this time Black did not believe that coercion was 
legal. 48 He was in favor of a convention.49 
Throughout November Buchanan was busy preparing his annual 
message to the Congress which was to assemble in the early 
part of December.. On November 17, he asked his Attorney-
General, J. S. Black, for an answer to the following questions: 
1. In case of a conflict between the authorities of any 
State and those of the United States, can there be 
any doubt that the laws of the Federal Government, if 
constitutionally passed, are supreme? 
2. What is the extent of my official power to collect the 
duties on imports at a port where the revenue laws are 
resisted by a force which drives the collector ira.. 
the custom house? . 
3. What right have I to defend the public ~roperty (for 
instance, a fort, arsenal and navy yard), in case it 
should be assaulted? 
4. What are the legal means at my disposal for executing 
those laws of the United States which are usually 
administered through the courts and their officers? 
5. Can a military force be used for any purpose whatever 
under the Acts of 1795 and 1807, within the limits of 
a State where there are no judges, marshals or other 
civil officers?50 
46. Ibi(l. 
47. Hunt, Gaillard, ed., "Narrative and Letter of William 
Henry Trescot," ~. ~., pp. 532, 533, 534. 
48. See Black's aavice to Buchanan, Nov. 20, 1860, Curtis, ~. 
cit. vol. 2, p. 324. 
49." Auchampaugh, .2£. ill., p. 131 














From these questions. it can be seen that the President was 
extremely cautious in undertaking auyactlon that might be 
considered aggressive. 
The Attorney-Gener~ gave the President his answers to 
the live questions in a rather long document, on November 20.51 
This opinion has been called by one historian of the period 
one of the most unfortunate state papers of our hIstory and 
the basis of the PresIdent's ,ven more unfortunate message of 
December 4.52 It was in line with Buchanan's belief that the 
Federal Government had no right to coerce or make war on a 
state, and that the problem of dealing with a seceded State 
was one for Congress to solve. It was also in line with the 
President's policy of inaction. Said the Attorney-General: 
If one of the States should declare her independence, 
your action cannot depend upon the rIghtfulness of the 
cause Upon which such declaration is based. Whether the 
retirement ot the State trom the Union be the exercise 
of a right reserved in the Constitution, or a revolution-
ary movement, it is certain that you have not in either 
case the authority to recognize her independence or to 
absolve her from her Federal obligations. Congress, or 
the other States in convention assembled, must take such 
measures as may be necessary and proper. In such an 
event, I see no course for you but to go straight onward 
in the ~th you have hitherto trodden - that is,- execute 
the laws~cto the extent of the defensive means placed in 
your hands, and act generally upon the assumption that 
the present constitutional relations between the States 
and the Federal Government contInue to exist, until a 
new code of things shall be establish,d.either by law or 
force. 53 
The last question, concerning the use of military force 
in the limits of a State where there wer no federal officers, 
caused the President the greatest concern. S. W. Crawford, 
in a conversation with Judge Black in 1883, was told that 
next to Major Anderson's transfer of his troops from Moultrie 
51. ~, pp. 319 - 324. 
52. Burgess, 2£. cit. vol. 1, p. 80 
















to Sumter, Federal Judge Magrath's resignation of his office 
aaused the President more anxiety than any other event that 
occurred. 54 In the opin10n of the Attorney-General, the 
President, under the laws of 1795 and 1807, could callout 
the militia only in aid of the courts and marshals, and there 
must be courts and marshals to aid. As most of the Federal 
officers had already resigned, the problem was to consider 
what could be done if there were no courts to issue judicial 
process, and no ministerial off1cers to execute it. The 
Attorney-General certainly did not give the President any 
encouragement for aggressive action when he wrote 1n the 
following language: 
In that event (lack of Federal of.flcers), troops would 
certainly be out 0'1' place, and their use wholly illegal. 
If they are sent to aid the courts and marshals, there 
must be courts and marshals to be aided. Without the 
exercise of those functions which belong exclusively to 
the civil service, the laws cannot be executed in any 
event, no matter what may be the physical strength which 
the Government has at its command. Under such circum-
stances, to send a military force into any State, with 
orders to act against the people, would simply be making 
war upon them. • • The existing laws put and keep the 
Federal Government strictly on the defensive. You can 
use force only to repel an assault on the pugSic and aid 
the courts in the performance of their duty. 
Later Mr. Black, the Attorney-General, was to change his 
views as to a strictly defensive policy, but it must be 
remembered that at this time no State had seceded, although 
South Carolina was preparing for it. Indicative of the 
defensive attitude, not only on the part of the Attorney-
General, but of the Administration as a whole, is the reply 
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of Judge Black to a letter from Judge Woodward of Pennsylvania. 
Judge Woodward wrote Black on November 28: 
54. Crawford, 2£. cit. p. 16 












As a Northern man, I cannot in justice condemn the South 
for withdrawing from the Union. We hav&dri ven them off,' 
andijwe raise an arm to strike, the stones of Rome will 
move to mutiny.56 
According to Black, Woodward's letter was submitted to the 
President and his Cabinet, and it "excited univers~l admit.-
tion and approbation for its eloquence and its truth".57 
At about the same time Judge Woodward had written the 
Attorney-General: 
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And if they do go out, don't let a blow be struck 
against them by the present administration. Dissuade them 
if you can, but if you can't, let them go in peace. I 
wish Pennsylvania could go with them. They are our brethren.58 
But it must not be inferred that Black was a "let them go in 
peace" man. Notwithstanding his opposition to the use of 
coercion, and his approval of the spirit of Judge Woodward's 
letter of November 28, he could not agree with Judge Woodward 
and other Pennsylvania friends that the seceding States should 
be allowed to go in peace. He was probably inconsistent in 
the following letter to Judge Woodward, but in it he gave 
evidenoe of a strong Union spirit when he said: 
I value as highly as anybody the recollection that I once 
seemed to have some portion of the public confidenoe at 
home. But it will give me far more pride for the balance 
or my life to remember that I risked and lost it in a 
faithful support of prinCiples which sooner or later will 
be acknowledtee as necessary for" the preservation of the 
noblest political system that the world ever saw. 59 
on December 4, 1860, President Buchanan's message to 
Congress, on the state of the nation, was delivered. In this 







which he "inflexibly adhered" to the end of his administration. 60 
One can hardly read any historian whose condemnation of this 
message is not severe. One historian has said that the 
message was craven and cowardly for the emergency; that its 
whole scope was to upbraid the people for their chOice of a 
President and "to exhort them to fall upon their knees to 
propitiate the fellow-citizens they. had outvoted l and avert 
the dire calamity of disunion which otberwise seemed inevitable. 6l 
The mess~ge does charge the North with responsibility in the 
following words: 
Why is itl then, that discontent now so extensively 
prevails, and the Un10n of the States, w hichis the source 
of all these blessings, is threatened with destruction? 
The long continued and intemperate interference of the 
Northern people with the question of slavery in the 
Southern States has at length produced its natural effects. 62 
Then the President went on to plead with the South not to take 
any rash and precipitate action, not to yell before the 
abolitionist dog had bitten, but to await some overt act of 
the incoming administration. Speaking of the duty of the 
Northern States to repeal their Personal Liberty laws, he s_id: 
The Southern States, standing on the basis of the Con-
stitution, have a right to demend this act of justice from 
the States of the North. Should it be refused, then the 
Constitution, to which all the States are parties l will 
have been willfully violated by one portion of them in a 
provision essential to the domestic ~ecurity and happiness 
of the remainder. In that event the injured States, after 
having first used all peaceful and constitutional means 
to obtain redress, would be justified in revolutionary 
resistance to the Government of the Union. 63 . 
60. Buchanan, James, 2£ • .ill. p. 109 
61. Schoulerl James, 2£ • .ill. vol. V, p. 462 
62. Richardson, J. D., Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 
vol. V, p. 626. PublisheCl by Authority of Congress, 1899. 
63. Ibid, pp. 630, 631 -
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The message followed the Attorney-General's opinion to 
the letter i~ that part concerning the President's lack of 
power to execute the laws in a State where th~ Federal officers 
had resigned. He said that that duty could not po~sibly be 
performed where no judicial authority existed to issue process 
and no marshal to execute it. And even if there were such an 
officer, he believed the entire population would combine to 
res1st him. 54 But the right of secession he repelled in words 
that might have been written by Lincoln: 
This Government. • • 1s a great and powerful Government, 
invested with all the attributes of sovereignty over the 
special subjects to which its authority extends. Its 
framers never intended to implant in its bosom the seeds of 
its own destruction, nor were they at its creation guilty 
of the absurdity of providing for its own dissolution. It 
was not intended by its framers to be the baseless fabric 
of a vision, which at the touch of the enchanter would 
vanish into thin air, but a substantial and mighty fabriC, 
capable of resisting the slow decay of time and of defying 
the storms of ages. 55 . , 
Buchanan gave a very thorough and able argument against the 
right of secession, saying that to justify secession, as a con-
stitutional remedy, it must be on the principle that the 
Federal Government is a mere voluntary association of States, 
to be dissolved at pleasure by anyone of the contracting 
parties. "Such a principle", he said, "is wholly inconsistent 
with the history as well as the character of the Federal 
Constitution". He quoted Jackson and went back to the old 
Articles of Confederation to buttress his argument. The old-
Articles of Confederation, in the thirteenth article, expressly 
declared that the Union was to be perpetual. The preamble to 
the Constitution declares that it was established "in order to 
64. Richardson, J. D., 2£. ~., p. 634 










for.m a more perfect union"; therefore Buchanan insisted that 
the increased perfection of an already perpetual Union made 
that Union doubly perpetual and indissoluble. 66 Certainly 
no sign of weakness and vaoillation was shown in denying the 
right of secession. 
But the strength of the argument against the right of 
seoessionwas considerably oounterbalanced by an emphasis on 
the right of reyolution and the identification of sec$ssion 
w~th revolution. The following paragraph might well have 
been omitted: 
It may be asked, then, Are the people of the States without 
redress against the tyranny and 'oppression of the Federal 
Govarnment? By no means. The right of resistance on the 
part of the, governed against the oppression of their govern-
ments can not be denied. It exists independently of all 
constitutions, and has been exercised at all periods of the 
world's history. Under it old governments have been des-
troyed and new ones have taken their place. It is embodied 
in strong and express language in our own declaration of 
Independenoe. But the distinction must ever be observed that 
this is revolution against an established government, and 
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not a voluntary secession from it by virtue of an inherent 
constitutional right. In short, let us look the danger fair~ 
in the face. Secession is neither more nor less than 
revolution. It mayor it may not be a justifiable revolution, 
but still it is revolution. 67 
So it might be argued that there was no legal right to secede, 
but there might be a moral right of revolution; but secession 
is revolution, therefore there is a moral right of secession. 
What Buchanan meant was that if the South seceded, it must be 
without the sanction of the Constitution, while the right of 
revolution existed outside the Constitution. The argument 
seems merely academic however. Whether the Southern States 
withdrew from the Union by the right of seoession or the 
66. Ibid,pp. 636, 631, 632. 




right of revolution, if successful, the denial of the right of 
secession would matter little. 
As for coercion, Buchanan said, "The question fairly 
statecl is" Has the Constitution delegated to Congress the 
power to coerce a State into submission Which is attempting 
to withdraw or has actually withdrawn from the Confederacy?" 
He said that if answere4 in the affirmative, it must be on 
the principle that the power to declare and to make war 
against a State has been conferred upon Congress. After much 
serious reflection he had concluded that no such power had 
been delegated to Congress or to any other department of the 
Federal Government. To the support of his contention he 
quoted Madison's denial of coercion in a speech before the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787: 
The use of force against a State would look more like a 
declaration of war than an infliction of punishment" and 
would probably be considered by the party attacked as a 
dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be 
bound. . 
Here the President identified coercion with making war against 
a State, and said that the power to make war against a State 
is at variance with the whole spirit of the Constitution. "But 
if we possessed this power", said Buchanan, "would it be wise 
to exercise it under existing circumstances? The object 
27 
would doubtless be to preserve the Union. War would not only 
present the most effectual means of destroying it, but would 
vanish all hope of its peaceable reconstruction.,,68 It was 
emphasized that the Union rested upon public opinion and could 
never be cemented by the blood of its citizens shed in civil war. 
68. Richardson, J. D., 22. ill., vol. 5, pp. 635, 636 
~'I 
Then the President put the responsibility of conciliation on 
Congress when he said: "Congress possesses many means of 
preserving it by conciliation, but the sword was not placed in 
their hand to preserve it by force. 69 We can at least under-
stand why Senator Hale wittily summed up Buchanan's position 
as: (1) South Carolina has just cause to secede. (2) She has 
no right to secede. (3) We have no right to prevent her. 70 
28 
W. H. Seward also threw in his quip: "It shows conclusively that 
it is the duty of the President to execute the laws, - unless 
somebody opposes him, - and that no State has a right to go 
out of the Union - unless it wants to."?l 
Buchanan again reminded Congress that secession could be 
prevented by invoking the fifth article of' the Constitution, 
which provided for amendments. "Congress can contribute much 
to avert it", he said, "by proposing and recommending to the 
legislatures of the several States the remedy for existing 
evils which the Constitution has itself provided for its own 
preservation". Then the President recommended an explanatory 
amendment on the subject of slavery. The amendment was to be 
confined to the "final settlement" of the true construction 
of the Constitution on three special points: (1) An express 
recognition of the right of property in slaves in the States 
where it now exists o~ may hereafter exist. (2) The duty of 
protecting this right in all the common Territories throughout 
their Territorial existence, and until they shall be admitted 
as States into the Union, with or without slavery, as their 
constitutions may prescribe. (3) A like recognition of the 
right of the master to have his slave who has escaped from one 
'69. Ibid, p. 636 
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State into another restored and "delivered up" to him, and 
of the validity of the fugitive-slave law enacted for this 
purpose, together w1th a declarat10n that all State laws 
impairing or defeating this right are violations of the 
Const1tution, and are consequently null and void. The President 
said that it might be objected that this construction of the 
Constitut1on had already been settled by the Suprema Court, but 
that a very large proport1on of the people st1ll contested that 
decision (Dred Scott), and would never cease from ag1tation 
until it was established by the people of the several States 
1n their sovere1gn character. Such an explanatory amendment, 
he believed, would forever terminate the existing d1ssensions, 
and restore peace and harmony among the States. 72 But 1t was 
obvious that the Republicans could not agree to such an amendment. 
As to the 1mmediate danger of an appeal to arms in the 
harbor of Charleston, the President had the following to say: 
Then, 1n regard to the property of the United States in 
South Carolina. This has been purchased for a fair equ1valent, 
"by the consent of the legislature of the State", "for the 
erection of forts, magazines, arsenals", etc., and over these 
the authority "to exercise exclusive legislat1on" has been 
expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress. It 1s 
not believed that any attempt will be made to expel the 
United States from this property by force; but if 1n this I 
should prove to be mistaken, the officer in command of the 
forts has received orders to act strictly on the defensive. 
In such a contingency the responsib11ty for consequences 
would rightfully rest upon the heads of the assa1lants. 73 
In the last sentence of the' above quotation Buchanan 
expregsed a determination from which he was not to depart, to 
avoid any contingency that would throw the responsib1l1ty of 
72. Richardson, J. D., 2£. £!1., vol. 5, p. 638 










initiating a conflict of arms on the Government. If war must 
come, Buchanan wanted the responsibility to rest on the 
secessionists. Lincoln's inaugural was to express the same 
desire. 74 
There was little hope of Buchanan's plan of compromise by 
the amendment method succeeding. This was not because of the 
refusal of Congress to try the method recommanded by the 
President, for many were the committees appointed and the plans 
. submitted. There were the Committee of Thirteen of the Senate, 
the Committee of Thirty-three of the House, the Crittenden 
plan of compromise, one outstanding feature of which was the 
extension of the Missouri Compromise line westward, and the 
Peace Convention sponsored by the State of Virginia. 75 The 
. \': 
failure of the compromise eff~ts was because the plans worked 
out were contrary to the fundamental Republican principle of 
"no further extension of slavery". On the other hand, the 
attitude of radical Southern Congressmen augured ill for the 
success of compromise, for on December 13, when the "Committee 
of Thirty-three" had just begun its efforts, and before a 
single State had actually seceded, a group of Southern 
Congressmen issued the following address to their constituents: 
The argument is eXhausted. All hope of relief in the 
Union, through the agency of committees, Congressional 
legislation, or constitutional amendments, is extinguished, 
and we trust the South will not be deceived by appearances 
or the pretense of new guarantees. The Republicans are 
resolute in the purpose to grant nothing that will or 
ought to satisfy the South. We are satisfied the honor, 
safety, and independence of the Southern people are to be 
found only in a Southern Confederacy - a res~lt to be 
obtained only by separate State secession - and that the 
sole and primary aim of each slaveholding State ought to be 
its speedy and absolute separation from an unnatural and 
hostile Union. 76 
30 
74. Nicolay and Hay, 2£. £!i., vol. 3, p. 342, Lincoln's Inaugural. 
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A POLICY OF APPEASEMENT IN CHARLESTON HARBOR 
It has already been noted that the Federal forts and 
property in the harbor of Charleston were the foremost cause 
of anxiety, both on the part of the Buchanan administration 
and the State of South Carolina. Even if South Carolina 
were allowed to leave the Union in peace, and Buchanan's 
policy of using no force to bring her back into the Union 
were indefinitely continued, the possession of these forts 
and property by the Federal Government would have been an 
infringement of South Carolina's alleged sovereignty. There-
fore it was almost as important that South Carolina should 
secure the ultimate possession of these forts as to make good 
her claim to the right of secession. 
Jefferson Davis has left an interesting argument that the 
ror:ts, by virtue of the act of £ession of 1805, were legally 
in the possession of South Carolina, even under the Constitution.l 
He stated that the property in Charleston harbor and on Beaufort 
River, the various forts and fortifications, and sites for the 
erection of forts, were granted to the Federal Government by 
legislative enactment by South Carolina, on the following 
conditions: 
That, if the United States shall not, within three years 
from the passage of this act, and notification thereof by 
the Governor of this State to the Executive of the United 
States, repair the fortifications now existing thereon or 
1. DaviS, Jefferson,.l.UJle a.w:1 ~ of t.l!.e Confederate Government, 








bu11d such other forts or fortifications as may be deemed 
most expedient by the Executive of the United States on 
the same, and keep a garrison or garrisons therein; in 
such ca~e this grant or cession shall be void and of no 
effect. . 
33 
The conditions in the act of cession apparently were not fulfilled, 
for no add1t1onal defenses nor repairs were determined upon 
until 1827, long after the three year 11mit had expired.3 
President Buchanan, in his annual message to Congress of December 
4, 1860, declared that the property had been purchased for a 
fair equivalent, by the consent of the Legislature of the State. 4 
But Jefferson Davis seems to have been correct in deny1ng a 
purchase, c1ting a law of 1794 prov1ding "that no purchase shall 
be made where such lands are the property of a State".5 This 
argument, however, was not made by Davis until after the Civil War. 
Now what was the status of the forts in Charleston harbor 
in the fall of 18601 There were forts Moultrie, Sumter, and 
Castle Pinckney. Fort Sumter was unoccupied, being 1n an un-
finished state, while Castle Pinckney was in charge of a single 
ordnance sergeant. The garrison of Fort Moultrie consisted 
of two companies that had been reduced to sixty-five men, who 
with the band made the total number in the post seventy-three. 
Fort Moultrie had no strength, being merely a sea battery, and 
its walls were about as high as an ordinary room. The sand had 
drifted from the sea aga1nst the walls so that cows could 
actually scale the ramparts. 6 
!,.·'IbIa;~quoting from Statutes at Large of South Carolina, vol. 5, 
p. SOl. 
3. Crawford, 22. cit. p. 2 
4. Richardson, J.-n;, 22. cit. vol. 5, p. 635 
5. Davis, Jefferson, 22. cIt., vol. 1, p. 210 
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Castle Pinckney. a small round- structure of brick. had 
long been practically abandoned. Grass grew on its walks. 
its casemates had craCked here and there. a nd signs of neglect 
and deoay were evident; but twenty-two guns still stood on its 
parapet. and the old sergeant still polished the lacquer on 
the guns and trimmed the harbor light that was mounted on its 
walls. 7 This fort commanded the city of Charleston. 
Fort Sumter was located on a shoal. ri~ht in the narrowest 
part of the ohannel of the harbor. a large pentagonal fort. 
fifty feet high. It was unfinished and without armament of 
any kind. A few heavy guns of old pattern lay on the parade. 
with masonry and large stones and material for the completion 
of the work. One hundred twenty workmen. under the charge of a 
lieutenant of engineers, were at that time working on the fort 
to complete it, under an appropriation made by an Act of 
Congress passed in June, 1859.8 This work on the forts, begun 
in the fall of 1860, had no connection with their possible 
future role in the secession drama, as the law appropriating 
the funds had been passed as a matter of routine. But as the 
actual work started in the fall of 1860, it arounsed the sus-
picions of t he people of Charleston. 9 
On November 26, 1860. W. H. Trescot. the Assistant 
Secretary of State in Buchanan's Cabinet, wrote Governor Gist 
of South Carolina that the President feared that before South 
Carolina acted on secession in the coming convention. an 
attempt might be made to take the forts in Charleston harbor. 
7. C·rawford. ,2E. cit., p. 2 
8. Crawford, Jll2..!. cit., p. 2 










Feeling his personal honor involved in such an attempt, the 
President, said Triscot, might make his fear the pretext to 
order an increase of forces to those posts. This order 
would be resisted at any cost by the Southern members of the 
Cabinet, but they would be strengthened in their position if 
Governor Gist would assure the President that so long as the 
status of the forts remained the same, and so long, as the 
State remained in the Union, no attempt to take them by force 
would be made. lO ,The Assistant Secretary of State received 
a reply, dated November 29, 1860, which so clearly outlined 
the situation as to any reinforcement that the greater part of 
it will be quoted. Said Governor Gist: 
Although South Carolina is determined to secede from the 
Union very soon after her convention meets, yet the desire of 
her constituted authorities is, not to do anything that will 
bring on a collision before the ordinance of secession has 
been passed and notice has been given to the President of 
the fact; and not then, unless compelled to do so by the 
refusal of the President to recognize our right to secede, 
by attempting to interfere with our exports or imports, or 
by refusal to surrender the forts and arsenals in our 
limits. I have found great difficulty in restraining the 
people of Charleston from seizing the forts, and have only 
been able to restrain them by the assurance that no addi-
tional troops would be sent to the forts, or any munitions 
of war. • • If President Buchanan takes a course different 
from the one indicated and sends on a reinforcement, the 
~~:~~~~:b!~i~~ :iii ~~; ~~ ~:n~~e~i~t~~~o~~!ltorch of 
Thus we see that the attitude of South Carolina was that the 
Federal Government must surrender the forts after the 
ordinance of secession was passed, and if war was to be avoided 
no troops were to be sent even before the State left the Union. 
This was indeed a clever attempt to play upon the President's 
10. Ibid, p. 30 








fear of a civil war, and to ,make the taking of the forts after 
secession all the easier. This letter was shown to the 
President by Mr. Trescot.12 
Buchanan's Secretary of War, Floyd, has left a story to 
the effect that the President was asking him to send reinforce-
ments at just about the time that Governor Gist sent the above 
letter to Trescot. Floyd's testimony has been questioned 
because of the fact that he did quite a bit of boasting to the 
South, after his resignation, of his part in preventing 
reinforcements. Although contrary to the President's policy 
at ,this time, it might well be that he had temporarily yielded 
to the pressure of Secretary Cass and Attorney-General Black, 
who favored reinforcements as early as the first week in 
November. Trescot, writing of the same period of time to which 
Floyd referred, said that he went to call on Buchanan, found 
Cass and Black in conference with the President, and the 
President announced to him that he had determined to send rein-
forcements. 13 Floyd's account ran as follows: 
Buchanan: "Mr. Floyd, are you going to send recruits to 
strengthen the forts? What about sending rein-
forcements to Charleston?" 
Floyd: ("I was taken very much by surprise to find the 
President making this inquiry, indicating to 
my mind a change of policy on his part".) 
"I said", "Mr. President, nothing about sending 
recruits to Charleston". 
Buchanan: "Don't you intend to strengthen the forts at 
Charleston?" 
Floyd: "I do not intend to strengthen the forts at 
Charleston". 
12. Crawford, 2£. cit., p. 34 
13. Hunt, Gaillard;-ed., "Narrative and Letter of William Henry 




Buchanan: " Mr. Floyd, I would rather be at the bottom of 
the Potomao tomorrow than that these forts in 
Charleston should fall into the hands of those 
who intend to take them. It will destroy me, 
sir." 
37 
Mr. Floyd, if that thing occurs it will cover your 
name - and it is an honorable name. ~ir - with an 
infamy that all time can never efface. because it 
is in vain that you will attempt to show that you 
have not some complicity in handing over those 
forts to those who take them. 
Floyd replied that he would risk his life and honor on the 
declarations of the South Carolinians that they would not be 
touched •. Buchanan said that was all very well, but "Does that 
secure the forts?" Floyd replied that it didn't. but that it 
was a guarantee that he believed in. Buchanan added that he 
wasn't satisfield. Floyd said that he was sorry for it. He 
offered to make out orders, but said that it would mean conflict. 
He said the forts would be safe. The State would send her 
commissioners to Congress, and that body would decide what to 
do. Floyd added that he would resign if Congress decided on 
coercion.14 The above conversation so excited Floyd that he 
sent for Davis, Mason, and Hunter to come up earlier than usual 
to Washington to assure Buchanan there was no danger to the 
forts. DaVis, while finding Buchanan concurring with some of 
his Views, was not at all successful in persuading him to take 
the troops out of the harbor. 15 
The appeasement policy, which was initiated by President 
Buchanan's message of December 4 to Congress, had thus been 
followed for weeks already by the Secretary of War. Much 
cOul~ind has been written on the question of Floyd's loyalty 
14. AuchBmpaugh, 22. ill., p. 150 
Floyd's speech at Richmond, Jan. 17. 1861. 







or treachery to the Union cause in this crisis, but we do 
know his position on the question of reinforcing the forts in 
Charleston harbor. Mr. Trescot, who had an opportunity to 
know him intimately, and who would have had no reluctance to 
brand him as a secessionist in the first weeks of the crisis, 
has declared that Eloyd thought secession unwise, and was in 
favor of preserving the Union. However he fully recogniz$d 
the right of a State to secede and his sympathY,was with the 
South.16 The Secretary of War was opposed to the coercion 
of a State, thought the reinforcement of the garrisons in 
Charleston harbor very much the same as coercion, and would not 
consent to it., On the other hand, he declared that any attempt 
on the part of the people to take the forts he was bound to 
resist and would resist. 17 
38 
Not only was this the avowed policy of the Secretary of War, 
but his actions indicated that he opposed anything that could 
be interpreted by the South Carolinians as a change in the 
"status quo" of the forts. In the month of November Fort 
Moultrie's garrison was commanded by Colonel J. L. Gardner. 18 
A few days before the first of November, the Chief Engineer, 
J. G. Foster, had asked the War Department for forty muskets 
to arm the workmen in the forts, on the ground that he feared 
a possible assault. 19 There could be no better indication 
16. Hunt, Gaillard, ed., "Narrative and Letter of William 
Henry Trescot, rr .2E,. c1 t., p. 3. 
17. Ibid, pp 533, 53~ 
18. u:-3. War Department, The War of the Rebellion, Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, vol. 1 
p. 68, QUoted hereafter as Official Records. 





than this or the state or reeling among the people or 
Charleston, who inspired such rears in the Chier Engineer 
even berore the election of Lincoln. On November 1, the 
War Department asked the approval or Colonel Gardner for 
the issuance of the muskets, and he advised against it, on 
the ground that many of the workmen were secessionists. 20 
Colonel Gardner, in his reply to the Department on November 5, 
gave warning or the danger of assault and asked for reinforce-
ments in the following language: 
• • • The only proper precaution - that which has no 
objection - is to fill these two companies with drilled 
recruits (say firty men) at once, and send two companies 
from Old Point Comfort to occupy respectively Fort 
Sumter and Castle Pinckney.2l 
Thus it is clear that the War Department was aware of the -
situation, for here is a definite statement of the fac~s and 
a request of the commanding officer for reinforcements and 
for the occupation of the two unoccupied forts. The advice 
was not heeded; it was contrary to the Secretary of War's 
views on coercion. 
On November 6, F. J. Porter, Assistant Adjutant-General, 
was ordered by the Secretary of War to Charleston harbor to 
inspect the fortifications and troops. In his report or 
November 11, Porter, speaking of Fort Moultrie, said that 
39 
the unguarded state of the fort invited attack, needed strength-
ening without exciting the community, and that "all could ~ve 
been easily arranged weeks since, when the danger was foreseen 
by the present commander. Now much delicacy must be practiced. 
The garrison is weak, and I recommend that a favorable 
opportunity be taken to fill up the companies with the best 
20. Ibid, p. 68 
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drilled recruits available."22 Here was another request for 
reinforcements by the War Department's own special investi-
gating agent. These recommendations were made just a few 
days after General Scott had sent his views to the President, 
October 29, and asked for reinforcements. 23 Buchanan's 
objection to General Scott's views was that the four or five 
hundred men available would be a confession of weakness when 
distributed among the nine Southern forts, but judging from 
the requests of Col. Gardner and F. J. Porter, there were 
plenty of men available for reinforcing the forts in the 
critical danger zone. 
Why were not the forts in Charleston harbor alone rein-
forced? Surely this line of action presented itself to the 
President's consideration. He took the responsibility upon 
himself when writing in 1866 of his refusal to follow Gen. 
Scott's advice, he said: 
This refusal is attributed, without the least cause, to 
the influence of Governor Floyd. All my Cabinet must bear 
~l me witness that I was the President myself, responsible 
for all the acts of my administration; and certain it is 
that during the last six months previous to the 29th of 
December, the day on which he resigned his office, after my 
request, he exercised less influence ~i the administration 
than any other member of the Cabinet. 
Thus it must have been Buchanan's own policy, as well as 
Floyd's, not to send reinforcements to Charleston harbor, when 
there we~men available for those particular forts, and two 
separate official requests for them. The President's 
22. Official Records, 2£. £!1. pp. 70,71. 
23. See page 8 








__ • __ ~_c __ .~_~ _______ ~~-______________ -----........ --
responsibility becomes all the more serious when it is 
remembered that at that time the secession ordinance had not 
even been passed, and the sending of a few additional 
soldiers would have been merely a matter of routine. The 
South Carolina military forces were not yet organized 
sUfficiently for successful resistance to reinforcement. The 
eXplanation must be in Buchanan's fear that such an attempt 
must produce a collision and inaugurate a civil war. As Floyd 
thought reinforcement bordered on coerCion, sO the President 
must have thought that it was aggression. When later comparing 
his policy with Lincoln's, he said: 
The true policy was that expressed by President Lincoln' 
to the seceded states in his inaugural months afterward, 
in which he informs them, 'you can have no conflict without 
being yourselves the aggressors. t25 
The removal of the commanding officer in Fort Moultrie was, 
according to both Northern and Southern opinion, a concession 
to the insurgents in Charleston. The Southern opinion was 
that Colonel Gardner was removed because of his requests for 
reinforcements, and that the order to F. J. Porter to inspect 
the forts and report on conditions in Charleston was simply 
an excuse to get rid of an efficient commander.26 Porter's 
report, made to the War Department November 11, in the main 
approved the conduct of Col. Gardner, but there were references 
to "a laxity of discipline" and a reference to the facilitation 
of certain matters given a "proper commander".27 If there was 
no connection between this inspection and report, it was a 
25~ Ibid, p. 165 
26. Nicolay and Hay, Vol. 2, 2£. £!l. p. 345. 
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rare coincidence that on the next day, November 12, Major 
Robert Anderson received a message £rom A4jutant-General 
Cooper, saying that the Secretary o£ War desired to see him 
and to proceed to Washington and report to him without 
unnecessary delay.28 Major Anderson was a Kentuckian with 
Southern sympathies, had married a Georgia woman who owned 
slaves, and there can be little doubt that he was put in 
command in Charleston harbor to appease the Charlestonians. 29 
Ca~tain Abner Doubleday, the second in command under Major 
Anderson, later recorded his suspicion ,that Floyd thought 
the new oommander oould be relied on to carry out the 
Southern programme. 30 Another o£fioer, Captain James Chester, 
was o£ the same opinion, saying that Anderson was appointed 
because he was expected to be reasonable, and that i£ he had 
scruples upon the question of qualified allegianoe, he might 
surrender on demand, on purely pro£essional grounds. 3l The 
Assistant-Secretary of State, who was quite close to Floyd, 
and whose evidence should carry weight, also stated, a £ew 
days after Col. Gardner's removal, that it had been done 
beoause o£ Gardner1s removal o£ ammunition from the arsenal 
in Charleston to Fort Moultrie.32 
To show the urgent need either £or reinforoement of the 
£orts, or a policy o£ appeasement, we have a startling report 
42 
o£ the military storekeeper at the Federal arsenal in Charleston. 
28. Official Records, Vol. I, p. 72 
29. Crawford,~. cit. p. 61 
30. Battles andLeacrers of the Civil War, Vol. I, p. 41 
31. !2!£, p. 51 
32. Crawford, 22. £li. p. 85 
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On November 12, the same day that Major Anderson was notified 
to report 1mmediat~ly to the Secretary of War, the military 
storekeeper at the arsenal wrote the War Department as follows: 
In view of the excitement now existing in this city and 
. State, and the possibility of an insurrectionary movement 
on the part of the servi~e population, the governor has 
tendered ••• a guard of South Carolina Militia ••• a 
lieutenant and twenty men for this post, which has been 
accepted. 33 
Brevet-Colonel Benjamin Huger, who was ordered to replace 
Humphreys in charge of the arsenal, in a report of November 
20 approved the course of Humphreys in accepting the South 
Carolina guard.54 This appointment was also in line with 
the appeasement programme. Huger was a native of South 
Carolina, and from his ability, high social standing and 
prominent social relations, he was expected to be a suitable 
apPointment.35 In this connection it is pertinent to refer 
to an alleged conversation between S. W. Crawford and General 
De Saussure. De Saussure, at one time commanding the State 
forces in Charleston, declared that he was told by Colonel 
Huger that the latter took charge of the arsenal as a sort 
of envoy from Mr. Buchanan and General Scott; that he had been 
assured that the status of the forts would not be changed. 56 
Whatever the expectations of the War Department or the 
Administration were as to a conciliatory policy on the part 
of Major Anderson, his first report after taking command was 
much in the vein of his predecessor's. In his report to the 
33. Official Records, vol. 1, p. 72 
34. Ibid, p. 74 
35. Crawford,~. cit., p. 119. 





War Department of November 23, soon after taking command, he 
referred to his verbal instructions from the Secretary of 
War to inspect the .forts', but said that as Porter had alr~ady 
made a report in relation to them, he would refer to other 
matters of great importance, "if the Government intends 
holding themtt • 37 This last phrase is worthy of refle ction. 
Did Major Anderson's conversation with Floyd leave him with 
the impression that the Government might go so far in con-
ciliation that the forts would be given up if assaulted? Or 
did the surprising weakness o.f the forts give him the idea? 
In a rather lengthy report he gave such an alarming view of 
things that one may easily wonder why immediate and positive 
action was not forthCOming on the part of the Government. 
Said the Commander: 
The garrison now in it (Moultrie) is so weak as to invite 
an attack, which is openly and publicly threatened. We 
are about sixty, and have a line of rampart of 1,500 feet 
in length to defend. If beleaguered, as every man of the 
command must be el'ther engaged or held on the alert, they 
will be exhausted and worn down in a few days and n!~ts 
of such service as they would then have to undergo. 
Again: 
The clouds are threatening, and the storm may break upon 
us at any moment. I do, then, most earnestly entreat that 
a reinforcement be immediately sent to this garrison, and 
that at least two companies be sent at the same time to 
Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney ••• I feel the full respon-
sibility of making the above suggestions, because I firmly 
believe that as soon as the people of South Carolina learn 
that I have demanded reinforcements, and that they have 
been order~a, they will occupy Castle Pinckney and attack 
this fort. 
37. Official Records, Vol. I, p. 74 
38. Ibid. 
39. !bid, p. 75. 
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Now, Major Anderson had done h1s duty, but- he had said 
the wrong thing for h1as requests to be granted. He admitted 
that reinforcements would provoke an 1mmediate attack by 
South Caro11na military forces. This was what President 
Buchanan, above all else, was anxious to avoid. It was con-
40 trary to his fundamental policy. It was contrary to Floyd's 
stand on reinforcements. He had said to the Assistant 
Secretary of State at just about that time that if the latter 
thought that collision between the people of South Carolina 
and the Government forces would 'be precipitated, "he would not 
consent that a man nor a gun should be sent to any of the 
forts in the harbor of Charleston".4l On November 28 and • 
December 1 Major Anderson again renewed his requests. 42 On 
the latter date Major Anderson received h1s refusal through 
the Adjutant-General, S. Cooper, who wrote: 
It is believed, from information thought to be reliable, 
that an attack will not be made on your connnand, and the 
Secretary has only to refer to his conversation with you# 
and to caution you that, should his convictions unhappily 
prove untrue, your actions must be such as to be free from 
the charge of init1ating a collision. If attacked, you are, 
of course, expected to defend the trust committed to you 
to the best of your ability. 
The increase of the forces under your command, however 
much to be des1red, would, the Secretary thinks, judging 
from the recent excitement produced on account of an 
anticipated increase, as mentioned in your letter, but add 
to that excitement, and might lead to ser10us results. 43 
The commander, if attacked, was to defend himself to the 
best of his ability, but the Government in refusing to send 
reinforcements, was limiting his ability from the fear of 
40. See page 16 
41. Hunt, Gaillard, ed'., "Narrative and Letter of William 
Henry Trescot tl , ,22. cit. p. 535. 
42. Official .. Records,-vol. I, pp. 78,79,81, 82. 




serious results. Buchanan approved this course whole-heartedly. 
His feeling was that South Carolina was at that time the only st~~ 
advocating secession, and that had collision been the result 
of reinforcement, the other cotton States would have rushed to 
the support of South Carolina, thus realizing her long sought 
object. He believed that South Carolina was seeking the 
spilling of a little blood in order to secure the cooperation 
of the other cotton States.44 
Another instance that gave evidence of the paramount 
desire on the part of the War Department to do absolutely 
nothing that could be interproted as a hostile movement toward 
the State of South Carolina was the case of the forty muskets 
already referred to.45 Although Col., Gardner advised against 
the issuance of the muskets to the workmen, the order was 
approved by the Secretary of War, but held in abeyance in the 
files of the Charleston arsenal.46 On November 30 the Chief. 
Engineer in charge of the repairing of Fort Moul ~r'ie, notified 
the War IDepartment that he intended to use the old order for 
the forty muskets and more if Col. Huger, in charge of the 
arsenal, would agree to let him have them. 47 In this communi-
cation he disagreed with Major Anderson's report of November 
23.48 He thought that the sending of reinforcements would not 
have produced a collision of arms, while the Major believed 
a collision would have fOllowed. No plainer charge of a 
neglect of duty on the part of the Administration could have 
44. Buchanan, James, 22,. ill. pp. 163, 164. 
45. See page 22. 
46. Official Recordsd Vol. I, p. 68 
47. Ibid, p. 80 
48. ~page 27. 
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been made. Wrote the Chief Enginner, Lieutenant J. G. Foster, 
to his superior, De Russy: 
47 
I think that more troops should have been sent here to 
guard the forts, and I believe that no serious demonstration 
on the part of the populace would have met such a course. 
But, as it is decided not to do this, and to rely instead 
upon the Engineer employes for the protection of'the public 
property, I shall do everything in my power to carry out 
this purpose. I shall, of oourse, exercise the neoessary 
amount of prudenoe, and avoid'any appearance of armingz. as 
I conoeive this to be the wish of the War Department.4~ 
If the forts were to be proteoted as publio property only, it 
seemed that it was up to the engineer workmen to do it. 
President Buchanan, just three or four days after Foster's 
denunoiat.ion of Government policy, explained that po1ioy in 
his annual address to Congress of Deoember 4, 1860. Speaking 
of the publio property in Charleston harbor, he said that he 
did not believe that any attempt would be made to expel the 
United States from that property by foroe, but if events 
should prove him wrong, the offioer in command had orders to 
aot striotly on the defensivej that if an attaok was made, the 
responsibility for consequenoes would rightfully rest upon 
the heads of the assailants. 50 Thus, i.t was acting on the 
defensive to refuse to send reinforoements, which were apparent-
ly needed to make a suooessful defense of the publio property. 
At any rate, the Chief Engineer obtained his forty muskets by 
virtue of the previous order on file at the arsenal. They 
were transferred to Forts Sumter and Castle Pinokney on 
Deoember 17, without oausing any excitement, according to 
Major Anderson's report. 51 But on the same day that Major 
49. Official ~eoords, Vol. I, p. 81 
50. Riohardson, J. D., ~. cit., Vol. ~ p. 635 
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Anderson made his report, the military storekeeper at the 
arsenal addressed a note to the Chief Engineer, stating that 
the transfer of the muskets had caused intense excitement, 
and that Col. Huger had assured the Governor of the State 
that no arms would be removed from the arsenal and pledged 
his word that the arms should be returned at once. 52 The 
Chief Engineer refused to return them. 53 
On December 19, W. H. Trescot, w~ had recently resigned 
as Assistant Secretary of State, and had assumed his new role 
as special negotiator for South Carolina, received the follow-
ing telegram from Charleston: 
48 
Captain Foster yesterday removed forty muskets from the arsenal 
in Charleston to Fort Moultriej great excitement prevailsj 
telegraph to have the arms instantly returned, or a collision 
may occur at any moment. Three days will determine, in con-
vention, peace or war, and this act, not instantly countermanded 
by telegraph will be decisive. Not a moment's time should be 
lost. Telegraph immediately to me. 54 
The threat brought results. On the same day that Trescot 
received his telegraph message, the Secretary of War telegraphed 
Major Anderson: "I have just telegraphed Captain Foster to 
return any arms that he may have removed from Charleston 
Arsenal. p55 If the public property was to be defended, it was 
not Onll to be done, if at all, by the. engineer workmen) /Jilt ~/~o 
wt"f4o u s ,,;;/ e/eNf t1 rAt S. , 
Another example, although seemingly trivial, will show the 
Government's policy of appeasement. Toward the latter part of 
November, an aplication was made by an adjutant of a South 
Carolina regiment to the engineer officer at Moultrie for his 
52. Crawford, 22. cit. p. 77 
53. Official RecorQS7 Vol. I, p. 97 
54. Hunt, Gaillard, "Narrative and Letter of William Henry 
Trescot", QQ. cit. p. 539. 
55. Official ReCords, Vol. I, p. 98 
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rolls, ~or the purpose o~ enrolling the men ~or military duty 
~or the State. Major Anderson wrote to the War Department 
asking what he should do i~ the State authorities should de-
mand ~rom Captain Foster men whom they might have enrolled 
into the service o~ the State. 56 On December 14 came the 
reply o~ the Secretary o~ War: 
I~ ~he State authorities demand any o~ Captain Foster's 
workmen on the ground o~ their being enrolled into the 
service o~ the State, and the subject is re~erred to you, 
you will, a~ter ~ully satisfying yoursel~ that the men 
are subject to enrollment, and have been properly enrolled 
under the laws o~ the United States, and o~ the State o~ 
South Carolina, cause them to be delivered up or su~~ert4eM 
to depart. 57 
Major Anderson was so surprised at the attitude o~ the 
Secretary o~ War that he ~elt the latter must have misunder-
stood his question. In a reply o~ December 18 we can read 
the Major's astonisbment between the lines: 
As I understood it, the South Carolina authorities sought 
to enroll as a part o~ their army intended to act against 
the ~orces o~ the United States, men who are employed by 
and in the pay o~ that Government, and could not, as I 
conceived, be enrolled by South Carolina "under the ll-ws o~ 
the United States and o~ the State o~ South Carolina. 58 
Major Anderson had also asked the War Department ~or 
authority to level the sand hills and remove some houses which 
rendered the defense o~ Fort Moultrie extremely di~~icult.59 
J 
In the same communication ~rom the War Department of December 
14, regarding the enrollment o~ the workmen, it was stated 
that under ordinary circumBtances the leveling o~ the sand 
hills, which commanded the ~ort, would not be considered as 
initiating a collision; but in the delicate state o~ the 
56. Craw~ord,~.~. p. 67 
57. Official Records, Vol. I, pp 82, 93 
58. Ibid, p. 94 
59. ~ciaJ Records, Vol. I, p. 88 
49 
popular mind, the question demanded the coolest and wisest 
judgment; that the leveling of the houses in anticipation of 
an attack might betray distrust, and prematurely bring on a 
collision. The advice was to await an attempted assault 
60 before taking the necessary measures for defense. In a 
letter to a friend, December 19, Major Anderson summed up 
his anomalous situation when he said that the fort (Moultrie) 
was a very weak one in its capacity of being defended and 
"it is surrounded by houses that I cannot burn or destroy 
until I am certain that I am to be attacked, and I shall not 
be certain of it until the South Carolinians are in possessionj 
but I have so little ammunition that I cannot waste it in 
destroying houses."6l In the same letter he lamented his 
lack of authority for leveling the sand hills, asserting that 
sharpshooters could pick off his little band of sixty men in 
a short time. 62 
This situation had been previously prepared by one of the 
most widely publicized episodes of the Government's appease-
ment policy. On December 8, the members of the South Carolina 
Congressional delegation who had not yet resigned their seats 
called on the President. They were John McQueen, WID. Porcher 
Miles, M. L. Bonham, W. W. Boyce, and Lawrence M. Keitt. 53 
Their purpose was stated in a written memorandum handed to the 
President in their second interview of December 9. The 
memorandum read: 
60. !'bid, p. 93 
61. Crawford,~. ill. p. 70 
62. Ibid. 
63. Curtis,~. cit. Vol. 2, p. 377 
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51 
In comp1iance with our statement to you yesterday, we 
now express to you our strong convictions that neither the 
constituted authorities nor anybody of the peop1e of the 
State of South Caro1ina wi11 either attack or mo1est the 
United States forts in the harbor of Char1eston previous1y 
to the action of the convention, and we hope and be1ieve, 
not unti1 an offer has been made through an accredited 
representative to negotiate for an amicab1e arrangement of 
a11 matters between the State and the Federa1 Government, 
provided that no reinforcements sha11 be sent into those 
forts, and their re1ative mi1itary status remain as at present. 64 
The importance of this communication is that it was the basis 
for most of the condemnationof Buchanan's p.o1icy, both North 
and South. The be1ief was genera1 throughout South Car01ina 
that the President had given a p1edge that the status of the 
forts wou1d not be changed prior to the secession of the State 
and the sending of accredited agents to negotiate for their 
possession. 65 Mr. Buchanan himself lateremphatica11y denied 
that he had given any p1edge and that he objected to the word 
"provided ff beoause it might give cause for be1ieving he had 
given a pledge "which he never wou1d make. n66 But the question 
of a p1edge seems to have been only an academic argument. It 
seems from the evidence that the interview resu1ted in the 
I 
equiva1ent of a pledge. The report of two of the Congressiona1 
delegation who ca1led on the President admitted Buchanan's 
refusa1 to give a forma1 pledge; but when the delegation em-
phasized a gent1emen's agreement that the relative mi1itary 
status of the forts wou1d be maintained, and asked Buchanan 
about the possibi1ity of his changing his mind and ordering 
reinforcements, the President said in·that case he wou1d first 
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It is to be remembered that these members of the South 
Carolina Congressional delegation, by their own admission, 
were not calling on the President as authorized agents of 
the State of South Carolina, but only as individuals. The 
President likewise let them know that he had no authority to 
make a pledge and that he was acting in an unofficial capacity 
in his discussions. 68 To substantiate the statement that the 
President made the equivalent of a pledge, we have his own 
admission of the fact in his reply to the South Carolina 
commissioners of December 31, 1860. To use the President's 
own words, he said: 
But I acted in the same manner I would have done had I 
entered into a positive and formal agreement with parties 
capable of contracting, although such an agreement would 
have been, on my part, from the nature of my official 
duties, impossible. 69 
Another admission in this s~e communication explains the 
bewilderment of Major Anderson and his officers at their 
neglect by the Administration. The President stated that it 
was a well known fact, freely admitted, that it was his 
determination not to reinforce the forts in the harbor ahd 
thus produce a collision, until they had been actually attack-
ed, or until he had certain evidence that they were about to 
be attacked. 70 If the Government did not have sufficient 
evidence that the forts would be attacked if they were not 
surrendered after the ordinance of secession was passed, then 
Major Anderson and his subordinate officers should have been 
68. CurtiS, 2£. £!l. Vol. 2, p. 386 





removed on the grounds of willfully misinforming the 
Government or of being incapable of sound judgment. For on 
December 9, the very day that the South Carolina delegation 
gave the President the written proposition for maintaining 
the relative status of the forts, Major Anderson had report-
ed that the attention of the South Carolinians seemed to be 
turned more toward Fort Sumter than it had been and that 
probably their first act would be to take possession of that 
work. 71 The danger of attack seemed to be so imminent that 
Anderson thought it might be advisable to destroy the 
ammunition, except what might be required for the defense of 
Moultrie and the armament of Sumter and Castle Pinckney, 
rather than let it fall into the possession of South Carolina. 
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CHAPTER III 
MAJOR ANDERSON TRANSFERS HIS COMMAND 
FROM FORT MOULTRIE TO SUMTER 
, -
It ~s been already noted that as soon as Major Anderson 
arrived in Charleston harbor and inspected the rorts, he' made 
his rirst report or November 23, in which he asked that the 
two unoccupied rorts, Castle Pinckney and Sumter, should be 
garrisoned. l In ract, he immediately saw the superior lo-
cation or Fort Sumter ror the derense or the harbor. He 
believed that Sumter was the key or entrance to the harbor, 
its guns commanded Fort Moultrie and could drive out its 
occupants, and should be garrisoned at once.2 Major Anderson's 
insistence that Fort Sumter should be garrisoned did not pro-
ceed rrom a soldier's impulse to invite a conrlict. He 
thought that the occupation and strengthening or the two other 
rorts would prevent an attempt or the South Carolina rorces 
to occupy them, and thus avoid a collision or arms and a 
civil war. His attitude toward the south and war was express-
ed on December 11 in a letter to Robert N. Gourdin, a rriend 
and leading secessionist in Charleston: 
You need no assurance rrom me that, although I am exert-
ing myselr to make this little work as strong as possible 
and to put my handrul of men in the highest state or dis-
cipline, no one will do more than I am willing to do to 
keep the South in the right and to avoid the shedding of 
blood. You may be somewhat surprised at the sentiment I 
express, being a soldier, that I think an appeal to arms 
and to brute rorce is unbecoming the age in which we live. 
1. See pa.ge 27. 
2. Crawford, 22. £li. p. 62 
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Would to God that the time had come when there should be 
no war, and that religion and peace should reign through-
out'the world.3 
55 
In several or his reports to the War Department he express-
ed his anxiety concernirg the threat or Fort Sumter's being 
taken by the rorces or South Carolina. He also expressed a 
desire ror derinite written instructions, as he had nothing 
but the verbal instructions or the Secretary or War to guide 
him. His communication to the War Department or December 1, 
1860, emphasizes his rears inspired by the visit or the 
Assistant Surgeon Crawrord to Charleston. Rererring to 
Crawrord's report or the situation in Charleston, Major 
Anderson writes: 
He (Crawrord) says that never until today did he believe 
that our position was critical. One or his rriends told 
him that we would have trouble in less than rirteen days. 
He thinks that they'will rirst attempt to take Fort Sumter, 
which they (justly) say will control this work. Castle 
Pinckney they regard as theirs already. Mr. King, the 
intendant or this island, told the doctor that as soon as 
the act or secession was passed a demand would be made on 
me to surrender this rort. All these remarks lead to the 
same conclusion - a rixed purpose to have these works. 
The question ror the Government to decide - and the sooner 
it is done the better - is, whether, when South Carolina 
secedes, these forts are to be surrendered or not. Ir 
the rormer, I must be inrormed or it, and instructed what 
course r am to pursue. rr the latter be the determination, 
no time .is to be lost in either sending troops, as already 
suggested, or vessels or war to this harbor. Either or 
these courses may cause some or the doubting states to join 
South Carolina.4 
Again the commander joins his request ror reinrorcements with 
the" opinion that such an action might encourage the secession 
or other States. No thing could have been surer to cause 
the President to hesitatej this was in opposition to his 
3. Ibid. p. 69 















fundamental policy of doing nothing to encourage the se-
cession movement. 
As the time was fast approaching when South Carolina's 
Secession Convention was to meet, and as the result was a 
foregone conclusion, the Government felt it urgent that 
Major Anderson should have some additional and written 
instructions to guide his conduct. Accordingly, Major Don 
Carlos Buell, an officer of the Adjutant-General's Department l 
was selected by the War Department to proceed to Charleston 
and convey the instructions to Major Anderson. 5 The reali-
zation of the urgency of sending orders l however, seems to 
have been the result of Major Anderson's repeated entreaties. 6 
The subject of orders had been discussed in the Cabinet around 
December 7, but the nature of the instructions had not been 
agreed upon, being left solely to the responsibility of the 
Secretary of War, Floyd.7 Because of the crisis produced by 
Anderson's future conduct, and because Buchanan's Secretary 
of State, J. S. Black, defended Anderson on the basis of 
these instructions, it is deemed essential to quote them in 
full. It is to be remembered that they were communicated 
verbally to Major Buell, but he, impressed with the importance 
of the occasion and the responsibility of the Commander of 
Moultrie l took it upon himself to commit them to writing. 8 
The written instructions were not the literal record of the 
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interpretation of the Secretary's intentions, adapted to the 
conditions of things.9 The written form of the order was 
approved, however, by the Secretary of WarlO and were as 
follows: 
You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of 
War that a collision of the troops with the people of 
this State shall be avoided, and of his studied deter-
mination to pursue a course with reference to the military 
force and forts in this harbor which shall guard against 
such a collision. He has therefore carefully abstained 
from increasing the force at this point, or taking any 
measures which might add to the present excited state of 
the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the 
confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt, 
by violence, to obtain possession of the public works or 
interfere with their occupancy. But as the counsel and 
acts of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint 
those expectations of the Government, he deems it proper 
that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so 
unhappy a contingency. He has therefore directed me 
verbally to give you such instructions. 
You are carefully to avoid every act which would needless-
ly tend to provoke aggression; and for that reason you are 
not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up 
any position which c'ould be construed into the assumption 
of a hostile attitude. But you are to hold possession of 
the forts in this harbor, and if attacked you are to defend 
yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your 
force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than 
one of the three forts, but an attack on or attempt to take 
possession of anyone of them will be regarded as an act 
of hostility, and you may then put your command into either 
of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power 
of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar 
steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to 
proceed to a hostile act.ll 
57 
Thus, we see that in the last sentence of the first 
paragraph, that originally the orders were to be given verbally. 
It is probable that Buell's sympathy with Anderson in his 
delicate position outweighed his directions from the Secretary 
of War, and caused him to commit them to writing. After a 
9. Ibid. 
10. OffIcial Records, Vol. I, p. 103 
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careful consideration of Anderson's secret desire to occupy 
Fort Sumter, one might wager that the last sentence of the 
instructions was added at Anderson's request. Certain 
writers have taken the extremely suspicious view that the 
instructions were purposely ambiguous and meant to subtly 
prepare Anderson's mind for an easy surrender; that they were 
the treacherous work of a secession conspiracy in Washington. l2 
Another historian, considered reliable, does not agree with 
such a theory, and believes tllat the policy of the Government 
being what it was, it is difficult to see how the instructions 
could be improved upon. 13 
58 
One ground for the conspiracy charge is that the instructions 
were kept secret from General Scott; in fact, up to December 
28, the whole conduct of military affairs in Charleston harbor 
had been withheld from the knowledge of the Chief of Staff 
14 of the Army. Another reason giwen for doubting Floyd's loyal-
t¥ is that he did not refer the instructions to t he President 
before communicating them to Anderson. It is true that the 
President was not aware of the instructions until December 21,,15 
but as they were more aggressive than the President's policy, 
he ordered them amended to a more defensive nature. 16 It 1s 
diffucult to consider the instructions in any other light than 
the repetition of a policy of appeasement to avoid armed 
host11ities; yet, considering the threats of aggression evidenced 
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his command to Fort Sumter was in the last sentence of 
Buell's memorandum, as was to be pointed out later by 
Secretary of State Black. The orders given by Buell to 
Major Anderson contained no hint that the forts were to be 
turned over to South Carolina. 
Things were now on the move in South Carolina. On the 
morning of December 17, the Convention met at Columbia. 
Mr. D. F. Jamison, its President, closed his inaugural speech 
wit~ advice to the South: "To darel and again to darel and 
without end to darel"17 South Carolina had just elected a 
new Governor, Francis W. Pickens, who was inaugurated on 
on the same day the Convention met. lS The new Governor 
immediately dispatched a special messenger to Washington 
with a message to the President on the subject of the forts.19 
. After stating that the forts in Charleston harbor were being 
pr~pared to turn their guns upon the city, the Governor 
asserted that such preparation might be proper in case of 
an ordinary mob rebellion, but not so when the people of a 
sovereign State were in convention assembled to resume their 
original powers of separate and individual sovereignty. He 
asked that all work on the forts be stopped and no more force 
ordered there. Referring to the fact that the arsenal in 
Charleston had been turned over to the keeping of a State 
force at the request of the Governor, it was asked that the 
State be allowed to take possession of Fort Sumter to give 
a feeling of safety to the community. Then came a sort of 
threat when Governor Pickens said: "If something of the kind 
be not done, I cannot answer for the consequences".20 The 
17. Crawford,~. £!i., p. 45 
18. Nicolay ana-Hay, 2£. £!i., vol. 3, pp. 1,2 
19. Ibid, p.a 
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Assistant Secretary of State, whose resignation had not yet 
become final received this message and was the intermediary 
agent; and through him the President was to give an answer 
to this threat of Governor Plckens. 21 
There is a record of this episode left by the President 
himself. The following memorandum in the President's own 
hadnwriting describes what took place at the meeting between 
the President and the Governor's messenger: 
On Thursday morning, December 20th, 1860, Hamilton, late 
marsl~l of South Carolina, sent especially for this purpose, 
presented me a letter from Governor Pickens, in the presence 
of Mr. Trescot, dated at Columbia, South Carolina, 17th 
December (Monday). He was to wait until this day (Friday 
afternoon) for my answer. The character of the letter will 
appear from the answer to it, which I had prepared. Thursday 
night, between nine and ten o'clock, Mr. Trescot called upon 
me. He said that he had seen Messrs. Bonham and McQueen of 
the South Carolina delegation; that they all agreed that 
this letter of Governor Pickens was in violation of the 
pledge which had been given by themselves not to make an 
assault upon the forts, but leave them in statu quo until 
the result of an application of commissioners to be apPointed 
by the State was known; that Pickens, at Columbia, could 
not have known of the arrangements. They, to wit, Bonham, 
McQueen, and Trescot, had telegraphed to Pickens for authority 
to withdraw his letter. 
Friday morning, 10 o'clock, 21st December. - Mr. Trescot 
called upon me with a telegram, of which the following is a 
copy from that which he delivered to me: 
December 21st, 1860. - You are 'authorized and requested to 
to withdraw my letter sent by Doctor Hamilton immediately. 
Mr. Trescot read to me from the same telegram, that 
Governor Pickens had seen Mr. Cushing. The letter was 
accordingly withdrawn.22 
It will be seen in this memorandum of the President that 
the members of the South Carolina Delegation stated that they 
had given a pledge not to make an assault on the forts, and 
probably they would not have made this pledge unilaterally 
21. Ibid. p. 83. 
22. Curtis,'2E. £!i. vol. 2, pp. 383,384. 
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without the agreement of the President not to change the 
status of the forts. In his prepared reply to the letter 
of Governor Pickens, the President stated that he had "de-
clined for the present to reinforce these forts, relying 
on the honor of South Carolinians that they will not be 
assaulted whilst they remain in their present condition".23 
This question of a pledge made by the President is very 
important in the light of later developments. Q;>e8!f;tt;e the 
Ppe8t~8Rt is very important the light of later developments~ 
Despite the President's denial of a formal pledge the 
evidence seems to show that he did make the equivalent. Even 
Judge Black, the President's Attorney-General and later 
Secretary of State, hesitated to assert that he didn't make 
this pledge. When S. W. Crawford, in an interview with 
Black, asked: "Well, then, Judge Black, there appears to be 
but one inference to be drawn, but one conclusion to be 
reached; the President did make that agreement." Judge Black 
always faithful to Buchanan, replied: "Remember, that is 
your conclusion.,,24 
Of course, the President's prepared reply was not sent, 
61 
as Governor Pickens' letter was withdrawn. The reply, however, 
shows a consistency of policy reminding the Governor of the 
risks he had incurred and would still incur to prevent any 
armed hostilities. But he rejected the idea that he had any 
power to surrender Fort Sumter, or any of the other forts or 
public property in South Carolina to any human being. As he 
23. Nicolay and Hay, 2£. £li. vol. 3, p. 5 
24. Crawford, 2£. £!1. p. 25 
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had said in his address to Congress of December 4, it was 
a matter for Congress to decide. 25 The letter shows the 
confusion in the President's mind when he flatly rerused to 
"acknowledge the independence of that State" and yet had 
expressed a willingness to refer the future commissioners 
of that State to Congress, which seemed to be an implied 
26 recognition of independence. But he did warn the Governor 
that any attack on the forts would mean war, saying: 
If South Carolina should attack any of these forts, she 
will then become the assailant in a war against the United 
States. It will not then be a question of coercing a 
State to remain in the Union, to which I am utterly opposed, 
as my message proves, but it will be a question of voluntar-
ily precipitating a conflict of arms on her part, without 
even consulting the onlY2,uthority which possesses the power 
to act upon the subject. 
According to the testimony of Trescot. a principal in the 
events just related, President Buchanan expressed his pleasure 
at the withdrawal of the Governor's letter, repeated over 
and over his desire to avoid collision, his readiness to re-
ceive commissioners, to refer them to Congress in good faith, 
and his determination not to disturb the status of the forts, 
but to aw~it the result of negotiation. He was pledged not 
to disturb the status in favor of the United States, and the 
Governor could not justly ask him to disturb it in favor or 
the State. He was acting under the obligations of his honor 
and would redeem it to the uttermost. 28 In a letter of 
December 21, to Governor Pickens, Trescot thanked the latter 
for withdrawing the letter, restating all the concessions 
61 
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Buchanan had already made, saying that such a course had 
been violently denounced by the Northern press, and that 
an effort was being made to institute a Congressional 
investigation. Then there were hopes for the future. Said 
Trescot: 
At that moment he could not have gone to the extent of 
action you desired, and I felt confident that, if forced 
to answer your letter then, he would have taken such 
ground as would have prevented his even approaching it, 
hereafter - a possibility not at all improbable and which 
ought to be kept open. 29 
In order to allay the fears of the Governor, Trescot, in the 
same letter, said that he had seen the Secretary of War 
that morning, and no orders had been issued that would at 
all disturb the "present condition" of the garrisons. 30 Had 
the instructions of December 11 been forgotten? 
These December days were indeed crowded ones for the 
President. The day after Governor Pickens had addressed his 
$. 
letter to the President demanding posses}on of the forts, 
President Buchanan, December 18, had addressed one to the 
Governor, asking tlmt the secession of the State of South 
Carolina might be stayed "so long as to allow the people of 
her sister States an opportunity to manifest their opinion 
upon the causes which have led to this proceeding. ,,31 This 
message was sent by Caleb Cushing, also entrusted with a 
secret mission, believed to have been to persuade the Con-
vention to postpone secession until after the 4th of March. 
Mr. Cushing also informed the Governor that there was no 
intention to change the status of the forts in the harbor in 
29. Ibid, pp 85, 86. Full text of Trescot's letter. 
30. !bIQ'. 
31. IICOlay and Hay, 2£. £!i. vol. 3, p. 11 
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any way.32 Of course, this mission was a failure, for the 
Convention had met on the 17th of December with the irrevoc-
able determination to secede from the Union. The irony of 
it all was that he reached his destination just in time to 
be invited by a joint committee of both Houses of the 
Legislature to attend the solemn ceremonies of the signing 
of the Ordinance of Secession. This invitation he declined. 33 
The Ordinance was signed on December 20, and on ~cember 22 
the Convention elected by ballot three commissioners, Robert 
w. Barnwell, James H. Adams, and James L. Orr to be sent 
forthwith to Washington, "to treat with the Government of 
the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, 
light-house:;!, and other real estate, with their appurtenances, 
within the limits of South Carolina.,,34 
Pressure was being brought on Governor Pickens for the 
1mmediate seizure of the forts. 35 Major Anderson was aware 
of this popular excitement, and on the same day that the 
commdssioners were appointed, December 22, he was writing 
the War Department: 
No one can tell what will be done. They may defer action 
until their Commissioners return from Washingtonj or if 
apprised by the nature of the debates in Congress that their 
demands will not probably be acceded to, they may act with-
out waiting for them. 
I do not think that we can rely upon any assurances, and 
wish to God I only had men enough here to man fully my guns. 
Our men are perfectly conscious of the dangerous position 
they are placed in, but are in as fine spirits as if they 
were certain of victory.36 
Major Anderson's fears were justified. On the same day that he 
32. Crawford, 2£. cit. p. 87. 
33. Ibid, p. 88 ---
34. Official Records, vol. I, p. III 
35. Crawford, 2£. ££i. p. 89. 
36. Official Records, vol. I, pp. lOS, 106. 






was deploring the fact that he had not men enough to man 
fully the guns of Fort Moultrie, the "Charleston Mercury" 
was boasting of, the fact that no reinforcements would be 
sent. It further' declared that when the forts were demanded 
and ~ot given up, the people would obey the call for war and 
take the forts. 37 No wonder Major Anderson was anxious, 
and we can imagine his reaction when he received at just 
about this time "a modification of his previous instructions 
38 of December 11. 
President Buchanan has claimed the responsibility for the 
change of Anderson's written orders of December 11, delivered 
to him by ~jor Buell.39 The President must have been alarmed 
at the phrase, flif attacked you will defend yourself to the 
last extremity". Having observed that phrase, the President, 
on December 21, the very day the orders first came to his 
notice, caused the Secretary of War to modify the instructions 
to "if attacked by a force so superior that resistance would, 
in your judgment, be a useless waste of life, it will be 
64 
your duty to yield to necessity, and make the best terms 1n 
your power~40 In fa1rness to Buchanan and Floyd 1t should 
perhaps be stated here that L1ncoln sent Major Anderson a 
message of the same nature, April 4, 1861.41 Such 1nstructions 
seemed only an act of humanity, and cons1dering the plight 
the garrison had been left in by the Government, such in-
struct10ns seem to have been the very least the Government 
37. Charleston Mercury, Dec. 22, quoted 1n, Greeley, Horace, 
American Conflict, Vol. 1, pp. 407,408. Hartford: Pub11shed 
by O.D. Case & Company. Chicago : Geo. & C. W. Sherwood 1865. 
38. Off1cial Records, Vol. 1, p. 103 
39. Buchanan, James, 2£ • .£li. p. 166. 
40. Official Records, Vol. 1, p. 103 





could have done to atone for what Black later called its 
"fatal error" of not reinforcing the forts at an early date. 
But it is a fact, verified by Major Anderson's daughter, 
that Major Anderson considered these instructions from Floyd 
of December 21 as an "infamous order" to give up the Fort 
without a fight, and to brand him in the eyes of the world 
as a traitor to his trust. 42 The secrecy of these orders and 
the closing paragraph, "These orders are strictly confidential 
and not to be9nommunicated even to the officers under your 
connnand without a clear necessit'1,ft43 probably contributed 
to this suspicion. 
Since the first report Major Anderson had made to the 
Gove'rnment, he had never ceased to stress the importance of 
garrisoning Fort Sumter. He believed it to be impossible 
for the Government to maintain any occupancy of the harbor 
if South Carolina should seize and garrison it. Daily threats 
were heard that his position would be attacked, and after the 
passage of the Ordinance of Secession these threats were more 
frequent and positive. A nightly watch with patrol boats was 
maintained by South Carolina lest he should transfer his 
connnand to Fort Sumter.44 He had orders to defend the forts 
in the harbor and the one he occupied was not in a state of 
defense. It was rumored that two thousand riflemen had been 
detailed to shoot down the troops from the houses which 
65 
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commanded the fort. 45 Anderson had always had a desire to 
throw his garrison into Sumter,46 and after Floyd's orders 
of the 21st of December, which he received on the 23rd, his 
desire was intensified. His daughter has stated that he 
made his transfer of command to escape the snare which he 
thought the Secretary of War had set for him.47 This was 
surely not the only reason, but it is possible that the new 
orders and Anderson's feeling toward them had something to 
do with the date of the transfer. He received these orders 
on December 23, and determined to make his move on December 
25, which was prevented by rains.48 He had orders not to 
make a useless resistance and needlessly sacrifice the 
lives of his men. The officers and men were of the opinion 
that in case of an attack from Charleston few of them would 
survive, but considered it a part of their business and were 
determined to make the best fight possible.49 Therefore, it 
would seem that not only to make a successful defense of the 
forts, but to protect the lives of his men as well, the 
transfer was to be made. In a telegram to Floyd the day 
after the transfer, Major Anderson declared that in spite of 
the orders of December 21 "the garrison would never have 
surrendered without a fight,"50 
It must be admitted that the move was in harmony at least 
with Floyd's orders to avoid a needless sacrifice of life, 
when it is. remembered that in the bombardment of Fort Sumter 
45. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 1, p. 42 
46. Crawford, 22. cit. p. 100 
47. Lawton, Eba Anae:rson, ~. £!i. p. 5 
48. Crawford, QE. cit. p. 102 
49. Battles ana-Leaders of the Civil War, p. 43. Statement of 
Captain Abner Doubleday, Second~in Command. 
50. Official Records, vol. I, p. 3 
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the garrison suf£ered not one casualty. It must also be 
remembered that Major Anderson was convinced that he had 
tangible evidence o£ a design to attack Fort Moultrie on 
the part o£ South Carolina,51 and his orders o£ December 11 
authorized him to occupy anyone of the forts when he had 
"tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act".52 
At any rate, he transferred his command £rom Moultrie to 
Sumter December 26. It was done with the utmost secrecy as 
was essential in order to escape the constant vigilance of the 
South Carolina patrols. On December 25 preparations £or the 
transfer were made under the guise o£ preparations £or a 
possible attack from Charleston. The packing of necessary" 
~ 53 
at~icles was done under plausible pretenses. Anderson kept 
the plan o£ mo~ement so secret that even his officers were 
given only twenty minutes notice.54 The soldiers disguised 
as laborers, the movement was effected in the night of 
December 26 without being suspected by the South Carolina 
guards. 55 Immediately after the move had been made, at 8:00 
P.M. on the night o£ December 26, 1860, Major Anderson 
addressed the £ollowing report to the War Department: 
I have the honor to report that I have just completed, 
by the blessing of God, the removal to this £ort (Sumter) 
o£ all of my garrison, except the surgeon, four non-
commissioned officers, and seven men. We have one year's 
supply of hospital stores and about four months supply of 
provisions for my command. I left orders to have all "the 
guns at Fort Moultrie spiked, and the carriages of the 
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to Captain Foster, who remains at Fort Moultrie, to 
destroy all the ammunition which he cannot send over. The 
step which I have taken was, io my opinion, necessary to 
prevent the effusion of blood. 56 
Early on the morning of December 27, the smoke rising 
from the burning gun carriages notified the people of 
Charleston that somethint was wrong at Fort Moultrie. The 
fact of the evacuation of the Fort was soon communicated to 
the authorities and people of Charleston, creating intense 
excitement. Crowds collected in the streets, military 
organizat1ons paraded, and threats were made that they 
would be heard from before twenty four hours and that blood-
shed was now unavoidable. Anderson was pronounced a traitor, 
and it was claimed that his act would concentrate the South. 57 
A committee from the Governor of South Carolina, headed by 
Colonel Pett1grew, was sent over to Fort Sumter to demand that 
he return to Fort Moultrie. After confessing that in the 
controversy between the North and the South, his sympathies 
were entirely with the South, but that his duty as commander 
of the harbor was first with him, Major Anderson rep11ed: 
"Make my compliments to the Governor, and say to him that I 
decline to accede to his request; I cannot and will not go 
back.,,58 The committee informed Major Anderson that there 
was an agreement between South Carolina and President Buohanan 
not to change the military status in the harbor, and that 
68 
this move to Fort Sumter was considered by them as reinforoement. 
Anderson replied that as far as any understanding of the sort 
56. Official Reoords, Vol. 1, p. 2 
57. Grawford, 2£. cit. pp. 108,109 















existing he had not been informed of it.59 
Now, disregarding the question of an understanding, it 
is certain beyond any doubt that Major Anderson had acted 
contrary to the policy and wisheS of both the President 
and the Secretary of War. The President admitted a few 
years after the event that he had determined not to disturb 
the status quo at Charleston as long as the troops remained 
in unmolested possession of the forts,60 but it should have 
been apparent to the President that as soon as this Ifmolesting" 
by overwhelming odds had been directed at about sixty men in 
an indefensible fort, it would have been too late to reinforce 
for their safety. The Secretary of War was opposed to the 
transfer to Sumter, and as soon as the news reached Washington, 
and before receiving Major Anderson's report of the 26th, Floyd 
telegraphed the Major on December 27: 
Intelligence has reached here this morning that you have 
abandoned Fort Moultrie, spiked your guns, burned the 
carriages, and gone to Fort Sumter. It is not believed, 
because there is no order f§l any such movement. Explain 
the meaning of this report. 
But had Floyd forgotten the orders of IDecember ll? Floyd 
had approved. Major Buell's written order that "you are also 
authorized to take similar steps (to put his command in any 
one of the forts) whenever you have tangible evidence of a 
design to proceed to a hostile act. n62 It was nowhere 
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be the judge of the "tangible evidence". 
On the same day that he received Floyd's telegram of 
censure, Major Anderson telegraphed the explanation called for: 
The telegram is correct. I abandoned Fo~t Moultrie 
because I was certain that if attacked my men must have 
been sacrificed, and the command of the harbor lost. I 
spiked the guns and destroyed the carriages to keep the 
guns from being used against us. If attacked, the 
garrison would never have surrendered without a fight. 53 
In the last sentence Anderson was evidently objecting to the 
orders of December 21, which he interpreted as an order to 
64 surrender Moultrie without putting up a resistance. Con-
sidering the text of the orders, Major Anderson seems to 
have had full authority to transfer his command, but still, 
there seems to have been some confusion on the point in his 
own mind, for at one time he wrote to a friend, on December 
27, that he had made the move on his own responsibility and 
not in obedience to orders from Washington. 65 He obviously 
was referring 'to an absence of immediate and specific orders 
to occupy Sumter at that particular time. In a letter of 
December 30, to his former rector, the Rev. R. B. Duane, he 
said: 
You see it stated that I came here without orders. Fear 
nott I am sure I can satisfy any tribunal I may be 
brought before, that I was fully justified in mOving my 
command. 66 
And President Buchanan, writing in 1866, justified Anderson 
when he said that the "President never doubted for a moment 
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'the tangible evidence' of an impending attack required 
by his instructions.,,67 
But this move was of the utmost importance and serious-
ness at the time, not only because it was in opposition to 
the avowed policy of the Government and South Carolina's 
belief in a pledge not to change the status quo, but on 
the very day the move was made, the .three commissioners 
71 
elected by the South Carolina Convention, to negotiate the 
question of the forts and public property, reached Washington. 68 
The commissioners arrived on December 26, and according to 
Buchanan, writing in 1866 a defense of his administration, 
it was through them that he received his first intelligence 
of the transfer to Fort Sumter. 69 The President recorded 
that he received this news with astonishment and regret. With 
astonishment, because he believed Major Anderson to be in 
security at Fort Moultrie and that he wouldn't make such a 
move, especially while the commissioners were on their way to 
Washington. With regret, because it would probably impel 
the other cotton States, and the border States, into active 
sympathy with South Carolina; that it would defeat the measures 
of compromise before the Committee of Fifteen of the Senate, 
and wreck his policy of confining secession to South Carolina 
alone. 70 There was no mention here of a pledge having been 
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w. H. Trescot, the former Assistant Secretary of state, 
who had recently resigned and was now acting as South 
Carolina's special manager of her interests in Washington, 
has left quite a different record of Buchanan's reaction to 
Major Anderson's sudden change of the status quo. He wrote 
his record jus~ a few weeks after the event and should have 
been less subject to errors of memory. Trescot has stated 
that on the morning of December 27, he, Jefferson Davis, 
and Senator Hunter of Virginia, called on Buchanan for an 
71 explanation of Major Anderson's move. Jefferson Davis 
told the President that he was surrounded with "blood and 
dishonor" on all sides. Buchanan called God to witness 
that they, better than anybody, knew that the move to Sumter 
was not only without, but against his orders. It was 
against his policy.72 Either he was at this time oblivious 
of the orders he had seen December 21, or he was, in his 
excited state, confusing his own polic~ with War Department 
orders. He was urged by these three gentlemen to restore the 
status by ordering Anderson back to Moultrie, which he de-
clined to do, although he seemed disposed to at first_ He 
said that he must call his Cabinet together, for he could not 
condemn Major Anderson unheard, and he postponed his meeting 
with the South Carolina commissioners until the next day.73 
The Secretary of War seemed to believe that Buchanan had made 
a pledge to South Carolina, for on the same day, December 27, 
72 
71. Hunt, Gaillard, ed. "Narrative and Letter of William Helll'T 
Trescot," 2£.. cit. p. 543. 
72. Hunt, Gaillard, ed. "Narrative and Letter of William Henry 
Trescot,"...JlP.. c.i:t. p. 539. 
73. Ibid, p. 544. 
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that Trescotl Davis l and Hunter called on the President l 
Floyd had a conversation with Major Buell l in which he 
said that Anderson's move bad made war inevitable and had 
compromised the President.74 
The Cabinet was called together immediately. At first 
all seemed to think that Major Anderson had acted without 
orders. Secretary Floyd vehemently repeated his accusation 
made to Anderson in the telegram of December 27, that he 
had disobeyed his instructions. At this point the Secretary 
of State l Judge Blackl suggested ,that the orders of December 
11 be sent forI and they were read in the presence of the 
President and the Cabinet, Black pointing out that the orders 
contained the endorsement of the Secretary of War for the 
75 move to Sumter. 
But there were other serious results of this transfer of 
command to Sumter, besides the frustration of the policy 
pursued by Buchanan and Floyd. It accentuated the hostile 
attitude of South Carolina toward the Government and inspired 
her to take drastic retaliatory measures. On December 27, 
immediately after Anderson's move to Sumter, the Governor of 
South Carolina issued to Colonel J. J. Pettigrew the following 
order: 
You are ordered to take possession of Castle Pinckney. 
You are to act with the greatest discretion and prudence, 
and to let it be known that you take possession in the 
name of the Governor of South Carolina, and in consequence 
of the extraordinary orders executed last night in relation 
to Fort Moultrie l and with a view at present to prevent 
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further destruction of public property, and as a measure 
of safety also. 76 
A similar order was issued to Lieutenant-Colonel 
De Saussure, to take possession of Sullivan's Island and 
Fort Moultrie. Both Moultrie and Castle Pinckney were thus 
taken the day after Anderson abandoned Fort Moultrie, all 
of thei~property and provisions being seized and appropri-
ated by South Carolina. 77 
On December 29, the Governor of South Carolina ordered 
Colonel John Cunningham to take a detachment of select men, 
and in the "most discreet and forbearing manner", proceed 
to the United States arsenal in Charleston and demand in 
his name its "entire possession". This was also done with 
"a view to prevent any destruction of public "'~f'band also 
as due to the public safety." So df)clared the Governor.78 
The Governor declared also that "I do not apprehend any 
difficulty in giving up the same, but if refused, then you 
are to take it, using no more force than may be absolutely 
necessary.,,79 No doubt the Governor's optimism was well 
warranted by the Government's past policy of appeasement, 
74 
and the consequent defenseless position of everything de-
manded. The arsenal was taken. Captain Humphreys surrendered 
it under protest, "as he had no force for its defense." He 
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allowed to occupy their quarters until instructions could be 
obtained from the 'War Department. This was granted and 
Colonel Cunningham began to issue the property of the 
United States arsenal to the soldiers of South Carolina. 80 
On December 29 Captain Humphreys, in a report to the War 
Department, complained that he had asked for instructions 
but had received none, that the arsenal was practically in 
a state of siege; that he would make a formal protest 
against the posting of sentinels around the arsenal and ask 
that they be removed unless otherwise instructed from the 
War Department. If his request was denied he would consider 
the arsenal occupied by the State, haul down his flag and 
surrender. 81 Just as Anderson had begged for some specific 
instructions and received none, so, it seems, a deaf ear 
was turned to Captain Humphreys, for on December 30, he sent 
a two-line report to the War Department, saying, "This 
arsenal has today been taken by force of arms. What dis-
position am I to make of my command~82 
On the same day, December 30, Fort Johnson and adjacent 
grounds were seized and occupied by South Carolina troops. 
A large supply of fuel, later badly needed by the Sumter 
Garrison, thus passed into the hands of South Carolina. 
Having now obtained possession of the unoccupied forts and 
the arsenal, measures were now taken by the Governor for the 
establishment of batteries for the control and defense of the 
harbor. 83 Explaining his course to D. F. Jamison, President 
80. Crawford, 2£.£!1. p. 122 
81. Official Records, Vol. I, p. 6 
82. Ibid. 











of the Convention, Governor Pickens definitely declared 
that there was a pledge on the part of the Buchanan 
Administration, and this pledge had been violated by Major 
Anderson. He considered the latter's action an act of 
aggression when he wrote: 
I considered the evacuat 10n of Fort Moul tria, under all 
the circumstances, a direct violation of the distinct 
understanding between the authorities of the Government at 
Washington, and those who were authorized to act on the 
part of this State, and bringing on a state of war. I 
therefore thought it due to the safety of the State that 
I should take the steps I have. I hope there is no 
irmnediate danger of further aggression for the present. 84 
Regardless of the interpretations placed upon the action 
of Major Anderson by South Carolina and the Government at 
Washington, the fact remains that he had by this action, 
although authorized, produced a crisis. Vlhile waiting for 
the reception of the South Carolina commissioners by the 
President, let us see what Major Anderson said about his 
alleged violation of a pledge and the status quo. On 
December 29 he wrote a long letter to his secessionist friend, 
Robert N. Gourdin, of Charleston, to whom he expressed himself 
rather frankly. He wrote: 
No one will regret more deeply than I shall, should it 
prove true that the movement I have made has complicated 
rather than disembarrassed affairs. There is an un-
accountable mystery in reference to this affair. I was 
asked by a gentleman within a day or two, if I had been 
notified by your Government that I would not be molested 
at Fort Moultrie, and when I replied that I had not been 
so notified, he remarked that he was glad to hear it, as 
it convinced him that I had acted in good faith, having 
just told him that I had not received such an intimation 
from my own Government. Now if there was such an under-
standing, I certainly ought to have been informed of it. 



















But why, if your Government thought that I knew of this 
agreement, was everything done which indicated an intention 
to attack? Why were armed steamers kept constantly on the 
watch for my movements? The papers say that I was under 
panic. That is a mistake; the moment I inspected my 
position I saw that the work was not defensible with my 
small command, and recommended weeks ago that we ought to 
be withdrawn. I remained, then, as long as I could under 
the fearful responsibility I felt for the safety of my 
command. 85 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSIONERS AND THE CABINET CRISIS 
At the time of the President's annual message to Congress, 
December 4, 1860, the Cabinet membership was unchanged. The 
President had the same Cabinet that he had originally 
appointed, with the exception of Joseph Holt, who, as has 
been noticed in the first chapter of this study, had been 
appointed to succeed Aaron V. Brown, deceased. l Cobb and 
Thompson were the only members of the Cabinet to disagree 
with the President's message, in particular that part of it 
which denied the right of secession. 2 Cobb was the first 
member to resign, December 8, 1860, and he was replaced by 
Philip F. Thomas, formerly Governor of Maryland.3 Cobb, in 
his letter of resignation, said that 'a sense of duty to the 
State of Georgia required that he should take a step which 
made it proper that he should no longer be a member of the 
Cabinet. He said that his remaining in the Cabinet would 
expose him to unjust suspicions. and put Mr. Buchanan in a 
false position. He said the evil had passed beyond control 
and must now be met by each and all under "our responsibility 
to God and country", and he believed that history would 
record Mr. Buchanan's administration as the last one of the 





Union and would place it "side by side with the purest and 
ablest of those that preceded it."4 Cobb was an ardent 
secessionist, and his action stands in bold contrast for 
honesty to that of the equally ardent secessionist, 
Thompson, who notified the President of his intention to 
resign at about the same time, but who remained as long as 
possible to use his influence in behalf of secession.5 
Now the President wanted his Cabinet to remain intact 
and all go out together at the end of his administration, 
and he felt keenly the necessary withdrawal of the Southern 
members. 6 An even more serious blow to the Administrationts 
policy, in the eyes of the North, was the resignation of 
Secretary of State Cass, the oldest and most prominent member 
of the Cabinet and the most insistent on the necessity of 
sending reinforcements to the forts in Charleston harbor. 
He sent in his letter of resignation December 12, 1860, and 
although he expressed his agreement with the Presidentts 
message and the theory that the Government had no power to 
coerce a State back into the Union, he made the basis of his 
resignation the President's refusal to reinforce the forts 
in Charleston harbor. "I continue to think", he said, "that 
these arrangements should be immediately made.,,7 In reply, 
the President said that as he believed that no necessity ex-
isted for a resort to force for the protection of the public -
4. Crawford, QQ. cit. p. 37 
5. Buchanan, Tame s;-.2E.. cit. p. 110 
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property, it was impossible for him to risk a collision of 
arms in the harbor of Charleston, which would have defeated 
the reasonable hope which he cherished of the final triumph 
of the Constitution and of the Union. 8 Cass was succeeded 
by the Attorney-General, Black, who was in turn replaced as 
Attorney-General by Black's friend and protege, Edwin M. 
Stanton. 9 Thus the difficulties in Charleston harbor were 
interfering with the President's personal desire to keep his 
Cabinet together to the end of his term of office and "all go 
out together." 
Now one of the most, if not the most, influential men in 
the Cabinet was Jeremiah S. Black. He was from Buchanan's 
own State and the President leaned on him for advice and 
trusted him. Although Black's advice to the President on 
November 20, the basis for Buchanan's constitutional 
argument on secession of December 4, was not all that might 
have been expected of a sincere Unionist that he was, no 
critic, however rabid, of the Buchanan administration has even 
hinted that Black was not able, sincere, and honest. Some 
writers on the period of history now under consideration be-
lieve that Black's more responsible po~ition as Secretary of 
State caused him to take a different view of the theory of 
coercion, and that he reversed his constitutional argument 
of November 20. 10 It has also been alleged that Black's 
8. Curtis, 2£. £!i., vol. 2, p. 398. 
9. Buchanan, James, 2£. ill. p. 110 
10. Burgess, 2£. £li. vol. 1, p. 89 
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friend, Stanton, who succeeded the former as Attorney-General, 
had some influence in this stronger view of the President's 
powers. ll However this may' be, in view of Black's opinion 
of the President's powers as to coercion given on November 20, 
and his firm policy as Secretary of State, there can be no 
doubt there was an intervening political metamorphosis. 
As the Secretary of State was to be the decisive factor 
in the coming interview between the President and the South 
Carolina cOmmissioners, let us see what type of man he was. 
A leading Republican contemporary of the period has left an 
enviable characterization of Black, the Unionist but 
extremely anti-abolitionist. Said James G. Blaine: 
He was a man of remarkable character. He was endowed by 
nature with a strong understanding and a strong will. In 
the profession of the law he had attained great eminence. 
His learning had been illustrated by a prolonged service 
on the bench before the age at which men, even of excep-
tional success .at the bar, usually attract public observa-
tion ••• In history, biography, criticism, romance, he 
had absorbed everything in our language worthy of attention. 
Shakespeare, Milton, indeed all the English poets, were 
his familair companions. Reading had made him a full man, 
talking a ready man, writing an exact man. The -judicial 
literature of the English tongue may be sought in vain for 
finer models than are found in the opinions of Judge Black 
when he sat, and was worthy to sit, as the associate of 
John Bannister Gibson, on the Supreme Bench of Pennsylvania. 
•• He applied to his own political creed the literal 
teachings of the Bible. If Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob had 
held slaves without condemnation or rebuke from the Lord 
of hosts, he believed that Virginia, Carolina, and Georgia 
might do the same.12 
But after this eulogy, Blaine stated that because Black 
wished it understood that the position of the Republican party 
was inconsistent with loyalty to the Union, and that its 
11. Ibid. 


























permanent success would lead to the destruction of the 
Government, it was not unnatural that his extreme views 
should have carried him beyond the bounds of prudence in 
his legal opinion of November 20; that he thus in large 
degree became responsible for the unsound position of 
Mr. Buchanan. But Blaine admitted that Buchanan's message 
was the more "odiOUS and more dangerous by the quotation of 
a part and not the whole." Blaine, as many others, believed 
82 
that Black changed his position because of his more responsi-
ble position as Secretary of State, and also because of the 
greater seriousness of the issue after Major Anderson's 
occupation of Fort Sumter.13 Such an opinion seems correct. 
We have already seen that it was Black who had the orders 
of December 11 sent for and pointed out to the President 
and Cabinet that Major Anderson's occupation of Sumter was 
according to orders. 14 
Now, the South Carolina Commissioners had arrived in 
Washington on the same day that Major Anderson caused the 
military crisis in Charleston harbor, and in their turn 
were to cause a political crisis in the Cabinet. On December 
22, 1860, W. H. Trescot, now South Carolina's special agent 
at Washington, received the following telegram from Governor 
Pickens: 
The Hon. R. W. Barnwell, the Hon. J. H. Adams and the 
Hon. James L. Orr have been appointed Commissioners by 
the Convention to proceed immediately to WaShington to 
present the Ordinance of Secession to the President, 
and to negotiate in reference to the evacuation of the 
forts and other matters growing out of the Act of 
Secession. They will probably arrive on Tuesday next. 
13. Ibid, pp. 231, 232, 233. 



















Please inform the President of this. Answer this. 15 
On Wednesday, December 26, the Commissioners arrived in 
Washington, and their arrival was communicated at once to 
the President by the agent o~ the State, Trescot. Accord-
ing to Trescot, Judge Black, the Secretary o~ State, was 
present at the interview. The subject was spoken o~ in-
~ormally, and the President appointed one o'clock on the 
following day, December 27, as the hour when it would be 
agreeable to him to receive the Commissioners.16 The 
83 
President was told by Trescot that the Commissioners proposed 
to present their credentials and have an informal conversa-
tion with him, but that i~ it was his intention to submit the 
question of their reception to Congress, they wished to 
submit a written communication to accompany his message. I~, 
however, the President should agree in thinking it the better 
course, the Commissioners would not, prepare the paper until 
after the interview with him, when they would better under-
stand one another, but in that case it was to be considered 
tl~t the communication was submitted at the interview.17 
According to Trescot, the President consented to thiS, 
and matters were approaching some definite solution when 
Anderson made his sudden and unexpected movement ~rom Fort 
Moultrie to Sumter. The news arrived in Washington, "at 
once wholly changing the relations of the parties and 
altering the whole character of the negotiation. ff18 Because 
15. Crawford, 2£. cit. Pr. 142 
16. Hunt, Gaillard;-6d 'Narrative and Letter of William 
Henry Trescot, "....2J2.. cit. p. 543. 
17. Ibid. 
- If 18. Hunt, Gaillard, ed., Narrative and Letter of William 
Henry Trescot,·~.~. p. 543. 
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of the excitement and the changed nature of things, the 
meeting of the President with the Commissioners, set for 
the 27th, took place on the next day. On December 28 the 
Commissioners presented the President their credentials l 
under which they were "authorized and empowered to treat 
with the Government of the United states for the delivery 
of the forts, magazines, lighthouses, and other real estate, 
with their appurtenances, within the limits of South Carolinaj 
and also for an apportionment of the public debt and a 
division of all other property held by the Government of the 
United States as agent of the Confederated States, of which 
South Carolina was recently a memberj and, generally, to 
negotiate as to all other measures and arrangements proper 
to be made and adopted in the existing relations of the 
parties, and for the continuance of peace and amith between 
this Commonwealth and the Government at WashingtoJ!19 
A copy of the South Carolina ordinance of Secession was 
delivered to the PreSident, and their desire to negotiate 
peaceably on the above matters was reiterated, but the changed 
state of things rendered a peaceful issue doubtful. Then the 
charge of a pledge violated. "We came hare", they said, "the 
representatives of an authority which could at any time within 
the past sixty days have taken possession of the forts in 
Charleston Harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner 
that we cannot doubt, determined to trust to your honor rather 
than to its own power."20 Then there was a demand for 
19. Official Records, vol. 1, p. 109 
20. OffIcial Records, vol. 1, p. 109 
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satisfactory explanations before any negotiations would be 
continued, and a request for the immediate withdrawal of the 
troops from Charleston harbor, Ita standing menace which 
r'enders negotiation impossible. ,,21 This interview with the 
South Carolina Commissioners lasted nearly two hours, with 
R. W. Barnwell acting as chairman of the Commission. Mr. 
Barnwell stressed the fact that an agreement on the part of 
the Government of the United states had been violated by 
Anderson's conduct, and the faith of the President and the 
Government had been forfeited. Then he urged the President 
to restore the status in the harbor of Charleston by order-
ing Anderson back to Moultrie, an inconsistent demand in the 
light of the request in the Commissioners' credentials to 
withdraw the troops from Charleston harbor altogether. 22 
Three times at least during the interview Mr. Barnwell 
insisted: "But, Mr. President, your personal honor is involved 
in this matter." Mr. Barnwell pressed him so hard on this 
point that the President said: "Mr. Barnwell, you are pressing 
me too importunately; you don't give me time to consider; 
you don't give me time to say my prayers. I always say my 
" prayers when required to act upon any great State affair. 23 
85 
The President wrote a reply to the Commissioners and submitted 
it to the Cabinet on December 29. Mr. Toucey, Secretary of the 
Navy, was the only member to wholly approve it. Black, Holt 
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the unguarded language it was open to the criticism of making 
concessions, which it could not be the purpose of the 
President or his Cabinet to make. The three remaining members, 
Mr. Thompson, Mr. Thomas, and Mr. Floyd, opposed it because 
it yielded too little to the demands of South Carolina. 24 
The President made no reply to these opinions but took the 
objections under consideration. The Secretary of War, Floyd, 
took this reply of the President as an opportunity to resign 
from the Cabinet, to avoid the odium of being forced out on 
other more serious grounds. As early as December 23 the 
President had, through his friend Breckenridge, asked for 
Floyd's resignation.25 The story of the charges against Floyd 
of aiding treasonably the rebellion, by supplying the Southern 
arsenals with arms in the fall of 1860, and otherwise promoting 
the interests of secession while still a member of the Cabinet, 
is too long to be told here. However, Mr. Buchanan himself 
stated that the reason he requested Floyd's resignation was the 
discovery of the latter's irregularity in bond issues. Floyd 
was instrumental in purloining bonds, to the amount of 870,000 
dollars, from the Interior Department and delivering them to 
William H. Russell, a member of the firm of "Russell, Majors 
& Waddell".26 It was for this irregularity of conduct that 
the President had asked for his resignation. 
But Floyd, who, until Major Anderson's move to Sumter, had 
apparently seen eye to eye with Buchanan's policy, in the 
Cabinet meeting of December 29, read to the President, before 
the Cabinet, the following paper: 
24. Crawford, ~~ ~. p. 149 
25. Buchanan, James, 2J2.. ill. p. 185 








Sir: On the evening of the 27th instant, I read the 
following paper to you, in the presence of the Cabinet: 
Sir: It ·is evident now, from the action of the cormnander 
at Fort Moultrie, that the solemn pledges of this 
Government have been violated by Major Anderson. In my 
judgment, but one remedy is now left us by which to vindi-
cate our honor and prevent civil war. It is in vain now 
to hope for confidence on the part of the people of South 
Carolina in any further pledges as to the action of the 
military. One remedy only is left, and that is to with-
draw the garrison from the harbor of Charleston altogether. 
I hope the President will allow me to make that order at 
once. This order, in my judgment, can alone prevent 
bloodshed and civil war. 27 
Embodying the above in a formal letter of resignation on 
December 29, Floyd stated that he considered the honor of the 
administration pledged to maintain the troops in the position 
they occupied. Again he was ignoring the orders he had given 
Anderson December 11, notwithstanding Black's recent review 
of those orders on December 27 before the whole Cabinet. Such 
an attidute indeed justified Anderson's suspicion that the 
modified orders of December 21 were of treasonable intent. But 
Black, whose honesty has never been doubted, later stated his 
conviction that Floyd's sudden espousal of the cause of 
secession was because of the break with the President on other 
matters. Said Black: "Up to the time when he got notice that 
he must resign, he was steadily opposed to the Southern move-
ment, and the bitterest enemies he had were the leading men of 
that section. After he found the whole Administration against 
him, he was driven by stress of necessity into the ranks of 
the party which he had previously opposed."28 
In closing his letter of resignation, Floyd stated that 
the refusal, or delay, to place things back as they stood 
27. Curtis, 2£. £!i. vol. 2, p. 409 
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28. Black, C. F., Essays and Speeches of J. S. Black, 2£. ~. 
pp. 266 •. 267. 
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under "our agreement" inn ted collision" and must inevi tably 
lead to civil war. He could not consent to be the agent o£ 
such a calamlty.29 Thus" the crisis had afforded Floyd the 
opportunity to withdraw on more dignified grounds than those 
of fraudulent manipulations of bond issues. Mr. Holt was 
transferred from the Post Office to the War Department at 
the end of December, his place being filled by the appoint-
ment o£ Horatio King, of Maine, as acting Postmaster-General" 
and shortly a£ter confirmed as Postmaster-General. 30 The 
importance of this change in the War Department" as well as 
88 
Southern confidence in Floyd" was reflected in the telegram 
sent by the secessionist Louis T. Wigfall, in Washington, to 
M. L. Bonham, of Charleston. Wig£all telegraphed on January 2, 
1861: "Holt succeeds Floyd. It means war. Cut off supplies 
from Anderson and take Sumter soon as possible."3l This fear 
proved to be exaggerated, but the telegram shows the excite-
ment produced by the Cabinet crisis produced by Major Anderson's 
action. 
But the most serious threat o£ withdrawal £rom the Cabinet 
was yet to come, immediately after Floyd's resignation. The 
determination o£ the Secretary o£ State, Black" to resign" 
proceeded £rom the same reply the President had written to the 
Commissioners, but on wholly different grounds £rom those o£ 
Floyd. Black believed that the reply conceded too much to 
South Carolina" and compromised the President and Cabinet. On 
29. curtis,,~. £!i. vol. 2" p. 409. 
30. Buchanan, James, 2£. cit. p. 111 






the morning after the President presented his reply to the 
Commissioners to the Cabinet, Judge Black communicated his 
conviction to Messrs. Stanton# Holt, and Toucey that it 
was his conviction that the President's mind was fixed beyond 
all hope of change, and his own determination to resign in 
consequence. 32 Mr. Toucey told the President, and Judge Black 
was sent for. He went reluctantly, dreading the effect on 
his own feelings of the appeal which he knew Mr. Buchanan 
wou~a make to the sacred friendship which had lasted through 
so many years. The President showed great emotion at the 
interview# which ended by the President's handing Black the 
paper and telling him to revise it to meet his own views. 33 
There has been no copy of this original reply of the President 
preserved, but in it, among other unwise things, the President 
seemed to have admitted a pledge made to maintain the status 
quo in Charleston harbor. In the interview, Judge Black told 
him that such an understanding was impossible, that he could 
not make it or any other agreement that would tie his hands 
in the execution of the l~wsj that if he did make it, he must 
repudiate it. 34 JUdge Black immediately went to the Office 
89 
of the Attorney-General, Stanton, and there made the amendments 
to the President's reply to the Commissioners. As fast as the 
sheets were written they were handed to the Attorney-General, 
who copied them in his own hand, the original being sent 



















As the original letter to the Commissioners has not been 
preserved, it will be necessary to quote rather freely from 
the long reply of the Secretary of State, which he divided 
into seven headings: 
1. The first and the concluding paragraphs both seem to 
acknow'ledge the right of South Carolina to be represented 
near this Government by diplomatic officers. That implies 
that she is an independent nation, with no other relations 
to the Government of the Union than any other foreign power. 
If such be the fact, then she has acquired all the rights, 
powers, and 'responsibilities of a separate government by 
the mere Ordinance of Secession. • • But the President has 
always, and particularly in his late message to Congress, 
denied the right of secession, and asserted that no State 
could throw off her Federal obligations in that way. 
2. I would strike out all expressions of regret that the 
Commissioners are unwilling to proceed with the negotiation, 
since it is very clear that there can legally be no negotia-
tion with them, whether they are willing or not. 
3. Above all things it is objectionable to intimate a willing-
ness to negotiate with the State of South Carolina about 
the possession of a military post which belongs to the 
United States, or to propose any adjustment of the subject 
or any arrangement about it. 
4. The words, 'coercing a State by force of arms to remain in 
the Confederacy' - a power which I do not believe the 
Constitution has conferred upon Congress - ought certainly 
not to be retained. They are too vague, and might have the 
effect (which I am sure the President does not intend) to 
mislead the Commissioners concerning his sentiments. The 
power to defend the public property, to resist an assailing 
force which unlawfully attempts to drive out the troops of 
the United States from one of their fortifications ••• is 
coercion, and may'very well be called 'coercing a State by 
force to remain in the Union. 
Thus Black departed from his 'constitutional legal hair 
splitting of November 20. No one can compare this opinion with 
that of November 26 and doubt that Black, the Secretary of 
State, held much stronger views on combating secession than 
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5. The implied (sic) assent of the President to the accusation 
which the Commissioners make, of a compact with South 
Carolina by which be was bound not to take whatever measures 
he saw fit for the defense of the forts, ought to be 
stricken out and a flat denial of any such bargain or pledge 
or agreement asserted. 
6 • 
7. 
The remotest expression of a doubt about Major Anderson's 
perfect propriety of behavior should be carefu~ly avoided. 
He is not only a gallant and meretorious officer, who is 
entitled to a fair hearing before he is condemned: he has 
saved the country, I solemnly believe, when its day was 
darkest and its peril most extreme. 
-
The idea that a wrong was committed against South Carolina 
by moving from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter ought to be 
repelled as firmly as may be consistent with a proper 
respect for the high character of the gentlemen who com-
pose the South Carolina Commission. It is a strange 
assumption of right on the part of that State to say that 
the United States troops must remain in the weakest 
position they can find in the harbor. • • The apparent 
objection to his being in Fort Sumter is, that he will be 
less likely to fall an easy prey to his assailants. 36 
From the above, it might seem that the President had 
conceded nearly every thing to South Carolina except the 
national debt. But it must be remembered that Floyd based 
his resignation on his not conceding enough. At any rate, 
Black's amendments and advice to the President give us an 
analysis of the nature of the President's original reply. 
It is quite possible that the President had determined to 
order Anderson back to Moultrie, for the President has 
admitted that "at the moment it was worthy of consideration", 
but t'to abandon all these forts to South Carolina, on the 
demand of commissioners claiming to represent her as an 
independent State, would have been a recognition, on the 
part of the Executive, of her right to secede from the Union. 
This was not to be thought of for a moment. n37 The President 
36. Black, C. F., 2£. £!i., pp. 14, 15. 
37. Buchanan, James, 2£. £!i., p. 182 
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wrote this in 1866. Among the many other writers who have 
attempted a defense of Buchanan's policy, Horatio King, 
Buchanan's friend and Postmaster-General, in speaking of 
Black's memorandum, does not attempt to reconcile Black's 
strictures with the claim of Buchanan's executive propriety 
92 
in the answer to the Commissioners. 38 King quoted a declaration 
of Holt to the effect that never had the President "willingly 
contemplated the surrender of the forts at Charleston."39 
Judge Black, after listing the seven points on which the 
President's reply to the Commissioners should be amended, 
also entreated the President to order the Brooklyn and the 
Macedonian to Charleston without the least delay, and in the 
meant:1.me send a trusty messenger to Major Anderson to let him 
know that the Government would not desert him. 40 In the seven 
points Black had condemned the past policy of the Adminis-
'\'). 
tration, when he charged "the fatal error of the administra-
tion in not sending down troops enough to hold all the forts.4l 
Buchanan's policy had definitely reached a turning pOint. 
The retirement of Cass had undoubtedly weakened Buchanan' at 
the North, and when Black threatened to resign, it seems that 
Buchanan capitulated and was willing to change his attitude 
toward secession to prevent another Cabinet defection at the 
President's expense. In the last analysis, his administration 
38. King, Horatio, 2£. cit. p. 171 
39. Ibid. -
40. Crawford, 2£. cit. p. 155. 














must rest upon conservative Northern opinion.42 The 
President amended his reply to the Commissioners on the 
basis of Black's pOints, and it is believed that Black's 
influence prevented the President from following his first 
impulse and ordering Anderson back to Moultrie. 43 ' 
On December 31 the President communicated to the South 
Carolina Commissioners a rather lengthy reply, in which he 
made it clear that negotiations were now impossible. He 
went over the old ground very fully, quoted the correspo~­
dence between him and the South Carolina delegation of 
December 10, denied the charge of a pledge, and qUdte~ in 
full the orders sent to Anderson on December 11.44 The 
President further declared that he had acted in the same 
manner as he would have done had he entered into a positive 
and formal agreement with parties capable of contracting, 
although such an agreement would have been on his part, from 
the nature of his official duties, impossible." The world 
knows that I have never sent any reinforcements to the forts 
in Charleston Harbor, and I have certainly never authorized 
any change to be made "in their relative military status~45 
This statement was indeed puzzling, as he had been reminded 
by Black of the orders by which Anderson had moved his 
command, and the President was to say in 1866 that Major 
Anderson did have the necessary instructions to change "the 
42. Randall, 3. G., The Civil War and Reconstruction" p. 207 
Chicago, Ill., D. C. Heath Co., 1937. 
43. Crawford, ££. £11. p. 156. 
44. Official Records~ vol. 1, pp. 115,116,117,118. 
















relative military status~46 
The President further stated that his first promptings 
were to command Anderson to return to his former position# 
and there await the contingencies presented in his instruct-
ions; but that before any steps could be taken in that direction# 
the South Carolina authorities had seized all the remaining 
forts in the harbor; and on the very next day after the 
occupation of Sumter by Major Anderson# the Federal Custom-
House and Post Office in Charleston had been taken.47 The 
President continued: 
It is under all these circumstances that I am urged 
immediately to withdraw the troops from the harbor of 
Charleston, and am informed that withoug this, negotiation 
is impossible. This I cannot do; this I will not do. 
Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible 
contingency. No allusion had ever been made to it in any 
communication between my fBlf and any human being. But 
the inference is that I am bound to withdraw the troops 
from the only fort remaining in the possession of the 
United States in the harbor of Charleston, because the 
officer there in command of all the forts thought proper, 
without instructions, to change his position from one of 
them to another. I cannot admit the justice of any such 
inference.48 
The President closed the communication by saying that, while 
it was his duty to defend F'ort Sumter as a portion of the 
ftpublic property" of the United States against hostile 
attacks, he did not see how such a defense could be construed 
into a menace against the city of Charleston.49 The statement 
that Fort Sumter was to be defended as public property# and 
not necessarily as a military post of the United States, was 
46. Buchanan, James, .2.E,. ill. p. 165 
47. Official Records, vol. I, p. 118 
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evidently an attempt to calm the South Carolina fears of 
aggression. Later, it was to be made the basis of another 
attempt to negotiate the question of the forts, by outright 
purchase. 
On January 1, 1861, the South Carolina Commissioners 
replied to the President in an equally long and comprehensive 
argument. The whole tone of the letter was a scathing 
denunciation of the duplicity practiced on South Carolina by 
the President and the Government of the United States. The 
Commissioners refuted the President1s assertion that he had 
made no formal pledge. 50 In replying to his denial that he 
had never thought of withdrawing the troops from Charleston 
harbor, the Commissioners were "compelled to say that your 
conversation with us left upon our minds the distinct im-
pression that you did seriously contemplate the withdrawal 
, 4 ... 4 t 
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of the troops from Charleston Harbor. tl5l And in support of 
their contention, they had the positive assurance of gentlemen 
of the highest possible public reputation, that such suggestions 
had been "made to and urged upon you by them, and had formed 
the subject of more than one earnest discussion with you. tl52 
They also declared that they could simply not believe the 
President's claim that Anderson had occupied Sumter against 
the orders of the President. The President was charged with 
probably rendering civil war inevitable, but the State of 
South Carolina would accept that issue, "relying upon Him 
who is the God of Justice as well as the God of Hosts, will 
50. Ibid, PP. 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125. 






















endeavor to perform the great duty which lies before her, 
hopefully, bravely, and thoroughly."53 Expressing their 
belief that the President had determined to reinforce the 
garrison in Charleston harbor, and the impossibility of 
negotiation and peace in the light of the President's letter 
of the 31st of December, they stated their intention o~ 
returning to Charleston on the afternoon of January 2.54 
The President's reaction to the Commissioners' reply of 
January 1 can best be given in the President's own words: 
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This (reply) was so violent, unfounded, and disrespectful, 
and so regardless of what is due to any individual whom 
the people have honored with the office of President, that 
the reading of it in the Cabinet excited indignation among 
all the members. With their unamimoUB approbation, it was 
immediately, on the day of its date, returned to the 
commissioners with the following indorsement: "This paper, 
just presented to the President is of such a character 
that he declines to receive it." Surely no negotiation 
was ever conducted in such a manner, unless, indeed, it had 
been t he predetermined purpose of the negotiators to pro-
duce an open and immediate rupture. 55 
Buchanan's explanation of his offer to lay the propositions 
the Commissioners had to make before Congress, when he 
knew they would not meet a favorable response, reiterates 
his fundamental policy. He said he made the offer to gain 
time for passion to subside, to bring the whole subject before 
the representatives of the people and cause them to adopt such 
measures as might possibly reclaim even South Carolina hersel.f. 
But even if South Carolina were not reclaimed, it might pre-
vent the other cotton States from following her example. 56 
53. Official Records, vol. I, p. 124 
54. Ibid, p. 125 
55. Buchanan, James, 2.£. ill. p. 183 
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At least the critical phase of Buchanan's policy had now 
passed. He now broke completely with his Southern friends 
and advisers. The remaining secessionist sympathizers in 
the Cabinet were soon to go as a result of the new direction 
given his policy by this crisis. This new direction was 
largely owing to the threat of Black's resignation. 57 It 
has also been stated by more than one critic of Buchanants 
administration, that from the time of the above crisis, the 
administration of Buchanan was not only thoroughly loyal to 
the preservation of the Union, but it fixed the policy that 
Lincoln accepted and pursued until war came upon him. 58 A 
new direction and a different attitude had been assumed, but# 
as will be seen, the necessary aggressiveness of action was 
to be thwarted by last minute hopes of avoiding a conflict. 
Also, an apparent change of attitude, and the adoption of 
an unwarranted optimism as to the safety of his position on 
the part of Major Anderson also contributed to a laxity in 
the prosecution of the new policy of firmness. 
Xi .Q 3 
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57. Dumond, DWight L., The Secession Movement 1860 - 1861, p. 176 
New York, The Macmillan Co., 1931. 
58. McClure, A. K., Abraham Lincoln and Men of War Times, 
p. 273, Philadelphia, The Times Publishing Co., 1892. 
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THE NEW POLICY OF REINFORCEMENT 
The insistence of General Scott on reinforcing all the 
Southern forts, and the cOlnmunication of his views on the 
subject to the President on October 29, have already been 
observed. The President turned down the proposal of 
General Scott as inconsistent with his policy and as re-
quiring more troops than were available. Again, on December 
12, General Scott had gone to Washington and, in an inter-
view with the Secretary of War, Floyd, had urged that 
reinforcements be sent, and pointed out the organized compan-
ies and recruits available for the purpose. The Secretary 
refused his request on the ground that it would be in 
opposition to the announced policy of the President. l The 
Secretary of War arranged an interview between General Scott 
and the President, which took place on the 15th of December. 
The General again urged a policy of reinforcement, but in vain. 2 
The President later stated that Scott knew at the time that 
his request would be rejected, that the President could not 
consent to it "without at once reversing his entire po1icYI 
and withoug a degree of inconsistency amounting almost to 
self-stultification."3 His main reason was that it would have 
1. Crawford, 22. £!i. p. 168 
2. Buchanan, James, .2.:£. ill. p. 168 






















dissolved the existing conferences for a peaceable adjustment. 
According to ScottI the President was determined to await 
the action of the South Carolina Convention and the arrival 
of Commissioners to him, which he would refer to Congress, 
and if Congress should decide against them, he would then 
reinforce the forts in Charleston harbor and direct the 
commanding officer to defend them.4 
Referring to this interview, the President later stated 
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that Scott knew at the time that a warship, the "Brooklyn", had a 
short time before been ordered to be made ready to go to the 
relief of Major Anderson in case of need. 5 Now # on the 28th 
of December, General Scott urged upon the Secretary of War that 
Fort Sumter might not be evacuated, but that one hundred fifty 
recruits be sent immediately to the fort. 6 On this same day 
General Scott sent a message to the President, revealing that 
since Major Anderson had been assigned to Fort Moultrie# "no 
order, intimation, suggestion, or communication for his 
government and guidance has gone to that officer from the 
Headquarters of the Army." Nor had the General-in-Chief receiv-
ed any communication from Major Anderson, later than the first 
report of the latter. 7 The General definit,ely did not trust 
the Secretary of War. In a letter written to Major Anderson's 
brother, through the agency of Lieut. Col. Lay# Scott's aide, 






Crawford, 2£. £!i., p. 169. Quoting Scott's autobiography, 
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Buchanan, James, 2£. ill., p. 168 
Crawford, ~. cit., p. 169 













to support Major Anderson and declared that the War Department 
had kept secret from the General the instructions sent the 
Major, but that the General, in common with the whole army, 
"has admired and vindicated as a defensive measur~ the 
masterly transfer of the garrison from Fort Moultrie to the 
position of Fort Sumter.,,8 There was a mutual distrust of 
Scott on the part of the Secretary of War, and he had intent-
ionally ordered that all communications from Charleston harbor 
should be kept from the General-in-Chief of the Army.9 
General Scott's distrust of the Secretary of War, and the 
latter's compl~te conversion to the cause of South Carolina 
and secession, as evidenced by his statement in the Cabinet 
meeting of December 27, probably account for the language 
of General Scott's memorandum to the President of December 30. 
On this date the General requested of the President permission, 
"without reference to the War Department and otherwise, as 
secretly as possible, to send two hundred and fifty recruits 
from New York Harbor to reinforce Fort Sumter, together with 
some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition, and subsistence 
stores."lO The General hoped that a sloop of war and cutter 
might be ordered for the same purpose as early as the next day.ll 
At this date General Scott's request fell on more willing ears. 
It came &hortly after Secretary of State Black's advice of the 
same date. We have the President's own admission that on the 
8. Ibid, pp. 113, 114. 
9. IbId, p. 77, Adjutant-General Cooper to Anderson, Nov. 28 






























receipt of Scott's request "the President immediately decided 
to order reinforcements~12 But now the President and General 
Scott differed on the kind of ship to be used. Scott had 
asked for~slooP-of-war, while the President preferred the 
warship If Brooklyn", and on Monday, December 31, he instructed 
\L ,l 
the Secretaries of War and Navy to despatch the ~rooklyn to 
Fort Sumter. The Gneeral, on the same evening, called on 
Buchanan to congratulate him, saying that he had the orders 
in his pocket. 13 But the President explained to General Scott 
that it might be considered improper to transmit the orders 
to the "Brooklyn" until the Commissioners had had time to 
reply to his letter of a few hours before, _,and the delay, in 
his opinion, would not exceed forty-eight hours. The General 
concurred in this suggestion.14 
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General Scott had conferred with an expert in naval 
affairs, and had become convinced that both secrecy and success 
would be best secured by sending a "mercantile steamer". 
-
General Scott's opinion was based on the fact that the Brooklyn 
drew too much water to cross the bar of Charleston harbor.15 
For this reason the "Star of the Tv'IJest", a side-wheel merchant 
steamer, was substituted for the "Brooklyn", to which change 
the President yielded with "great reluctance" on the "pressing 
instance" of General Scott. 16 The detail of the expedition 
I2. Buchanan, James, Ope cit. p. 189. 
13. Ibid --
14. !SIa, p. 190 
15. Crawford, QQ. cit., p. 190 














was entrusted to General Scott, who, for the first time in 
all the long drawn crisis, was taken into the confidence 
of the Government and given his proper role as Chief of 
Staff of the Army. It has been alleged that the brief delay 
in executing the orders issued December 31, until the Commiss-
ioners had had time to reply to the President's letter, was 
fatal, in that it gave time for General Scott to change the 
ship to be used. The argument is that instead of a powerful 
man of war and seasoned soldiers, capable of repelling an 
attack in the harbor, there was substituted a weak, unarmed 
merchant steamer, with lately recruited men, and at a decided 
disadvantage if attacked by the South Carolina batteries 
in the harbor. 17 A good argument if it could be conclusively 
shown that the "Brooklyn" could have crossed the bar in the 
harbor. Available facts and the opinions of authorities 
support the argument. 
The details of chartering the Star of the West, which 
had previously been suggested to General Scott by a Mr. Schultz, 
were entrusted to Assistant-Adjutant General L. Thomas. Thomas 
went to New York, saw Schultz, and the two visited, a Mr. M. O. 
Roberts, the owner of the "Star of the west". In his report 
to General Scott of January 4, Thomas stated that Mr. Schultz 
was acting for the good of his country, but that Mr. Roberts 
was looking exclusively to the dollars. The ship had been 
chartered at $1,250 per day.18 The Assistant Adjutant-General 
further stated: 
17. Chadwick, French Ensor, Causes of the Civil War, 1858-1861, 
p. 225. American Nation Series, New-,:or~Harper & Brothers 1906. 
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She is running on the New Orleans route l and will clear 
for that port; but no notice will be put in the papers l 
and persons seeing the ship moving from the dock will suppose 
she is on her regular trip. Major Eaton, commissary of 
subsistence l fully enters into my views. He will see 1~. 
Roberts, hand him a list of the supplies with the places 
where they may be procured, and the purchases will be made 
on the ships account. In this way no public machinery will 
be used. Tonight I pass over to Governor's Island to do 
what is necessarYI i.e' l have 300 stan~ of arms and ammuni-
tion on the wharfl and 200 men ready to march on board 
Mr. Schultz's steam-tugs about nightfall tomorrowl to ~o to 
the steamer, passing very slowly down the bay. I shall cut 
off all communication between the Island and the cities 
until Tuesday morningl when I expect the steamer will be 
safely moored at Fort Sumter.19 
Thus precautions for secrecy were being taken. On January 
51 Thomas sent an order to Major T. H. Holmes of Fort Columbus, 
saying that by order of General ScottI Holmes would detach 
that evening two hundred of the best instructed menl by the 
"Star of the Westl" to reinforce Fort Sumter. 20 
On the same day, January 5, Thomas notified First Lieutenant 
Charles R. Woods of Fort Columbus: 
The steamship "Star of the West" has been chartered to 
take two hundred.recruits from Fort Columbus to Fort Sumter, 
South Carolina, to reinforce the garrison at that post. You 
are placed in command of the detachment, assisted by Lieuts. 
W. A. Webb, C. W. Thomas, and Asst. Surge P. G. S. Ten 
Broeckl Medical ~partment. Arms and ammunition for your 
men will be pla~!d on the steamer and three months' supply 
of subsistence. 
The. greatest secrecy was enjOined, his men were to be 
placed below deck on approaching the Charleston bar, and 
every precaution was to be resorted to to prevent being fired 
upon by batteries erected either on Sullivan's or James Island.22 
Thenl again on the same day I the Assistant Adjutant-General 
19. Ibid. pp. 130, 131 
20. Official Records l vol. 1, p. 131. 
21. Ibid. 
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Thomas wrote a communication to Major Anderson, which, if it had 
not been carried to him on thet'Star of the West;) might have 
brought on civil war in January instead of April. The orders 
were as follows: 
Should a fire, likely to prove injurious, be opened upon 
any vessel bringing reinfo!cements or supplies, or upon 
tow~boats within the reach of your guns, they may be em-
ployed to silence such firej and you may act in l~~e manner 
in case a fire is opened upon Fort Sumter itself. 
Note the qualification of the order, "likely to prove injurious~ 
Just as in the orders of December 11 it was left to Anderson's 
Q;iscretion to determine whether he had "tangible evidence of ' 
$;,: design to proceed to a hostile act", now he was authorized 
'f: 
~t to open fire if he thought the enemy fire not "likely to 
prove injurious." 
On the very day that General Scott pad the orders for 
~einforcement in his pocket, December 31, Major Anderson, 
despite his almost daily reports detailing the extensive 
preparations of South Carolina in the harbor, gave the 
Government an optimistic report on his situation. It is 
difficult to reconcile the Major's optimism with the intensive 
erection of batteries at various points by the South Carolina 
forces. Still he wrote the Government: 
Thank God, we are now where the Government may send us 
additional troops at its leisure. To be sure, the uncivil 
and uncourteous action of the Governor in preventing us 
from purchasing anything in the city will annoy and in-
convenience us somewhatj still we are safe ••• We can 
command ~~is harbor as long as our Government wishes to 
keep it. 
Then, on January 6, Anderson's position was so controlled by 
the South Carolina authorities that a message was sent to 
23. Ibid. 
24. OffIcial Records, vol. I, p. 120 
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Washington "through the courtesy of Governor Pickens. rr Again 
the commander reports on the warlike preparations of South 
Carolina, but says that if there is no treachery among his 
workmen, he would be able to hold the fort against any force 
25 that could be brought against him. Then concerning the 
relief expedition, which sailed on the 5th of January, but 
which Anderson didn't know was coming, he gave no encourage-
ment. He reported that "at present it would be dangerous 
and difficult for a vessel from without to enter the harbor, 
in consequence of the batteries which are already erected 
and being erected." To show the difficulty of his situation 
in consequence of being deprived of free communication with 
the Government, after reinforcement was on the way, Major 
Anderson wrote: 
I shall not ask for any increase of my command, because 
I do not know what. the ulterior views of the Government 
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are. We are now, or soon will be, cut off from communication, 
unless by means of a powerful fleet, which shall have the 
ability to carry the batteries at the mouth of this harbor. 26 
It is difficult to reconcile Major Anderson's optimism with 
this last opinion. It is evident that in the Major's mind 
there was confusion as to the intentions of the Government. 
His opinion that it would take a powerful fleet to run the 
batteries at the mouth of. the harbor gave little hope of 
success for the relief expedition already under way. 
Abner Doubleday, second in command at Fort Sumter, has 
charged that Anderson was a Union man, and in the beginning 














of the difficulties was perfectly willing to chastise 
South Carolina in case she should attempt any revolution-
ary measures, but that his feeling changed when he found 
that nearly all the Southern States had joined in the 
support of South Carolina.27 It is true that Anderson had 
always felt a reluctance to see a beginning of hostilities, 
and his hesitancy of action in later developments proceeded 
both from this reluctance to see civil war initiated as 
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well as from his correct opinion that it was still the policy 
of his Government to do everything possible to prevent a 
collision. 
On the very day the "Star of the West" sailed, General 
Scott despatched a telegram to his son-in-law, Colonal Scott, 
then at New York, to countermand her departure. This action 
was authorized by the Government on the basis of Anderson's 
report of December 31, but the countermand came too late to 
28 
stop the sailing of the relief ship. Buchanan has asserted 
that now both the Secretaries of War and Navy, as well as 
General Scott, were convinced of the error of substituting 
the "Star of the West" for the "Brooklyn", and proceeded to 
provide, as far as possible, against anticipated disaster.29 
This was based on the receipt of Anderson's communication of 
January 6,for on the next day the following order was sent by 
27. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 2£. cit. p. 41 
Abner Doubleday, ill!Irom Moultrie to Sumter~-
28. Buchanan, James, 22. £!1., pp. 190, 191. -
















General Scott to Lieut. Woods, in command of the troops 
on the "Star of the WestJ n 
This communication is sent through the commander of the 
steam sloop-of-war "Brooklyn". 
His mission is twofold: First to afford aid and succor 
in case your ship be shattered or ~njured; second, to 
convey this order of recall for your detachment in case 
it cannot land at Fort Sumter, to prGceed to Fort Monroe, 
Hampton Roads, and there await further orders. 
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In case of your return to Hampton Roads, send a telegraphic 
message here at once from Norfolk. 
P. S. On arrival at Fort Monroe, land your troops and discl~rge 
the ship.30 From this order it seems that there was no con-
fidence the relief expedition would succeed. 
In fact, it seems likely that the expedition would never 
have been attemp~d if Anderson's report of December 31, 
affirming the safety of his position, had reached the Govermnent 
in time to countermand the sailing. A letter sent to Anderson 
on January 10, before the fate of the "Star of the West" was 
known, shows that the policy of the Government was still a 
defensive one, and the emphasis was on preventing a COllision • 
Secretary of War Holt wrote the following: 
Your despatches to No. 16, inclusive, have been received. 
Before the receipt of that of 31st December, announcing that 
the Government might re-enforce you at its leisure, and that 
you regarded yourself safe in your present position, some 
two hundred and fifty recruits had been ordered to proceed 
from Governor's Island to Fort Sumter on the 'Star of the 
West t , for the purpose of strengthening the force under your 
command. The probability is, from the current rumors of 
today, that this vessel has been fired into by the South 
Carolinians, and has not been able to reach you. To meet 
all contingencies, the • Brooklynl has been despatched, with 
instructions not to cross the bar at the harbor of Charleston, 
but to afford to the "Star of the West" and those on board 
all the assistance they may need, and in the event the 
recruits have not effected a landing at Fort Sumter, they will 
return to Fort Monroe. 









I avail myself of the occasion to express the great 
satisfaction of the Government at the forbearance, 
discretion and firmness with which you have acted, amid 
the perplexing and difficult circumstances in which you 
have been placed. You will continue, as heretofore, to 
act strictly on the defensive; to avoid, by all means 
compatible with the safety of your command, a collision 
with the hostile forces with which you are surrounded. 
But for the movement, so promptly anq brilliantly ex-
ecuted, by which you transferred your forces to Fort 
Sumter, the probability is tha-t ere this the defenseless-
ness of your position would have invited an attack, which, 
there is reason to believe, was contemplated, if not in 
active preparation, which must have led to the effusion 
of blood, that has been thus so happily prevented. The 
movement, therefore, was in every way admirable, alike for 
its humanity and patriotism, as for its soldiership.3l 
Hot At least the Government was~condemning Major Anderson, but 
giving him some moral support. This Secretary of War sent 
a message quite different from Floyd1s "there is no order 
" for any such movement~ explain the meaning of this report. 32 
At 1:30 on the morning of January 9, the "Star of the 
West" arrived off the Charleston hare The harbor lights were 
all out and she extinguished her own. All of the buoys that 
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marked the channel had been taken up, making careful soundings 
necessa,ry. At 6:20 A. M. the national flag was run up, and 
the ship crossed the bar at high tide and continued along the 
Morris Island side up the ship channel. When opposite a 
group of houses near the shore, a red palmetto flag was seen 
and without warning a gun-battery opened on the ship. The 
battery was concealed amid the sand-hills near the shore and 
its existence had been unsuspected. 33 The first shot had 
been fired across the bow of the ship, and as the ship con-
tinued on her course, a rapid and continuous fire was opened 
31. Official Records, vol. 1, pp. 136, 137 
32. See page 49. 














by the battery. The ship was hit but suffered slight damage., 
As soon as the battery opened fire a large garrison flag 
was run up on the ship, lowered, and again run up as a 
signal to Major Anderson, whose flag was flying at Sumter. 
Before leaving New York, Assistant Adjutant-General Thomas 
had sent the gdrrison flag to the ship, giving ordersf~ its 
use, and saying that in case the ship was fired on by the 
batteries, Major Anderson would understand the signals and 
protect the ship with the guns of Sumter. 34 
At reveille on the 9th of January it became generally 
known among the men at Sumter that a large steamer, flying 
the United States flag, was off the bar, apparently at anchor. 
There had been some talk among the men, based upon rumors from 
Charleston, that the garrison would either be withdrawn from 
the harbor or returned to Fort Moultrie, and there were some 
who believed the rumors. Therefore quite a few of the men 
believed that a withdrawal had been determined upon and that 
thisship was the transport to take them away.35 Nearly all 
the men were at the ramparts when the ship was fired on by 
the batteries, and there was great "hurrying and scurrying" 
among the men. The long roll was beaten, and the batteries 
were manned almost before the guns of the hidden battery had 
fired their second shot. As the "Star of the West" approached 
a single gun at Fort Moultrie opened at long range, its shot 
falling over half a mile short.36 Major Anderson was excited 
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batteries and thus initiate the civil war which he so re-
ligiously hoped would be averted? The responsibility for. 
decision was his, and the time was upon him. Lieutenant 
Meade, of Virginia, who ,was shortly after to go'with the 
Conrederacy, advised that fire should not be opened at all, 
as it would at once ~n1tiate civil war, and that the 
Governor would probably repudiate the act of hostility on 
the part of the South Carolina battery.37 Major Anderson 
called a conference of his officers. He stated that he 
had called them together to hear their views in relation to 
the act of the State, and to tell them that he proposed to 
close the harbor with his g~s, and to fire on any vessel 
that might attempt to enter. He desired to receive any 
recommendations they might have to make. 38 
III 
The decision of the officers' council was not to open fire# 
but to await the Governor's explanation. Some of the officers, 
not~bly Captain Abner Doubleday, second in command, advised 
immediate action. Assistant Surgeon Crawford thought that as 
the battery was not fired upon when it opened up on the ship, 
they had allowed the opportunity to go by for immediate action. 
Lieutenant Meade repeated his opinion, adding that as they 
had been directed to act strictly on the defensive, they had 
no right to open fire. Major Anderson acted on the advice of 
his officers, that the Governor should be advised of the 
course he proposed to take in case the action should not be 
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dissatisfaction with the decision, as one witness has left 
the record that Captain Foster left council, "smashing his 
hat, and muttering something about the flag, of which the 
words, 'trample on it' reached the ears of the men at the 
guns. ft40 c.t ' " Lessening her speed, t he Star of the West came 
round in a narrow part of the channel, lowered the flag 
from her fore, and putting on all steam headed down the 
channel for the bar. The battery on Morris Island continued 
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its fire as long as the ship was in range, but without injury. 
The strong ebb-tide carried the ship swiftly out of range to the 
bar, upon which the tide had so fallen that she struck three 
times in crossing it. A steamer from Charleston followed the 
retiring ship for some time, but finally returned.4l Thus the 
first determined effort of the Buchanan administration to "defend 
the public property" ended in a fiasco. 
Buchanan, writing in '1866, stated tl~t Major Anderson was 
wrong in his action subsequent to the firing on the'~tar of 
l' the West; that if he thought the fort was going to be attacked, 
"which was then extremely doubtful tt , that,he let a propitious 
moment slip by for the commencement of hostilitles.42 This 
was hardly a fair criticism in the light of the Government's 
past policy, and even at the very time the(~tar of the West" 
was being fired on, the attitude of the Government justified 
Anderson's failure to open fire on the South Carolina batteries. 
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10, prove this. He was still to "avoid, by all means 
compatible with the safety of your command, a collision 
with the hostile forces with which you are surrounded.,,43 
Strictly speaking, it was not Anderson's command in Fort 
Sumter that was threatened as long as the firing was direct-
ed at the Star of the West. vVhether or not the failure to 
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return the fire was wise, it cannot be denied that the action 
was in harmony with the Government's ftstrict1y defensive" 
policy. 
On January 9, Major Anderson addressed a communication 
to the Governor of South Carolina, declaring. that he had re-
frained from opening fire on the South Carolina batteries 
under the hope that the hostile act was without the Governor's 
sanction. If the action was not disclaimed, after the return 
of his messenger, Anderson would not permit any vessel to 
pass within range of his guns in Fort Sumter. 44 On the same 
day the Governor replied that the act of firing on the Star 
of the West was perfectly justified by him. Later in the 
same day Major Anderson sent another communication to Governor 
Pickens, informing him that the plan to blockade the harbor 
with his guns would be withheld until the whole matter could 
be referred to Washington, and asked that his messenger, 
Lieutenant Hall, be allowed to make the journey unmo1ested. 45 
On the same day, Captain Foster, Chief of Engineers at Sumter, 
was voicing his protest at Anderson's action by writing his 
superior, General Totten: 
43. See page 80. 


















The firing upon the star of the West this morning by the 
batteries on Morris Island opened the war, but Major Anderson 
hopes that the delay of sending to Washington may possibly 
prevent civil war. The hope, although a small one, may be 
the thread that preventsthe sundering of the Union. We are 
none the 12gs determined to defend ourselves to the last 
extremity. 
This was the same officer who, earlier in the day, had left 
the officers' council smashing his hat and protesting that 
the flag was being trampled on.47 
In the meantime, South Carolina was taking measures to 
completely isolate Fort Sumter and prevent a second attempt 
to send reinforcements. On January 11, the main ship channel 
was closed by sinking four 'hulks across it" upon the bar" 
and during the night a good deal of work was done on Fort 
Moul trie., now in possession of' South Carolina, to defend it 
from the fire of Fort Sumt~r. A large steamer, apparently 
a man of war, was stationed outside the bar.48 Amid th~se 
defensive preparations, the Governor sent two agents, Judge 
A. G. Magrath and General D. F. Jamison, two of the highest 
ranking officials of the State, to hear Major Anderson a demand 
to deliver Fort Sumter to the constituted authorities of' 
South Carolina.49 Major Anderson replied that the demand must 
not be made on him, but on the Government. He was just as 
anxious as Buchanan to effect a peaceful settlement of the 
difficulties. He appealed "as a Christian, as a man, and as 
a fellow-countryman", though not as a soldier, as he said his 
46. Official Records, vol. 1, p. 136 
47. See page 82 .. 
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duty was plain in that respect~ that the Governor's messengers 
would use their influence to prevent an appeal to arms. He 
would send an officer with a messenger from t he Governor to 
Washington. He would do anything that was possible and 
honorable to prevent an appeal to arms. 50 Even Holt, the 
new Secretary of War~ whose aggressive character Senator Wigfall 
had so feared~ at this time agreed with Buchanan on the desira-
bility of preserving peace~ and was not as "stifflt in policy 
as Stanton or Black. 5l 
Therefore, in consonance with the prevailing attitude, 
Anderson sent the Governor a message by the returning agents, 
Magrath and Jrunison~ in which he regretted that the Governor 
had made a demand on him with which he could not comply, but 
stated that should the Governor deem fit, "prior to a resort 
to armsn, to refer the matter of surrendering the fort to 
Washington, he would depute one of his officers to accompany 
any messenger the Governor might deem proper to be the bearer 
of his demand.
52 
The Governor accepted Anderson's proposal, 
and appointed Colonel I. W. Hayne, the Attorney-General of 
South Carolina, to accompany Lieut. Hall~ who had already 
been charged by Anderson with referring the matter of closing 
the harbor to Washington. The two started to Washington on 
the afternoon of January 12.53 This was the origin of what 
the President considered as a truce, the news of which 
reached him ftgreatly to the surprise of the President. rr54 
50. Crawford, Q£. £li. p. 194. 
51. Randall, ~G., 2£.. cit. p. 209 
52. Crawford, 2E. cit. p:-Y94 
53. Official RecordS; vol. 1, PP. 137, 138 





Quoting Vattel's Law of Nations, the President called this 
"p partial truce under which hostilities are suspended only 
in certain places, as between a tovm and the army besieging 
itl" And until the deciSion should be made by the President, 
Major Anderson had thus placed it out of his own power to ask 
for reinforcements, and equally out of the power of the 
Government to send them without a violation of the public 
faith pledged by him as the commandant of the fort. 55 Thus 
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Major Anderson, according to the President, had produced a 
stalemate which could only be broken when the truce ended, and 
Hayne's negotiations were prolonged until February 5.56 It 
was an anomalous fact that the Government's first and only 
real attempt to send reinforcements to Charleston harbor was 
to lead to a situation which for weeks prevented a second 
effort. 
This act of firmness on the part of Buchanan had brought 
other results. The Secretary of Interior, Jacob Thompson, 
claimed that the President had promised, after the orders for 
reinforcements had been held up temporarily to await the reply 
of the ~outh Carolina Commissioners, that no further orders 
would be issued without being previously considered and dis-
cussed in the Cabinet. 57 It seems that Thompson was kept in 
the dark on the "Star of the test" expedition, for on the 
very day that it sailed from New York, he sent Judge A. B. 
Longstreet of South Carolina, a message to the effect that he 
55. Buchanan, James, £E. £li. p. 194 
56. Ibid, p. 195 
57. Curtis, 2£ • .ill. vol. 2, PP. 401, 402 





) . . 
didn't believe that any additional troops would be sent to 
Charleston while the "present status" lasted; but if Fort 
Sumter should be attacked, he believed they would be sent. 58 
On the day before he had telegraphed to a Mr. Kimball, of 
Jackson, Mississippi, that no troops had been sent, nor would 
be, while he was a member of the Cabinet.59 Naturally, the 
Secretary's discomfiture was uncomfortable when on January 8 
he learned that reinforcements had been sent. He sent the 
President his letter of resignation the same day, charging 
that the matter of reinforcements had been discussed in the 
Cabinet meeting of January 2, but no conclusion had been 
reached. 60 The President sent Thompson a letter accepting 
his resignation, January 9, with a full argument against the 
Secretary's contention, which showed that Thompson must have 
been asleep at the Cabinet meetings or was lying. The 
President regretted that he had been mistaken. 6l Thus the 
~~ \\ . 
Star of the West fiasco at least accomplished a resignation' 
from the Cabinet which should have occured back in December 
with that of Cobb. The post of Thompson was not filled by a 
new appOintment, the duties being performed by the chief 
clerk, Moses Kelly, until the close of the administration. 62 
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The new policy also brought the resignation of Philip F. Thomas, 
Secretary of Treasury, who gave his reason to be the purpose 
of the Cabinet and President to enforce the collection of the 
58. Crawford, 2£, £!i. p • 178 
59. Ibid. 
60. Curtis, .2£. ill. vol. 2, pp. 401, 402. 
61. Ibid, p. 402. 
62. 13Uc".Ei8.m8. n, J arne s , .2£. £lie p. III 
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customs in the port of Charleston. He resigned January 11. 63 
Thus# by January 11# all the secessionists were out of the 
Cabinet. John A. Dix, of New York, w~s immediately appointed 
to fill the Treasury vacancy#64 and he was a strong Unionist. 
The stiffening of the Buchanan administration 'was also 
made evident in the President's message to Congress on January 8, 
1861. According to one of the Cabinet members, Thomas# it 
was written paragraph by paragraph in the presence of the 
Cabinet and discussed as it was prepared. 65 The President 
stated frankly that the hope that Congress might make some 
amicable adjustment of the difficulty had been diminished by 
every hour of delay# and that as the prospect of a bloodless 
settlement faded away the public distress was becoming more 
aggravated. Government bonds were not being taken at a lower 
rate of interest than 12 percent~96 There was an absence of 
negative emphasis, such as insistence on the lack of power to 
coerce a State and a positive emphasis on his "right and ••• 
duty to use military force defensively against those who resist 
the Federal officers in the execution of their legal functions 
and against those who assail the property of the Federal 
" Government. 67 But the President still urged Congress to act 
to settle the difficulties which had now reached such vast 
and alarming proportions as to place the subject above and 
beyond Executive control. "The fact can not be disguised", 
said the President, "that we are in the midst of a great 
revolution. In all its various bearings, therefore, I commend 
the question to Congress as the only human tribunal under 
63. Ibid, p. 110 
64. Ibid. 
65. RanOall, J. G., ££. ~. p. 209 
66. Richardson, J. D., .Q£..cit. vol. 5, p. 655 









Providence possessing the power to meet the existing emergency.u68 
Then the President declared that to Congress alone belonged 
the power to declare war or to authorize the employment o~ 
military force in all cases contemplated by the Constitution l 
and Congress alone possessed the power to remove grievances 
which might lead to war and to secure peace and union to the 
69 
distracted country. Instead of condemning the North for 
bringing on the trouble, as he did in his message of December 4, 
the President now accused the South of being in the wrong. 
He was firmly convinced that the secession movement "has been 
chiefly based upon a misapprehension at the South o~ the 
sentiments o~ the majority in several o~ the Northern States." 
He appealed through Congress to the people of the country that 
the Union "must and shall be preserved by all constitutional 
means. ff "The present If, he said, "is no time for palliations. 
Action, prompt action, is required. A delay in Congress to 
prescribe or to recommend a distinct and practical proposition 
for conciliation may drive us to a point from which it will 
be almost impossible to recede. ff70 Toward the end o~ the 
message he praised Major Anderson ~or his occupation of Fort 
Sumter and gave evidence to the effect that the move had been 
made according to orders. 71 
This was the last time the President addressed Congress on 
the subject of disunion. In this last message he stressed two 
w'llck 
aspects of his policy in~he was consistent ~rom the beginning, 
that Congress or the people should find some satisfactory 
68. Richardson, J. D., 2£. £li. vol. 5, p. 656. 
69. Ibid. 
70. !bId, p. 657. 











. compromise, and that any forceful measures were for the 
Congress to prescribe and outside the province of the 
Executive. In closing his message of January 8, 1861, the 
President expressed sentiments prophetic of the avalanche 
of criticism to be loosed upon him. He said: 
In conclusion it may be permitted to me to remark that I 
have often warned my countrymen of the dangers which now 
surround us. This may be the last time I shall refer to 
the subject officially. I feel that my duty has been 
faithfully, tho~gh it may be imperfectly, performed, and, 
whatever the result may be, I shall carry to my grave the 
consciousness that I at least meant well for my country.62 
72. Richardson, J. D., ££. £li. vol. 5, p. 659. 
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THE HAYNE MISSION AND THE END OF THE BUCHANAN ADMINISTRAT ION 
The attempt through the "Star o:f the west" to rein:force Fort 
Sumter marked the highest point of Buchanan's "aggressive" 
defensive policy. Major Anderson, because o:f hesitancy 
and overcaution, and a sincere aversion to initiating a 
civil war, played into the hands of the South Carolina 
authorities when he made the truce with the Governor. l The 
di:fficulty of the Fort Sumter situation was that time W.~SON 
the side of the South Carolinians. Although military pre-
parations had been in progress in the harbor since the 
occupation of Sumter by Anderson, the South Carolina military 
power was very slight at the time Anderson made the truce. 
On January I, the South Carolinians had on :Morris Island 
only three 24-pounders, manned by a :force that had probably 
never seen a 24-pounder manipulated or fired. 2 It was all 
important for South Carolina to have time to erect batteries 
and strengthen the forts taken over from the Federal 
Government, while the small Federal force in Fort Sumter was 
isolated a~d without rein:forcements. 
The President, writing in 1866, said that Major Anderron 
probably had committed an error in making the truce, that 
1. a See page 85 • 
2. Chadwick, French Ensor, ££. £!i. p. 240. 
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under the laws of war it might be annulled after due notice 
to Governor Pickens; but it would cast a serious reflection 
on Major Anderson for having concluded it, although he, 
beyond question, had acted from the purest and most patriotic 
motives."3 In this connection it is interesting to refer to 
the communication to Anderson from Secretary of War Holt on 
January 16, 1861. Holt stated that Anderson rightly de-
signated the firing on the "Star of the West U as "an act of 
war", and had it been perpetrated by a foreign nation, it 
would have been "your imperative duty to have resented it 
with the whole force of your batteries"; but as it was the 
work of the Government of South Carolina, which must still be 
considered a member of the Union, and was prompted by the 
passions of citizens of the United States, his forbearance 
to return the fire was fully approved by the President.4 But 
note the responsiblity of Major Anderson for a return to the 
non-reinforcement policy. In the same letter Holt stated 
that, from Anderson's late dispatches, the Government was 
relieved of the apprehensions previously entertained for his 
safety, and therefore it was not the Government's purpose 
at present to reinforce him. "The attempt to do sort, said 
Holt, "would, no doubt, be attended by a collision of arms 
and the effusion of blood - a national calamity which the 
President is most anxious, if possible, to avoid."5 From 
this point on, Major Anderson must share a large part of the 
responsibility for his own discomfiture. He was told in the 
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same letter that whe,never.. in his judgment .. additional supplies 
or reinforcements were necessary for his safety .. or for a 
Successful defense of the fort .. he was to communicate the 
fact at once to the War Department, and a prompt and vigorous 
effort would be made to forward them. 6 
secretary of State Black, impatient at the turn events 
were taking, on the same day as Holt's letter to Anderson, 
addressed a long letter to General Scott. In this letter 
Judge Black expressed a fear that the old policy of inaction 
was to be resumed. He asked General Scott three questions; 
1. "Is it the duty of the Government to reinforce Major 
Anderson?" 2. ~rIf yes .. how soon is it necessary that those 
reinforcements should be there?" 3. "vVhat obstacles exist 
to prevent the sending of such reinforcements at any time 
when it may be necessary to do sJl7 'Judge Black said that 
it then seemed to be settled that Major Anderson and his 
command at Fort Sumter were not to be withdrawn. But if 
the troops remained in Fort Sumter without any change in their 
condition, and the hostile attitude of South Carolina re-
mained the same, the question of surrender was one of time 
only. "If he is not to be relieved", asked Judge Black .. "is 
it not entirely clear that he should be ordered to surrender 
at once?" He urged that relief be sent at once before it was 
too late to save him. 8 Black asked for an immediate reply 
from Scott .. but it seems that he never received one. 9 
6. Ibid. 
7. Crawford .. .212..~. p. 237. 
8. Crawford .. ££. cit. p. 237. 








It was just three days before Secretary of State Black's 
questions were put to General Scott that South Carolina's 
envoy, I. W. Hayne, arrived in Washington, accompanied by 
Lieut. Hall, Major Anderson's messenger. They arrived on 
January 13, and on the next morning, January 14, Hayne called 
upon the President and stated that he would deliver the 
Governor's letter on the following day. The President, 
"admonished by his recent experience with the former 
• 
commissioners", declined to hold any conversation with h1m 
124 
on the subject of his mission, and requested that all communi-
cations between them might be in writing. lO The President 
suspected that the message contained a demand for the 
surrender of Fort Sumter, "which he was at all times prepared 
peremptorily to reject." The President expected that the 
letter would be transmitted to him on the following day, that 
he would refuse to surrender the fort, and the truce would 
be terminated, leaving both parties free to act as each saw 
fit.ll 
On January 16, Senator C. C. Clay, of Alabama, called 
upon the President on behalf of a group of Senators from 
seceding States. He mentioned the fact that there had been 
a truce agreed on so long as Hayne was in Washington, to 
which the President agreed. The President was told that 
these Senators wanted Hayne to remain a few days while they 
submitted through him a proposition to the Government of 












South Carolina, suggesting that the latter agree that 
Major Anderson should be placed in his former position; 
which meant that he was not to be treated as under siege; 
that his Government might have free access to him, and he 
could buy all the provisions he wanted in Charleston. He 
should not be disturbed if the President would not send 
him additional reinforcements. Senator Clay went on to 
suggest that the truce, already effected and confirmed by 
the President, might be extended till the 4th of March. 12 
The President made it clear that the truce would last only 
until Hayne left Washington, and that no proposition could 
be entertained unless it was presented in writing. The 
last sentence of Buchanan's memorandum on this interview) 
made it clear that he "could not, and would not, withdraw 
Major Anderson from Fort Sumter.,,13 This action on the part 
of the seceding Senators was an attempt to forestall any 
action on the part of South Carolina until the Southern Con-
federate Government had been organized, when the controversy 
regarding possession of the Charleston forts would be made 
a part of a more comprehensive programme of "taking over". 
Nearly all the cotton States seceded in January. It was 
expected that the Confederate Government would be instituted 
in a few weeks, and to that Government Jefferson Davis was 
anxious to leave the settlement of the Charleston harbor 
125 
controversy. Davis wrote to Governor Pickens after Hayne had 
12. Curtis,~. £!i. vol. 2, PP. 452, 453. Buchanan's memorandum. 


















arrived in Washington: 
The opinion of your friends • • • is adverse to the 
presentation of a demand for the evacuation of Fort Sumter. 
The little garrison in its present position presses 
on nothing but a point of pride, and to you I need not say 
that war is made up of real elements. Your friends here 
think that you can well afford to stand still, so far as 
the presence of' the garrison is concerned, a nd if things 
continue as they are for a month, we shall then be in 
a co~!tion to speak with a voice which all must hear and 
heed. 
The above was written on January 20, just a week after 
Hayne had arrived in Washington, and after the seceding 
Senators had conferred and agreed on a plan of delayed 
action. Just a week before, January 13, the day Hayne 
arrived in Washington, but of whose mission Davis had only 
a vague idea, the latter's letter to Pickens was quite 
different in tone. Davis had written to Pickens on January 13: 
I cannot place any confidence in the adherence of the 
administration to a fixed line of policy. The general 
tendency is to hostile measures, and against these it is 
needful for you to prepare. I take it for granted that 
.the time allowed to the garrison of Fort Sumter has been 
diligently employed by yourselves, so that before you 
could be driven out of your earthworks you will be able 
to capture the fort which commands them. 
Let us compare the letter of January 13 with that of January 20, 
and we can agree that Davis expected the Hayne mission to tie 
up any action on the part of the Government, and in this he 
was supported by the President's own views. If Hayne could 
be kept in Washington, the truce would remain in effect, 
Davis could trust in a "fixed line of policy", the Charleston 
batteries would be strengthened, and the Confederate Government 
14. Crawford, 2£. cit. p. 265. 
15. Crawford, ££. £1i. p. 264. 
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would be a Going concern, able to cooperate with South 
Carolina, while the Government's position, and that of 
the garrison in Fort Sumter, would be growing daily weaker. 
On January 15, Senators Louis T. Wigfall, John Hemphill, 
D. L. Yulee, S. R. Mallory, Jefferson Davis, C. C. Clay, 
Benjamin Fitzpatrick, A. Iverson, John Slidell and J. P. 
Benjamin had addressed their note to Hayne, asking him to 
defer presenting the South Carolina Governor's letter to 
the President.16 They said they had assurances that 
Sumter was held with no hostile purpose, but "merely as 
property of the United States". They went on to say that 
they represented States which had already seceded fram the 
United States, or would have done so before February 1, and 
those States would meet with South Carolina in convention 
before li'ebruary 15. Then, flour people feel that they have 
a common destiny with your people, and expect to form with 
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them in that convention, a new confederation and provisional 
government. We must and will share your fortunes - suffering 
with you the evils of war, if it cannot be avoided, and 
enjoying with you the blessings of peace it if can be preserved. 
We therefore trust that an arrangement will be agreed upon 
between you and the President, at least till the 15th of 
February next, by which time your and our States may in con-
vention devise a Wise, just, and peaceable solution of existing 
difficulties. If not clothed with power to make such an 













arrangement, then we trust that you will submit our sugges-
tions to the Governor of your State for his instructions."17 
They added that, of course, until Hayne had received his 
reply and communicated it to the President, South Carolina 
would not attack Fort Sumter, and the President would not 
reinforce it.18 They urged, too, that South Carolina should 
allow Major Anderson to obtain necessary supplies of food, 
, , 
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fuel or water, and enjoy free communication with the President, 
all of which had been prohibited or seriously curtailed, 
upon the understanding that the President would not send 
reinforcements during the same period.19 
Hayne replied to the Senators on January 17, saying that 
he had no power to make the arrangement referred to, but 
that he agreed to withhold the presentation of the Governor's 
letter pending further instructions. 20 On the 19th of January 
the correspondence between the Senators and Hayne was sub-
mitted to the PreSident, accompanied by a note from three of 
the Senators asking him to take the subject under consideration. 
The President's answer made through his Secretary of War, on 
January 22,21 stated that the President refused to enter into 
the proposed agreement. The Senators were told that they 
did Mr. Buchanan no more than justice when to Hayne they had 
said: "Notwithstanding the circumstances under which Major 
Anderson left Fort Moultrie and entered Fort Sumter with the 
forces under his command, it was not taken, and is not held, 
17. Nicolay and Hay, ££. ~. Vol. 3, pp. 155, 156. 
18. Ibid, p. 156. 
19. Crawford,~.~. p. 219. 
20. Ibid, p. 220 
21. B'U'Cii'anan, James, 2,E. ill. p. 198. 


















with any hostile or unf'riendly purpose towards your state, 
but merely as property of the United States, which the 
President deemed it his duty to protect and preserve. ff22 
The same words had been used in the reply to the South 
Carolina commissioners. The Secretary further declared 
that as to the proposition of Hayne, that no reinforcements 
would be sent to Fort Sumter in the interval, and that the 
public peace would not be disturbed by any act of hostility 
towards South Carolim, it was impossible for him to give 
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any such assurances; the President had no power to enter into 
such an engagement. But further, flat the present moment 
it is not deemed necessary to reinforce Major Anderson, be-
cause he makes no such request, and feels quite secure in 
his position. Should his safety, however, require rein-
forcements, every effort will be made to supply them. "23 The 
secretary expressed his pleasure at Hayne's assurance that 
Major Anderson was then receiving all necessary supplies-
from Charleston, and hoped that he would continue to do so. 
Yet in a report to the War Department of the same date as the 
above, Maj6r Anderson asked that he be sent through Leiut. 
Hall some tlthin ruled note paper, with envelopes". Being 
cut off from Charleston, he could not procure "those indis-
pensable articles.,,24 
On the next day, January 29, seven of the seceding 
Senators again addressed Hayne, enolosing him a copy of 
22. Official Records, vol. 1, p. 149. 
23. Ibid, p. 150. 
24. tbi(l. 
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Secretary Holt's reply and again asking him to withhold the 
Governor's letter unt1l he had further 1nstruot1ons. They 
expressed the hope that South Carol1na would take no step 
tend1ng to produce a collis1on unt11 their States should join 
the1r counsels w1th hers. 25 In his reply to th1s note, 
Hayne took advantage of both the Pres1dent's and Holt's 
declarat10n that Fort Sumter was held and protected as merely 
property. He gave an argument on purely a property bas1s, 
say1ng that South Caro11na would acorn the appropr1at1on of 
another's property without paying for it to the last dollar. 
He adv1sed that holding the fort by Un1ted States troops was 
the worst poss1ble means of protect1ng it as "property".26 
Later developments were to prove h1m correct in the latter 
observation. 
After a rather long and repetitious exchange of correspon-
dence among the several parties concerned, Hayne, at last, 
received the reply of the Governor of South Carolina, on 
January 30, and on the next day, January 31, transmitted the 
reply to the President. 27 The Governor's letter was dated 
January 12, the day Hayne left Charleston, and Hayne trans-
mitted it with a long letter of h1s own to the President. 28 
The Governor's long-delayed letter read as follows: 
At the t1me of the separation of the State of South 
Carolina from the United States, Fort Sumter was, and still 
is, in the possession of the troops of the United States, 
under the command of Major Anderson. I regard that . 
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of the State of South Carolina, and have this day 
addressed to Major Anderson a communication to obtain 
possession of that fort by the authorities of this 
State. The reply of Major Anderson informs me that he 
has no authority to do what I required, but he desires 
a reference of the demand to the President of the 
United States. Under the circumstances now existing, 
and which need no comment from me, I have deter~ined to 
sand to you Hon. I. W. Hayne, the Attorney-General of 
the Btate of South Carolina, and have instructed him to 
demand the delivery of Fort Sumter. In the harbor of 
Charleston, to the constituted authorities of South 
Carolina. The demand I have made of Major Anderson, and 
which I now make of you, is suggested by my earnest 
desire to avoid the bloodshed which a persistence in 
your attempt to retain possession of that fort will .cause, 
and which will be unavailing to secure to you that 
possession, but induce a calamity most deeply to be de-
plored. If consequences so unhappy shall ~nsue, I will 
secure for this State, in the demand which I now make, 
the satisfaction of having exhausted every attempt to 
avoid it.29 
The last paragraph of the letter emphasized the purely 
proprietary aspect of the demand, for which view there had 
been some support given by the President's statements. On 
this point the Governor continued: 
In relation to the public property of the United States 
within Fort Sumter, the Hon. I. W. Hayne, who will hand 
you this communication, is authorized to give you the 
pledge of the State that the valuation of such property 
will be accounted for by this State, upon the adjustment 
of its 38lations with the United States, of which it was 
a part. 
To this letter the President gave an answer through the 
Secretary of War, February 6, 1861. The Secretary of War 
went over the whole ground of the correspondence exchanged 
on the subject of Hayne's mission, and gave a very able 
and thorough argument against the claims advanced by the 
Governor and Hayne. 3l The reply was too long for full 
29. ·eu:rtis, .£l2.. £li. vol. 2, p. 456. 
30. Curtis,.2.£. £li. vol. 2, p.I 456. 











quotation in this paper, but it definitely corrected the 
impression that the demand for the surrender of the fort 
was to be made on a purely proprietary basis. Hayne had 
referred, in one of his communications to the President, 
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to the right of "eminent domain" possessed by South Carolina. 
Said the Secretary of War: 
The title of the United States to Fort Sumter is complete 
and incontestable. Were its interest in this property 
purely proprietary, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, 
it might, probably, be subjected to the exercise of the 
right of eminent domain; but it has also political relations 
to it, of a much higher and more imposing character than 
those of mere proprietorship. It has absolute jurisdiction 
over the fort and the soil on which it stands ••• South 
Carolina can no more assert the right of eminent domain 
over Fort Sumter than Maryland can assert it over the 
District of Columbia. The political and proprietary rights 
of the United States in either case rest upon precisely 
the same grounds. 32 
Holt added that the President was relieved from the necessity 
of further pursuing that phase of the subject, whatever might 
be the claim of South Carolina to the fort, as he had no 
constitutional power to cede or surrender it.33 Holt stated 
that it could not be a menace to the safety of Charleston 
and South Carolina, as the garrison was acting under orders 
to act strictly on the defensive; that South Carolina must 
well know that she could receive nothing but shelter fram 
its guns, unless, in the absence of all provocation, she 
should assault it and seek its destruction. 34 The Secretary 
quoted Jefferson Davis and the other seceding Senators, in 
their letter to Hayne of January 15, to counter the argument 
of the Governor that the fort was a menace to the safety of 
South Carolina: "It is not held with any hostile or unfriendly 
32. Ibid, p. 167 
33. Ibid. 
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purpose towards your State, but merely as property of the 
United States, which the President deems it his duty to 
protect and preserve".35 In conclusion the Secretary 
declared: 
If, with all the multiplied proofs which exist of the 
President's anxiety for peace and of the earnestness 
with which he has pursued it, the authorities of that 
State shall assault Fort Sumter and peril the lives of 
the handful of brave and loyal men shut up within its 
walls., and thus plunge our common country into the horrors 
of civil war, then upon them, and them alone., must rest 
the responsibility.36 
In a letter dated February 7, but which the President 
has said addressed to him on February 8, Hayne gave what 
the President considered an insulting reply., flnot to 
Secretary Holt, as usage and common civility required, but 
directly to the President".37 Hayne commenced his letter by 
saying that he was constrained to correct some t'strange mis-
apprehensions into which your Secretary has fallen tl • 38 The 
reply was a very bitter denunciation of the Govermnent's 
policy., and contained a flat denial of the Secretary's 
inplied charge that Hayne had ~odified the original demand 
of the Governor. Said Hayne: 
You next attempt to ridicule the proposal as simply an 
offer on the part of South Carolina to buy Fort Sumter and 
contents as property of the United States., sustained by a 
declaration, in effect., that if she is not permitted to 
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make the purchase, she will seize the fort by force of arms. 
It is difficult to consider this as other than intentional 
misconstruction. 39 
Then Hayne delivered a rather astute argument when he referred 
to the point of the President's former declaration that the 
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It was precisely because you had yourself chosen to place 
your action upon the ground of 'purely proprietary' right, 
that the proposal of compensation was made, and you admit 
that in this view 'it (Fort Sumter) would probably be 
subjected to t he exercise of the right of eminent domain. 
In your letter of yesterday (through your Secretary) you 
shift your position. You claim that your Government bears 
to Fort Sumter 'political relations of a much higher and 
more imposing character,.40 
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Hayne's letter was returned to him on the same day, 
addressed to Charleston, with the following indorsement by the 
President: liThe character of this letter is such that it 
cannot be received. Col. Hayne having left the city before 
it was sent to the President, it is returned to him by the 
,'" 41 first mail. ' 
Although Hayne failed in his immediate mission, the 
seceding Senators had scored a success in their policy of 
delay. Hayne was kept in Washington from January 13 to 
February 7, during which time,by the President's own admission, 
the status quo in Charleston harbor was to be maintained, uni-
laterally only, while the South Carolinians were free to prepare 
to take the fort. Also, by February 7, the Confederate 
Government was well on the way to being instituted. Seven 
States had now seceded, and shortly before Hayne had left 
Washington, a meeting of delegates was held at Montgomery, 
Alabama, to form a provisional Government for the Southern 
Confederacy. The provisional government was soon formed and 
in operation.42 By the 18th of February, Jefferson Davis 
had been inaugurated as President, and the new Government 
40. Crawford, 22. £!1. p. 232. 
41. Buchanan, James, 2E. cit. p. 205 
42. Channing, 2E.. £l:..t.. p. 272, vol. 6 




was put into operation.43 The forts in Charleston harbor 
were no longer a subject for negotiation between the Federal 
Government and South Carolina, for the Confederacy had taken 
over the matter. 
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In addition to Major Anderson's truce, which the President 
had respected, a nd which had precluded the reinforcement of 
of Fort Sumter for several weeks, there was yet another event 
which, in the mind of the President, amounted to a truce. 
This was the Peace Convention, which had been instituted under 
the auspices of the General Assembly of Virginia. Now, on 
February 4, just a day or two before the Anderson truce and 
the Hayne mission ended, this Peace Convention assembled in 
Washington. It was presided over by the ex-President John 
Tyler, and had many distinguished names among its delegates. 
The Convention was seriously weakened by the refusal of the 
seven States of the lower South to send delegates, as well as 
the failure to do so on the part of Arkansas, Michigan, 
Wisconsin, Minnesota, California, and Oregon.44 The Convention 
delib,erated until February 27, when it presented to Congress a 
plan of conciliation, involving seven amendments to the 
Constltution, very similar to those of the abortive Crittenden 
plan. The plan received but negligible support when brought 
to a vote in the Senate on March 2. Even the Virginia leaders 
repudiated the plan of the Convention. 
43. 
44. 
Thus, as the President has said, this Peace Convention "had 
Burgess, QQ. £!i. vol. 1, p. 123. 






















interposed another insurmountable obstacle to the reinforce-
ment of Fort Sumter, unless attacked or in immediate danger 
of attack, without entirely defeating this beneficent 
measure".45 Thus, knowing the President's paramount desire 
that some plan of compromise might be effected to insure a 
peaceful settlement of the crisis, and in the light of his 
own statement above, it is logical to consider the Peace 
Convention with the same force of a truce as the truce made 
by Major Anderson. This view is supported" in a measure, 
by a dispatch from the Secretary of War to Major Anderson, 
February 23. In this dispatch, the Secretary reminded 
Anderson that he still held Fort Sumter as he had helf Fort 
Moultrie, under the orders given him by Major Buell, 
December 11, and as subsequently modified by the instructions 
of December 21. Anderson was to continue to act strictly on 
the defensive, and was encouraged and advised as follows: 
A dispatch received in this city a few days since from 
Governor Pickens, connected with the declaration on the 
part of those convened at Montgomery, clamining to act on 
behalf of South Carolina as well as the other seceded 
States, that the question of the possession of the forts 
and other public property therein had been taken from the 
decision of the individual States and would probably be 
preceded in its settlement by negotiation with the ' 
Government of the United States, has impressed the President 
with a belief that there will be no immediate attack on 
Fort Sumter, and the hope is indulged in that wise and 
patriotic counsels may prevail and prevent it altogether • 
The labors of the Peace Congress have not yet closed, and 
the presence of that body here adds another to the powerful 
motives already existing for the adoption of every measure, 
except in necessary self-defense, for avoiding a collision 
with the forces that surround you. 46 
45. Buchanan, James,...2l2.t cit. p. 206. 



















Thus, from January 13 to almost the end of the Buchanan 
administration, the President had considered his hands tied 
in the matter of reinforcements. Yet, they would probably 
have been sent even during the Peace Convention had there 
been an attack or danger of attack. 
It must be noticed, to the credit of the Buchanan 
administration, that on January 30, the President was taking 
measures to reinforce in case of need. On Janu~ry 30, the 
day before he had received the demand of Governor Pickens 
for the surrender of Fort Sumter, the President had requested 
the Secretaries of War and the Navy, accompanied by General 
Scott, to meet him for the purpose od devising the best 
practicable means of "instantly reinforcing Major Anderson, 
should this be requiredtr • 47 After several consultations 
an expedition for that purpose was quietly prepared at 
New York, under the direction of Secretary Toucey, the command 
of which was intrusted to the Secretary's intimate friend, 
Commander Ward. The expedition consisted of a few small 
steamers, and it was arranged that on receiving a telegram 
from the Secretary of the Navy, in case of an emergency, 
the Commander, in the course of the following night, should 
set sail for Charleston, He was to enter the harbor in the 
night and anchor under the guns of Fort Sumter.48 Again it 
must be noticed that Major ..Anderson's changed opinion on 
reinforcement contributed in large measure to the Government's 
policy at this time. On January 30, the same day that the 
47. Buchanan, James, 2£. cit. pp. 210, 211. 
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President was arranging for the expedition to relieve him 
in case of an emergency, Anderson was writing to the War 
Department, hoping "that no attempt will be made by our 
friends to throw supplies in; their doing so would do more 
harm than good". 49 
Another attempt to form a plan of relief for Major 
Anderson had been undertaken by General Scott. Early in 
January, soon after the"Star of the Vlestllfiasco, Captain 
G. V. Fox submitted a plan in writing to a friend of 
<, 
General Scott, to whom it was shown and approved. 50 The Fox 
plan was to place troops and provisions on board a large 
'I ) steamer, preferably the Baltic, whiCh was to carry three 
hundred extra sailors and enough armed launches to land all 
the troops in one night. The whole was to be convoyed by 
the United States sloop of war, the Pawnee, the only avail-
able steam vessel north of the Gulf of Mexico. The batteries 
were to be run at night by the tugs. 5l On February 4, 
General Scott summoned Fox to Washington. The plan was dis-
cussed in the presence of Major Anderson's messenger, Lieut. 
Hall, who had accompanied Hayne and was still in Washington. 
The plan was approved by Scott on February 7, and he agreed 
to present it to the President that evening. Fox's plan 
was turned down. for the time in deference to the Peace 
Convention. 52 According to the President's statement, it was 
49. Official Records, vol. 1, p. 159. 
50. Crawford,.9.l2.t. cit. p. 248. 
51. Ibid, p. 249. 














learned a few days after the termination of Major Anderson's 
truce that Governor Pickens had determined to respect the 
appeal made to him by the General Assembly of Virginia, and 
to retrain from attacking the fort during the session of the 
Peace Convention. 53 
The story of President Buchanan's policy regarding Fort 
Sumter would not be complete without a word or so about the 
Fort Pickens truce. At Pensacola, Florida, there was a 
large navy yard, and near it, on the mainland,Fort Barrancas 
with a nominal garrison of 46 men under Lieut. A. J. Slemmer; 
also there was Fort McRae, occupied by an ordnance sergeant 
only, and Fort Pickens, entirely unoccupied. 54 On January 3, 
General Scott sent a written order to Slemmer to take 
measures to prevent the seizure of either- of the forts in 
Pensacola Harbor by surprise or assault. Slemmer received 
the order on January 9 and immediately started the occupation 
of Fort Pickens, comp.~ting his move on January 11.55 On 
~ 
January 21, orders were given by the Assistant Adjutant-General 
,. " for the sloop of war Brooklyn to be provisioned and loaded 
with troops,w.ith sealed orders for Captain Vogdes, not to be 
opened until the ship was at sea. 56 The sealed orders directed 
Captain Vogdes to reinforce Fort Pickens, of which he would 
become the commander, as well as of other forts which it 
might be in his power to occupy and defend with the cooperation 
53. Buchanan, James, 2£- £il. p. 209 
54. Nicolay and Hay, 2£. £li. vol. 3, p. 162 
55. Ibid, p. 163. 














of any naval commanders at hand. The company was to be first 
landed to cover the supplies intended for the fort. 57 In a 
postscript Vogdes was given to understand 'that he was not to 
attempt any reoccupation or recapture involving hostile 
collision, but to confine himself strictly to the defensive.58 
But it seems that representations from ex-president Tyler, 
Senator Mallory, and others, prevailed on the President to 
change the plan of reinforcing Fort Pickens. 59 On the 28th 
of January, Senators Slidell, Hunter, and Bigler received a 
telegram from Senator Mallory, who had gone to Pensacola to 
inspect the situation. Mallory asked them to present the 
telegram to the President. 60 ~~llory reported: 
We hear the "Brooklyn" is coming with reinforcements for 
Fort Pickens. No attack on its garrison is contemplated, 
but, on the contrary, we desire to keep the peace, and if 
the present status be preserved we will guarantee that no 
attack will be made upon it, but if reinforcements be 
attempted, resistance and a bloody confl~ct seem inevitable • 
Should the Government thus attempt to augment its force-
when no possible call for it exists; when we are preserving 
a peaceful policy-an assualt may be made upon the fort at a 
moment's warning. Our whole force - 1,800 strong - will 
regard it. as a hostile act. Impress this upon the President, 
and urge that the inevitable consequence of reinforcement 
under ~resent circumstances is instant war, as peace will 
be preserved if no reinforcements be attempted.ol 
The peaceful intent, barring reinforcements, expressed by 
Mallory, is hard to reconcile with the fact that already the 
navy yard had been demanded by Florida authorities and 
surrendered. 62 Mallory1s telegram was dated the 28th, and on 
57. Ibid, p. 352. 
58. Ibid. 
59. NICOlay and Hay, 2£. ~. vol. 3, p. 166 
60. Official Records, vol. I, p. 354. 
61. Official Records, vol. I, p. 354. 











the 29th of January the Secretaries of War and the Navy sent 
a joint order to the officers responsible at Pensacola. The 
assurances of Senator Mallory were believed, Fort Pickens 
would not be assaulted, so "you are instructed not to land 
L» . 
the company on board the Brooklyn unless said fort shall be 
attacked or preparations shall be made for its attack. The 
provisions necessary for the supply of the fort you will 
land. "53 But the "Brooklyn') and other vessels were. to reamin 
and the officers were to exercise the utmost vigilance and 
be prepared to land the company at a moment's warning. They 
were to instantly repel an attack on the fort. 54 This has 
been considered as a truce, but the time limit was indefinite. 
The Anderson truce ended when Hayne left Washington. The 
secessionists claimed that the Pickens truce was still in 
e·ffect when the Lincoln administration was inaugurated. 
Buchanan has stated his reasons for the trude. He 
141 
carefully considered Senator Mallory's proposal". The Brooklyn 
might not arrive in time for the protection of the fort. 
Besides, he thought a collision would be fatal to the Virginia 
Peace Convention, about to assemble. But the fort was badly 
in need of provisions, and these must flat every hazard" be 
supplied. 55 The President later claimed that the decision 
reached was with the approbation of every member of the Cabinet, 
but in a letter in July, 1861, Secretary Stanton declared that 
the order was opposed by himself, Black, and Dix. 66 General 
63. Official Records, vol. 1, p. 355. 
64. Ibid. 
65. Buchana, James, 2E. cit. p. 215. 
66. North American Revie~ovember 1879, p. 481. 
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ScottI in a later report to Lincoln# severely condemned the 
Pickens truce# and said the armistice was consequent upon 
the meeting of the Peace Convention# and was understood to 
end with it.67 Scott denied that he had approved the truce 
or the joint order of the Secretaries establishing it. This 
claim must have been a result of defective memory, for 
Secretary Holt# in a letter to Buchanan, declared that Scott 
was shown the order and said that he could see no objection 
to it. 68 Thus the Buchanan administration ended on March 4, 
1861# after having "muddled through" one of the most critical 
periods in the history of the nation. The key to the policy 
throughout the four months of the secession threat was, 
without doubt# the overwhelming desire to avoid ,war at almost 
any cost, and to cling to any hopeI even the faintest# of 
saving the Union without a civil war. 
There has been written a mass of criticism, favorable 
and unfavorable, of Buchanan's course. Many reasons and 
theories have been advanced to explain his conduct of the 
crisis. A Democratic anti-secessionist candidate for the 
qpvernorship of Tennessee, in a campaign speech delivered an 
extremely condemnatory opinion of Buchanan. As this was a 
very common opinion of Union men immediately after Buchanan's 
retirement, it is worthy of quotation. Said Parson Brownlow, 
March 23, 1861: 
67. Buchanan, James# ££. cit., p. 481. 







The late Chief Magistrate, James Buchanan, was in-
augurated into office under auspices of general peace and 
prosperity, -- strong in the confidence of a might, united, 
and triumphant Democracy. Possessed of every aid and 
inducement to an hontest, a patriotic, a brilliant, and 
a vigorous and successful administration of the Government, 
he has retired from power amid general execration and 
disgrace, carrying into his retirement the offioial brand 
of public condemnation upon his forenead, and leaving to 
history, as the only trophies of his administration, the 
national treasury depleted, the country loaded with an 
incubus of debt, that great national and conservative party, 
to whose generous and confiding suffrages he owes all 
his fortunes, demoralized and dismembered, and perpetuity 
of the republic a doubtful and an appalling problem, and 
his own name a by-word of infamy and derision throughout 
the civilized world. 69 
The same opinion as the above has been expressed by many 
historians with a Northern viewpoint. The charge has been 
frequently made that Buchanan's policy was strained in the 
"skim-milk of apology", that it had no backbone in it, and 
that the secessionists who came to Washington to negotiate 
with the Government should have been arrested as traitors 
instead of being encouraged by official welcome. 70 
The frequent charge that Buchanan was senile and in his 
dotage, incapable of meeting the heavy responsibilities of 
office, must have an element of truth in it, but has been 
probably overemphasized. In a letter to a correspondent of 
New York, on December 20, 1860, the President stated that he 
had never enjoyed better health nor a more tranquil spirit 
than during the past year. He said that all his troubles bad 
not cost him an.hourls sleep or a single meal, though he 
trusted he had a just sense of his high responsibility. "I 
69. Brownlow, W. G., Sketches of the Rise, pro~ess, and 
Decline of Secession. Philadelphia, George w. hIlds Co., 
1862, p. 232. 
70. Schoulder, 22. £!1. vol. 5, p. 472. 
weigh well and prayerfully", he said, "what course I ought 
to adopt and adhere to it steadily, leaving the result to 
Providence".7l W. H. Trescot, the Assistant Secretary of 
State during some of Buchanan's most trying months, and 
very much in his confidence, has left his opinion of the 
President, written in February, 1861. Said Trescot of 
Buchanan: 
He therefore diplomatized with those whose action he 
could not entirely stay. He promised not to force an 
issue, to refer to Congress, and in this policy he per-
servered even in the face of General Cass' resignation. 
But the issue came nevertheless, and Major Anderson's 
move to Sumter placed it sharp and sudden before the 
country. Now this policy of delay and compromise and 
reference was Mr. Buchanan's, not his Cabinet's - it was 
conducted without the intervention of his Northern 
members, and in private consultations with his Southern -
not exactly in official pledges, but in conversations 
with Southern members of Congress - in adopting suggest-
ions from Floyd and Thompson - and keeping up indirect 
communications with those in authority in South Carolina. 
When Anderson's conduct made the issue, official action 
was necessary. Mr. Buchanan had to take his choice 
between two courses, to sustain him or condemn him. The 
conduct of his officer was in direct contradiction to the 
whole undercurrent of his policy. • • He surrendered intQ 
the hands of the North and refused to withdraw Anderson. 72 
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Trescot went on to assign a selfish motive for Buchanan's 
policy. His opinion was tllat Buchanan could not bring himself 
to take decisive measures in Lincoln's interestj that while 
he was anxious.to preserve the Union, his secret sympathy . 
was with the South, and in his heart he felt that their pro-
test was his defense. The Black Republican triumph was one 
especially over him, taking from him his State of Penn~ylvan1a, 
71. Curtis, QR. cit. vol. 2, pp. 354, 355. 
72. Hunt, GaITla"I='d:; ed., ff Narra t i ve and Le t te r of William 
Henry Trescot", 2l!.. ill. p. 548. 
~ .. 
and they had held him up tu scorn by the famous Covode 
investigation. According to Trescot, Buchanan had no 
objection to see the storm rage if it stopped short of 
shipwreck, to see the Black Republicans broken to pieces 
in the very flush of their insolent triumph and a reaction 
sweep over the North and float the old Democracy to power 
in 1864. 73 
Buchanan, in his defense, charged with truth that much 
of his dilemma was the result of the persistent refusal of 
Congress to pass laws to increase th~ military forces, and 
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to authorize him to take the necessary measures. The Congress 
that met in December was hostile to the administration and 
not inclined to help the President. Buchanan has charged 
that "Congress positively refused to pass a law conferring 
on the President's authority to call forth the militia, or 
accept the services of volunteers, to suppress insurrections 
which might occur in any State against the Government of 
the United States".74 He further stated that this ammission, 
which ought to have been supplied, was allowed to continue 
until after the end of his administration, and was remedied 
only on the 29th of July, 1861, when Congress conferred the 
necessary power on Lincoln. 75 Buchanan's Secretary of State, 
Judge Black, has made the same charge. In a letter to Henry 
Wilson Black charged that the Republicans refused to increase 
73. Ibid, pp. 549, 550. 
74. BUchanan, James, .2E, • .ill. p. 154. 
75. Ibid. 
the military forces. "iNhy?"1 Black asked; "you must have 
desired the Union cause to be disgraced and defeated l for 
nothing else could have resulted from such a war as you now 
abuse Mr. Buchanan for not making. You and your party in 
Congress ••• did not recommend peace l nor offer your support 
to war. "76 
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As bas. been noted before l the failure of the administration 
to reinforce M~or Anderson after the Cabinet crisis of 
December 30, must be in a large degree charged to the responsi-
bility of Major Anderson. It may be that the Government's 
policy up to that time had demoralized Andersonl and thoroughly 
convinced him that a collision of arms would be the inevitable 
result of reinforcement. In factI there is a letter written 
by Anderson, on April 51 18611 to a woman sympathizer in 
New York, in which he admits his responsibility for the failure 
of reinforcement after the Floyd resignation. Major Anderson 
wrote as follows: 
. Justice l however l compels me not to stop here l but to 
take upon myself the blame of the Government's not having 
sent to my ruscue. Had I demanded reinforcements while 
Mr. Holt was in the War Department I know that he would 
have dispatched them at all hazards, I did not ask for them, 
because I knew that the moment it should be known here 
that additional troops were coming, they would assault me 
and thus inaugurate civil war. My policy, feeling - thanks 
be to God - secure for the present in my stronghold l was to 
keep stil11 to preserve peace l to give time for the quieting 
of the excitement, which was at one time very high through-
put this region, in the hope of avoiding bloodshed. The 
ladies must not then blame the latter part of Mr. Buchanan's 
administration, nor the present one l for not having sent me 
reinforcements. I demanded them under Mr. Floyd. T~~ time 
when they might have been sent has passed weeks agg. 
In the same letter Anderson expressed the hope that the seceding 
States, leaving the Union as friends l might at some future 
76. 
77. 
Blackl C. F. I ~. cit., p. 249. 
Crawfordl 2£. ~.;-Pp. 290 1 291. 
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time be won back by conciliation and justice.78 
Historians of the present day tend to judge Buchanan 
with more tolerance and pronounce a more favorable and 
unprejudiced opinion. A recent study of the period under 
investigation concludes that Buchanan's motives, at any rate, 
were of the best, and that unless one begs the question with 
the assumption that his basic policy of peace toward the 
South was invalid, it is hard to find many mistakes in the 
measures that he actually took. He did avert war for a time, 
giving the various compromise efforts a chance to develop, 
and offering the incoming administration an opportunity to 
work out its own schemes of conciliation, should that be the 
intention. Avoiding any recognition of the Confederacy, 
Buchanan made no commitments that would seriously embarrass 
his successor. 79 
A very thorough study of Buchanan and his Cabinet on the 
eve of secession has been made by Dr. Philip G. Auchampaugh, 
who came to the conclusion that Buchanan had every reason to 
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congratulate himself on the success of his policy. According 
to the writer, Buchanan's main aim, to give things a peaceful 
direction, to prevent the opening of a brothers' war, had been 
accomplished. At the same time, Buchanan had held his Northern 
Cabinet members together, save one, thus preventing the dis-
integration of his administration. No official recogn1tion 
had been given the seceded States, so that his successor was 
under no commitment in that regard. Some Federal property 
had been taken, but other pointshad been reinforced. No stone 
78. Ibid. 






had been left unturned to promote measures of compromise 
that would be fair to all concerned. The public was rapidly 
becoming qui~ed and reconciled to the idea that the Union 
" 
could be saved without civil war. The President had also 
escaped the pitfalls of the Republicans, by standing firmly 
on his constitutional prerogatives, both in dealing with 
Congress a nd the Southern States. Few men, thought Dr. 
Auchampaugh, beset by so many chances of pitfall have ever 
managed to extricate themselves so skillfUlly.80 
Some Northern historians would have one believe that 
Buchanan's Secretary of War, Joseph Holt, was contemptuous 
of his chief's policy and constantly sought to strengthen it 
on the side of aggressiveness toward the secessionists. The 
facts do not seem to justify this belief. During the war, 
Holt became a Republican and therefore was much more hostile 
toward the South than at the time he was Buchanan's Secretary 
of War. Holt has left many letters of approval of Buchanan's 
policy. A typical one is the following: 
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I wish distinctly to say that I believe Mr. Buchanan was 
in all respects and at all times true to the Union. He 
believed, and so did I, that a war during his admimdstration, 
especially if we began it, would result in the destruction 
of the Union. It was his policy to preserve the peace if 
possible and hand over the Government intact to his successor. 
Mr. Stanton, Judge Black, and myself differed at times with 
him as to the be~i way to do thiS, but we were agreed that 
it must be done. 
At the end of Buchanan's administration, Buchanan and Holt 
were warm friends. Buchanan said, "Holt, you have been true". 
"I have tried to be", replied Holt. 82 
80. Auchampaugh, 2£. ~. p. 190. 
81. Ibid, p. 81 
82 • l'5'I<r, p. 82 
It is the opinion of the writer of this study that 
Buchanan, with all his faults and pro-Southern leanings could 
hardly have accomplished more than he did in the way of pre-
venting civil war and a rapid disintegration of the Union. 
He did turn the Government over to the incoming administration 
without having recognized the independence of any of the 
seceding States, and had refused all along to withdraw the 
Federal garrison from Fort Sumter. It is true that five more 
States had followed South Carolina in secession before the 
end of Buchanan's administration, and most of these had se-
ceded after the only effort Buchanan had made to reinforce 
Fort Sumter. Before condemning Buchanan's policy there should 
be some evidence that fewer States would have seceded if 
Buchanan had resorted to more forceful measures. 
It might also be argued that the apparent weakness of 
Buchanan's policy toward the seceding States was its strength. 
It was Buchanan's chief desire to save the Union and avert 
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civil war, to do nothing that could swell the tide of secession. 
He did everything in his power to give the people an opportunity 
to settle the crisis by peaceful means. Much has been made of 
Buchanan's failure to emulate Jackson in his forceful treatment 
of the South Carolip~ nullification crisis in 1832; but at 
that time Jackson had to deal with the rebellious attitude of 
one State alone, with the people of the state about equally 
divided for and against nullification. Buchanan had to deal 
with practically a unanimous South Carolina in her secession 
movement, with other states ready to follow her if the 
Federal Government resorted to coercion. A comparison of 
Buchanan's dilemma with Jackson's smaller problem is not 
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CHAPTER VII 
LINCOLN AND o~CESSION THROUGH THE INAUGURAL 
We have reviewed the policy of the Buchanan administration 
in regard to secession in general, and the Fort Sumter crisis 
in particular. We have seen that the policy pursued was 
hased on the fear of an armed conflict as the result of any 
forceful action. Secession was illegal, yet it could not 
legally be prevented by coercive measures. The President 
disclaimed any responsibility for a settlement of the difficulties 
and put the burden on Congress exclusively. He pinned his 
faith on compromise and conciliation, to be effected by 
Congressional action. He promised to receive, and did receive, 
South Carolina commissioners. Vlhile waiting for Congress to 
repair the house divided, he followed a "strictly defensive" 
policy in regard to the forts in Charleston harbor, and re-
fused to reinforce the garrisons there. Those garrisons could 
have been successfully reinforced in November, when Major 
Anderson and his predecessor, Colonel Gardner, earnestly re-
quested it. But the policy of delay and inaction had not only 
made reinforcement more difficult, but had disheartened the 
commander of Fort Sumter, and convinced him also that a conflict 
should be prevented at almost any price. 
It is reported that Buchanan, during his last days at the 
White House, exclaimed several times, "I am the last President 
of the United States!" Lincoln, on the contrary, decided 
that the Union could and must be saved. Buchanan believed 
in and proposed further compromises on the slavery question, 
while Lincoln, in accordance with the Chicago platform on 
which he was nominated, could accept no compromise which 
would extend slavery in the Federal territories. Buchanan's 
proposal of explanatory amendments, in his message of December 
4, provided for that extension of slavery£l But the Republican 
platform stated that "the new dogma that the Constitution, of 
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its own force, carries slavery into any or all of the Territories 
of the United States, is a dangerous pollcital heresy", and 
that the "normal condition of all the territory of the United 
States is that of freedom".2 Lincoln therefore could not 
afford to accept a compromise such as the South demanded. The 
. only support he could immediately count on was that of a united 
party. He could not jeopardize that support by a violation 
of his party's platform. 
It was a great responsibility that Lincoln assumed in 
rejecting this compromise, but those who would condemn him 
must prove that such a compromise would have definitely averted 
civil war, instead of merely postponing it a few years. But 
did the South really want a compromise? It must be remembered 
that the radical secessionists had been preparing the Southern 
mind for years to support secession when the favorable moment 
came. Lincoln's election was not so much the cause, as the 
"Sarajevo" of secession and civil war. The radical secessionist, 
1. RIchardson, t. ~., 2£. cit., vol. 5, p. 038. 
2. Greeley, American ConflICt, vol. 1, p. 320. 
· . 
Roger Pryor of Virginia; expressed a scorn for compromise in 
his speech of April 10 to the people of Charleston. Said 
Pryor: 
Gentlemen, if Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal Hamlin were 
to abdicate their office tomorrow, and were to give me a 
blank sheet of paper whereupon to write the conditions of 
reannexation to the Union, I would scorn the privilege of 
putting the terms on paper. (Cheers) And why? Because our 
grievances have not been with reference to the insufficiency 
of the guarantees, but the unutterable perfidy of the 
guarantors. I thank you especially that you have at least 
.annihilated this accursed Union, reeking with corruption 
and insolent with excess of tyranny. Not only is it gone l 
but gone forever. As sure as tomorrow's sun will rise 
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upon us, just so sure will old Virginia be a member of the 
Southern Confederacy; and I will tell your Governor what will 
put her in the Southern Confederacy in less than an hour 
by a Shrewsbury clock. Strike a blow! (Tremendous applause) 
The very mOPlent that bl:)od is shed l old Virginia will make 
common cause with her sisters of the South.~ 
This feeling was not representative of the Southern people l I 
but it was typical of the radical secessionist "fire-eaters~ 
Lincoln's policYI both in the election of 1860 and during 
the months before inaugurationlwas to maintain prudent silence 
on his intended actions. We have an ample record of Buchanan's 
views l but there is a striking dearth of material on those of 
Lincoln. Many were the letters he received soliciting his 
views on the compromise efforts of Congress and his own plans 
of meeting secession. Lincoln's most common answer to those 
wanting a pre-view of his policy was that given to Truman Smith, 
in a reply of November 10 to the latter's complaiht that un-
certainty as to his policy had caused a financial depression. 
Lincoln told Smith that his views were already known, and to 
give them again would be useless.1! tl To press a repetition of 
this upon those who have listened is useless; to press it upon 
3. Sandburg, Carl, Abraham Lincoln - The War Years, vol. 1. p. 20U. 
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those who have refused to 11sten. and st1ll refuse, would 
be wanting in self-reppect, and would have an appearance ot 
sycophancy and t1m1dity which would excite the contempt of 
"4 good men and encourage bad ones to clamor the more loudly • 
Lincoln continued, ttl am not insensible to any commercial 
or financial depression that may exist, but nothing is to 
be gained by fawning around the 'respectable scoundrels' who 
got it up. Let them go to work and repair the mischief of 
their own making. and then perhaps they.will be less greedy 
to do the like again".5 
Lincoln's attitude on a compromise such as was being 
considered at the time ~n Congress, was given in many letters 
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to close party friends and advisers. To the Hon. William 
Kellog, the Illinois Congressman on the Committee of Thirty-
three, who had written Lincoln early in December, for instructions 
as to the course he should pursue, Lincoln wrote the following: 
Entertain no proposition for a compromise in regard to 
the extension of slav~ry. The instant you do they have us 
under again; all mur labor is lost, and sooner or later 
must be done over. Douglas is sure to be again trying to 
bring in his "Popular Sovereignty". Have none of it. The 
tug has to come, and better now than later. You know I 
think the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution ought 
to be enforced - t0
6
put it in its mildest form, ought 
not to be resisted. 
Not only was Lincoln averse to compromise, but the leading 
Republicans in the Congress that met in December 1860 also 
thought they had no concessions to make. On December 10, 
Senator Corwin wrot~ Lincoln that all the Republican Senators, 
except one, had the impression that they had no concessions or 
4. Lincoln' Works, ed., Nicolay and Hay, 2 vol. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Nicolay and Hay, 22. £!i., vol. 3, p. 259. 
compromise to offer, and that it was impolitic even to 
discuss making them. Corwin thought that inactivity and 
a kind spirit was all the Republicans could offer until the 
4th of March. Senator Corwin admitted that he never in his 
life had seen the country in such a dangerous position, and 
although he looked upon it with great alarm, he declared, 
flI am resolved not to be paralyzed by dismay. Our safety 
can only be insured by looking the danger full in the face 
and acting with calm dignity in such a way that, if possible, 
we may ride out the storm".7 
It seems that Lincoln and the leading Republicans, such 
as W. H. Seward and Salmon P. Chase, did not think that a 
dissolution of the Union and civil war were inevitable. They 
were almost as eager, it seemed, as Buchanan had been, to let 
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things drift, and believed that somehow, after the 4th of 
March, some solution for peace and Union could be found. Chase 
wrote to Henry Wilson, December 13, 1860, that the Republicans 
could do nothing, in the way of a settlement of the crisiS, 
until they assumed control of the Government on March 4. He 
thought that all attempts on their part to do anything, under 
existing circumstances, would prove unfortunate. 8 Seward, 
the man who, probably more than anyone else, was responsible 
for the successful organization of the Republican party, and 
the coiner of the phrase "irrepressible conflict", could not 
convince himself that the Union was disintegrating. Both he 
Thurlow Weed, his alter ego, were strong advocates of a policy 
7. 
8. Association, 1902, 
ase, Gov't. 
\ 
of conciliation toward the South. Seward had been chosen 
Lincoln's Secretary of state, and he was possessed with 
an overweening confidence that as soon as the new adminis-
tration took over the Government, he would be able to effect 
a reconciliation. Speaking before the New England Society 
of New York, December 22, 1860, he expressed his confidence 
of secessions's waning in the following words: 
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The cause of secession was as strong on the night of 
November 6, when a President and Vice-President were elected 
who were unacceptable to the Slave States as it has been at 
any time. Fifth days have passedj and I believe that every 
day the sun has set since that time, it has set upon 
mollified passions and prejudicesj and if you will only wait 
the time, sixty more suns Wbll shed a light and illuminate 
a more cheerful atmosphere. 
Seward had been actively enga,ed, during the winter of 
1860-61, incontacting all parties, and had openly proclaimed 
that his policy was one of peace and conciliation. lO He held 
many conferences with the members of Buchanan's Cabinet, and 
at the end of the first week of January, 1861, he wrote his 
wife of his efforts, saying, "I l~ve assumed a sort of 
dictatorship for defense, and am laboring night and day with 
the cities and States. My hope, rather my confidence, is 
unabated".ll Seward's activities and confidence in himself 
made him feel as if he were the guiding light of even the 
Buchanan administration. On January 18 he wrote his wife; 
"It seems to me if I am absent only eight days, this adminis-
tration, the Congress, and the District would fall into con-
9. Lothrop, Thornton K, William Henry Seward, p. 223. 
American Statesmen Series, Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1898. 
10. congreSSiOnal Globe, Jan. 12, 1861, p. 343, Vol. 3~, Part I. 
11. Tar ell, Ida M., The Life of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 2, p. 26. 
New York, The Macmillan Co., 1917. . 
sternation and despair. I am the only hopeful, calm, con-
ciliatory person here".12 
Lincoln himself had a lingering faith in a conciliatory 
solution of the national crisis. Early in December, in a 
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conference with Thurlow Weed, David Davis, and Leonard Swett, 
Lincoln declared that while there were some loud threats and 
much muttering in the cotton States, he hoped that by wisdom 
and forbearance the danger of serious trouble might be averted, 
as such dangers had been in former tLmes.13 It was a natural 
expectation that Lincoln would repudiate the policy pursued by 
Buchanan, and take a !'irm stand against secession, but during 
the election and after he gave no sign of such a policy in 
any public utterance. On November 28, Lincoln wrote to Henry 
J. Raymond, in regard to a speech made by Senator Trumbull, 
Republican, which the opposition had seized upon to inflame 
the North with the opinion that Republican ground was to be 
abandoned by the incoming administration. Lincoln wrote to 
Raymond: 
This is just as I expected, and just what would happen 
with any declaration I could make •. These political fiends 
are not half sick enough yet. Party malice and not public 
good, possesses them entirely. They seek a sign, and no 
sign shall be given them. At least such is my present 
feeling and purpose.14 
Although Lincoln had said little or nothing publicly 
about his attitude on secession, his priVate correspondence 
was not lacking in revealing a determination not to recognize 
secession, but to ignore any de facto status in regard to it, 
12. Ta»bell, ££. cit., vol. 2, p. 26. 
13. Weed, Thur-row, Autobiogralh~, ed. Harriet .A. Weed, p. 605 
Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 8 3. 
14. Lincoln's Works, vol. 1, p. 656. 
and not to treat it with the deference and respect with 
which Buchanan had met it. In a letter to Weed, December 17, 
Lincoln wrote: 
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I believe you can pretend to find but little, if anything, 
in my speeches, about secession. But my opinion is, that 
no State can in any way lawfully get out of the Union without 
the consent of the others; and that it is the duty of the 
President and ot~5 Government functionaries to run the 
machine as it is. 
In a letter to Lincoln of December 17, Congressman Washburne 
reported to Lincoln the anxiety of General Scott as to the 
President-elect's firmness. Scott was smarting under the 
affront of Buchanan's refusal to follow his recommendations 
to reinforce the Federal forts. Scott said to Washburns If I 
wish to God that Mr. Lincoln was in office. I do not know him, 
but I believe him a true, honest, and conservative man. Mr. 
Washburn~, Is he a firm man?" V/ashburne replied that Lincoln 
would discharge his duty, and his whole duty, in t he light of 
the furnace seven time's heated. General Scott then said, "All 
is not lost".16 A note of firmness in regard to the question 
of the forts was given by Lincoln in his reply to Washburne: 
"Please present my respects to the General, and tell him, 
confidentially, I slutil be obliged to him to be as well pre-
pared as he can to either hold or retake the forts, as the 
case may require, at and after the inaugurationrt • 17 Seward 
now communicated to Lincoln his views regarding the questions 
of the forts and secession. On January 27, two weeks before 
15. Nicolay and Hay, 2£. cit., vol. 3, p. 253. 
16. Nicolay and Hay, ~. cit., vol. 3, p. 249. 
17. ~. 
Lincoln started on his way to Washington for the inaugural 
ceremony, Seward advised him thus: 
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For my own part I think that we must collect the revenues, 
regain the forts in the Gulf, and if need be maintain our-
selves here; but that every thought that we think ought to 
be conciliatory, forbearing, and fraternal, and so open the 
way for the rising of a Union party in the seceding States 
which will bring them back into the Union. 18 
Not a word about Fort Sumter. Waiting for the rising of a 
Union party in the seceded States explains much that is to follow; 
it was to be the key of the Lincoln policy for the first few 
weeks of the new administration. 
Lincoln had drafted his inaugural address and started on 
his way to Washington on February 11. On the way he made 
several speeches in the cities through which he passed, and in 
these utterances we probably find Lincoln at his worst. He 
could say little of importance without anticipating his prepar-
ed inaugural address. In a speech at Indianapolis, February 11, 
he spoke interrogatively, explaining that he was not asserting 
anything, but merely raising questions for his hearers to 
consider. Yet he gave some indication of his intentions when 
he spoke thus: 
The words "coercion" and "invasion" are much used these 
days, and often with some temper and ~ot blood. Let us make 
sure, if we can, that we do not misunderstand the meaning 
of those who use them. • • What then is "Coercion?" What is 
"Invasion?" Would the marching of an army into South Carolina, 
without the consent of her people, and with a hostile intent 
towards them, be invasion? I certainly think it would; and 
it would be coercion also ,if the South Carolinians were 
forced to submit. But if the United States should merely hold 
and retake its own forts and other property, and collect the 
duties on foreign importations, or even withhold the mails 
from places where they were habitually violated, would any or 
all thewe things be "invasion" or "coercion"? Do our pro-
fessed lovers of the Union, but who spitefully resolve that 
they will resist coercion and invasion, understand that such 
18. ~, p. 366. 
things as these on the part of the United States, would be 
coercion or invasion of a State? If so, their idea of 
means to preserve the object of their affection would seem 
exceedingly thin and airy ••• In their view, the Un1on~ 
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as a f~ily relation, would seem to be no regular marriage~ 
but a sort of -free love" arrangement, to be maintained 
only on "passional attraction".I9 
It is quite clear that Lincoln, while on the way to assume 
control of the Government, intended to hold and retake the 
Federal forts and public property. He intended to "run the 
machine" as it was. In the same speech he also asked: trOn 
what rightful principle may a State, being not more than one-
fiftieth part of the nation, in soil and population, break up 
the nation a nd then coerce a proportionally larger subdivision 
of itself, 1n the most arb1trary way? What mysterious right 
to play tyrant is conferred on a district of country, with 
its people, by merely calling it a State?"20 Here Lincoln 
was reversing the South Carolina argument that she was being, 
or feared she was to be coerced, and presented a wholly 
different view of the matter. South Carolina was coercing 
the Government of the United States. 
In the light of all that had happened since November 6, 
with seven States by their own action out of the Union, and a 
Southern Confederate government already organized, with many 
thinking people even in the North convinced of the inevitability 
of a dissolution of the Union, with nearly every Federal fort 
in the South in secessionist hands, and the Confederate 'forces 
hurling defiance at the United States Government in Charleston 
harbor, it is puzzling to consider Lincoln's utterance at 
19. Raymond, Henry J., Histo~ of the Administration of 
President Lincoln, p. 80. New ork, J. C. Derby and N. C. Miller 
Co., 1864. 
20. Ibid, p. 81. 
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Columbus, Ohio, when he said: 
I have not maintained silence from any want of real anxiety. 
It is a good thing that there is no more than anx'lety, for 
there is nothing going wrong. It is a consoling circumstance 
that when we look out there is nothing that really hurts 
anybody. We entertain different views upon political 
questions, but nobody is suffering anything. This is a most 
consoling circumstance, and from it we may conclude that all 
we want is time, patience, and ~lreliance on that God who 
has never forsaken this people. 
From the above expression it might easily be inferred that 
Lincoln did not realize the magnitude of the secession movement 
and the earnest resolve of the South to support secession 
by force of arms. No wonder Congressman Edwin R. Reynolds 
of New York expressed astonishment at Lincoln's attitude, when 
he asked the House of Representatives: 
Have not our torts and vessels been seized, our arsenals 
invaded, our mints robbed, by men and States in arms? Has 
not our flag been fired into, our mails rifled and inter-
cepted, our commerce on the Mississippi bbstructed? Is not 
the public mind today, North and South, convulsed as never 
before? What else crowds the bursting columns of the daily 
and weekly journals wherever published? What other topic 
now feeds the thunders of the London Times and attr~§ts 
more undivided attention from European Governments. 
These speeches of Lincoln on his way to Washington did nothing 
to bolster the morale of the Federal troops in Fort Sumter. 
They were tired of their confinement and wanted action. They 
expected that Lincoln would now sound an aggressive note 
and repUdiate Buchanan's "strictly defensive policy". We have 
the word of one of the men in the fort that these speeches, from 
their pacific nature, "produced a depress'ing effect upon the 
garrison, who were disappointed in them".23 
21. Sandburg, 2£. cit., vol. 1, p. 47. 
22. Ibid. 






If these mediocre speeches of Lincoln on his way to 
Washington gave no encouragement to those who hoped for some 
firm and aggressive policy as to the forts, what would the 
Inaugural Address say on the subject? The day before the 
inauguration, March 3, Senator Wigfall of Texas delivered 
his farewell speech, in which he flung defiance in the face 
of the North. Said Wigfall: ffThe Star of the West", flying 
your flag, staggered into Charleston Harbor with supplies for 
Fort Sumter, South Carolina struck her between the eyes, 
and she staggered back; and now, what do you propose to do 
about it?,,22 He sat down, and for a time nobody responded. 
Then, the staunch Unionist of Tennessee, Andrew Johnson rose 
and exclaimed: "Mr. President, I will tell the Senator from 
Texas what I would do about it. I speak only for myself. But 
if I were President, as James Buchanan today ls, and as 
Abraham Lincoln tomorrow will be, I would arrest the Senator 
and his friends on the charge of treason; I would have them 
tried by a jury of their countrymen, and ., if convicted, by 
the eternal God, I would hang theml"23 But Andrew Johnson 
was not to be President until after Lincoln hadmet the issue 
of Civil War. What was Lincoln to do about the forts2 
Lincoln arrived at Washington February 23, while the 
Virginia Peace Convention at Washington was still in session. 
Committees from this convention called on the President-elect 
to try to get some guarantees from him, on the basis of which 
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a compromise could be effected. On February 23, Stephen T. 
Logan of Illinois, a member of the Peace Convention and a 
former law partner of Lincoln, rose in the convention and 
moved that the President of the convention be instructed to 
calIon the President-elect and inform him that the members 
of the convention would be pleased to wait upon him in a body. 
It was so ordered, and John Tyler, the convention's President, 
sent a note to Lincoln, who replied that he would be happy to 
receive the delegates at nine o'clock that night. Many were 
the arguments made by the members of the Peace Committee, and 
they were ably answered by Lincoln. William E. Dodge, a 
merchant and capitalist of New York, was much concerned about 
the financial and commercial ruin which he thought would follow 
a conflict. Dodge said that it was for Lincoln to say whether 
the whole nation should be plunged into bankruptcy, and whether 
the grass should grow in the streets of the commercial cities. 
Lincoln replied: "Then I shall say it shall not. It if depends 
upon me, the grass shall not grow anywhere except in the fields 
and the meadows". "Then", said Dodge, "you will yield to the 
just demands of the South. You will not go to war on account 
of slaveryl "24 j/ith all merriment now gone from Lincoln's face, 
he answered in words which held no promise of a recognition 
of the Southern Confederacy. Said Lincoln: 
I do not know that I understand your meaning, Mr. Dodge. 
Nor do I know what my acts or opinions may be in the future, 
beyond this. If I shall ever come to the great office of 
President of the United States, I shall take an oath. I 
shall swear that I will faithfully execute the office of 
President of the United States, of all the United States, 





and that I will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, 
and defend the Constitution of the United states. This is 
a great and solemn duty. With the support of the people and 
the assistance of the Almighty I shall undertake to perform 
it. I have full faith that I shall perform it. It is not 
the Constitution as I would like to have~ it, but as it is, 
that is to be defended. The Constitution will not be 
preserved and defended until it is enforced and obeyed in 
every one of the United States. It must be so respected, 
obeyed, enforced and defended, let the grass grow where it 
may. 25 
Lincoln's answer to Dodge indeed sounded a firm note. The 
Southern Confederacy did not legally exist in Lincoln's mind. 
The Constitution must be obeyed in everyone of the States. 
Yet William H. Seward was holding out promises of cOnciliation 
and peace to the South. He had promised Charles S. Morehead, 
ex-Governor of Kentucky and temporary chairman of the .Virginia 
Peace Convention until John Tyler assumed the position of 
permanent chairman, that there would be no collision between 
the North and South. According to Morehead's declaration, 
Seward pledged his sacred honor that there would be no 
collision. "Nay, Governor Morehead", said Seward, laying 
his hand on Morehead's shoulder to make it more emphatic, "let 
me once hold the reins of power firmly in my hands, and if I 
don't settle this matter to the entire satisfaction of the South 
in sixty days, I will give you my head for a football".26 
Morehead and a group of men called on Lincoln shortly after 
his arrival in Washington, and in this interview Lincoln showed 
his great anxiety that the border slave States should be saved 
for the Union. Morehead told Lincoln that he prayed and trusted 
to God that he would not resort to coerCion, and if he did, 
the history of his administration would be written in blood, 
25. Ibid, p. 90. 
26. MISSiSSi~Pi vallea Historical Review, vol. 28, June, 1941, p. 66. b. R. arbee an M. t. Boriham, "Notes and Documents: Fort 
Sumter Again". pp. 63 - 73. 
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and all the waters of the Atlantic Ocean could not wash it 
fro~ his hands. 27 Lincoln asked Morehead what he should do,-
and if he meant by coercion the collecting of the revenue and 
the taking back of the forts which belonged to the United 
states. Morehead replied that that was the only mode in which 
it was possible under the Constitution to resort to coercion. 
Lincoln replied with a characteristic anecdote that tl1at would 
be "guvin it up". Morehead replied that itmight be "guvin it 
up", but that it would be better to give it up than to drench 
the land with blood and then have to give it up.28 
Lincoln replied, "I would like to know .from you what I 
am to do with my oath of office?" Morehead replied, "As to 
the forts, that is a matter within your discretion, sir. You 
can withdraw the troops if you please. You are the commander-
in-chief, and it belongs to you, either to keep them there or 
to withdraw them totally, and prevent a collision, and a 
consequent deadly and ruinous war.,,29 Lincoln replied with 
one of Aesop's fables: 
There was a lion once that was desperately in love with 
a beautiful lady, and he courted the lady, and the lady 
became enamoured of him and agreed to marry him, and the 
old people were asked for their consent. They were afraid 
of the power of the lion with his long and sharp claws and 
his tusks, and they said to him, "We can have no objection 
to so respectable a personage as you, but our daughter 
is frail and delicate, and we hope that you will submit 
to have your claws cut off and your tusks drawn, because 
they might do very serious injury to her". The lion sub-
mitted, being very much in love. His claws were cut off 
and his tusks drawn, and they took clubs and knocked him 
on the head. 30 
21. Ibid, p. 69. 
28. lbId, p. 70. 
29 • '!bTci' • 
30. MISS. Val. Hist. Review, vol. 28, June 1941, 2£. £!l. p. 71. 
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Then W. C. Rives of Virginia l one of several men who 
accompanied Morehead in this interview with Lincoln l warned 
that if Lincoln should resort to coercion, Virginia would 
leave the Union and join the seceding States • "Nay, sir", 
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said Rive s I "old as I am, and dearly as I have 10 ved the Union, 
in that event I go with all my heart". At this l according 
to Morehead, Lincoln leaped from his chair, advanced one step 
toward where Rives was standing, and cried, flMr. Rives, Mr. Rives, 
if Virginia will stay in, I will withdraw the troops from 
Fort Sumter".3l There is quite a bit of evidence that Lincoln 
did make an offer to evacuate Fort Sumter. The Virginia State 
Convention had just met to consider passing an ordinance of 
secession. If Virginia should secede, her example would probably 
have great weight in determining the action of the remaining 
border slave States l which Lincoln, just as Buchanan before 
him, was most anxious to keep in the Union. John Hay reported 
in his diary that after the Morehead interview 1 Lincoln spoke 
of his offer, saying that a committee of pseudo-Unionists 
came to him for guarantees and that he "promised to evacuate 
Fort Sumter if they would break up their (Virginia) Convention 
without any row or nonsense. They demurred".32 Rudolph 
Schleiden, minister of the Republic of Bremen to the United 
States, reported to his Government that when border State men 
asked Lincoln to remove the troops from Fort Sumter, the 
President-elect replied: "Why not? If you will guarantee to me 
31. tbld, p. 71, Sandburg, 22. £!!. vol. I, p. 97. 
32. Sandburg,~. £!1., vol. 1, p. 98. 
), 
the State of Virginia I shall remove the troops. A State 
for a fort is no bad business.,,33 The above proposition 
will be discussed later, but it is probable that Lincoln 
made the proposal before inauguration. 
Although Lincoln's inaugural address had been been 
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wri tten weeks before his arrival in 1Nashington, it was sub-
mitted to Seward and others for suggestions and modifications. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to go into a detailed 
study of Lincoln's first Inaugural Address, but it might be 
observed that its original tone was much more hostile to the 
South than the final form. On February 24, Seward suggested 
many changes on the side of conciliation. He told Lincoln 
that he had a common interest and responsibility with him, 
and he would say frankly that the second and third paragraphs, 
even if modified as he proposed, would give such advantages 
to the disunionists in Maryland and Virginia that those 
States would secede, and "we shall within ninety, perhaps 
sixty days, be obliged to fight the South for this capital, 
with a divided North for our reliance, and we shall not have 
one loyal magistrate or ministerial officer south of the 
Potomac.,,34 As for the forts, Lincoln's original draft 
stated: 
33. Annual Report - American Historical Association, 1915, p. 211. 
Lutz, Raiph Haswell, "Rudolph Schleiden and the VIsit to 
Richmond, April 25, 1861." 
34. Nicolay and Hay, ~. £!i., vol. 3, pp. 319, 320. 
· , 
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All the power at my disposal will be used to reclaim the 
public property and places which have fallen; to hold, 
occupy, and possess these and &1 other property and places 
belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and 
imposts; but beyond what may be necessarY for these objects, 
there will be no invasion of any State.oo 
The modified and final form of the above was: 
The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, 
and possess the property and places belonging to the 
Government. 36 
Thus it was on the suggestion of Seward that he was to follow 
Buchanan's policy of giving up the forts already taken by 
the South, at least in the inaugural. But Lincoln's friend 
and adviser, O. H. Browning, suggested also that the declara-
tion of the purpose of reclamation, which would be construed 
into a threat or menace, and might be irritating even in the 
border States, might prudently be omitted. Said Mr. Browning: 
"The fallen places ought to be reclaimed. But cannot that 
be accomplished as well or even better withoug announcing 
the purpose in your inaugural?,,37 
In still another respect Lincoln inclined to the policy 
of Buchanan. The latter had maintained that it would have 
been useless to attempt to supply the Federal offices in South 
Carolina by nominating men from other States and to force 
them on the people. On this point Lincoln declared in his 
Inaugural: 
Where hostility to the United States, in any interior 
locality, shall be so great and universal as to prevent 
competent resident citizens from holding the Federal 
offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious 
strangers among the people for that object. ~fuile the 
35. !bid, p. 333. 
36. IOIU, pp. 333, 334. 
37. tbid, p. 334. 
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strict legal right may exist in the Government to enforce 
the exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would 
be so irritating, and so nearly impracticable withal, that 
I deem i~8better to forego for the time the uses of such 
offices • 
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Buchanan, in his ~ssage of December 4, denied any 
Constitutional right of secession, but admitted a revolution-
ary right. Lincoln's reference to this line of thought was: 
This country, with its institutions, belongs to the 
people who inhabit it. ~Vhenever they shall grow weary of 
the existing Government they can exercise their constitu-
tional right of amending it, gg their revolutionary right 
to dismember or overthrow it. 
Buchanan had disclaimed any responsibility to effect a 
settlement of the secession crisis, saying that it was the 
duty of Congress. Lincoln's statement of that side of the 
question was: 
The Chief Magistrate derives all his authority from the 
people, and they have conferred none upon him to fix terms 
for the separation of the States. The people themselves 
can do this also if they choose; but the Executive, as 
such, has nothing to do with it. His duty is to adminis-
ter the present Government, as it came to his hands, and 
to transmit it, unimpaired by him, to his successor.40 
Buchanan had proposed to his Cabinet, a t the first meeting 
after the election of Lincoln, that there should be a 
national convention of the States to determine the solution 
41 
of the difficulties. Since Lincoln made no recommendations 
for amendments to the Constitution, and in his original draft 
of the inaugural address said that he was "not much impressed 
with the belief that the present Constitution can be improved", 
must he not have been thinking along the same line as Buchanan, 
when in the following paragraph he identified the voice of the 
people with the voice of God? Appealing to both North and 
South to avoid disunion, he said: 
38. Nicolay ana ffiiy,...2ll!.£ll: vol. 3, p. 334. 40. Ibid, p. 341 
39. Ibid, p. 340. 41. AUCnampaugh, 
2£. £i1., p. 131 
-- " 
vTny should there not be a patient confidence in the 
ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or 
equal hope in the world? In our present differences is 
either party without faith of being in the, right? If 
the Almight Ruler of Nationa, with his eternal truth and 
justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of 
the South, that truth and that judgment will surely 
prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal of the 
American people. 42 
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Another pOint of comparison. Buchanan's policy had been 
based, among other things, on his anxiety of having the 
responsibility of war, if it must come, placed on the South. 
The strictly defensive policy in Charleston harbor had been 
pursued to dangerous extremes in order that civil war should 
not come, and if it came, that there would be no possibility 
of the charge that the Government had been the aggressor. 
Toward the end of Lincoln's address, after urging his 
countrymen, one and all, to think calmly and well "upon this 
whole subject", and saying that Itnothing valuable can be lost 
by taking time", he said: 
In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and 
not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The 
Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict, 
withoug being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath 
registered in Heaven to destroy the Government, while I 
shall have the most solemn one to "preserve, protect, and 
defend it". 43 
Did this mean that the seceded States, now organized in a 
Southern Confederacy, would be let alone? It seems that 
Seward was responsible for much of the generalizing and 
ambiguity of the inaugural address. 44 
Naturally everyone was anxiously awaiting Lincoln's 
address. People in general expected a definite statement of 
42. NiCOlay and Hay, ££. £!!., vol. 3, p. 341. 
43. Ibid, p. 342. 
44. Ibid, p. 343. 
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policy, and that policy was also expected to be a radical 
departure from that of Buchanan. In some respects the 
policy announced was little different from that of Buchanan. 
Nicolay and Hay, prejudiced in Lincoln's favor, have said 
that Lincoln announced !fa decided, though not a violent, 
change of policy" j that Buchanan's course had been one 
professedly of conciliation, but practically of ruinous 
concession, while Lincoln announced his purpose of concilia-
tion, and restoration.45 It is true that all through the 
inaugural address Lincoln made it clear that secession was 
impossible, but there was no declaration of an intention to 
use strong measures to prevent it. It is quite possible 
that Lincoln was doubtful of the support of a united North 
in coercive measures. There was the hope of eventual 
conciliation by some mysterious means, and the grave concern 
over the border slave States. Lincoln, in a message to 
Congress on July 4, 1861, stated the policy announced in the 
inaugural as follows: 
The policy chosen looked to the exhaustion of all 
peaceful measures before a resort to any stronger ones. 
It sought only to hold the public places and property 
not already wrested from the Government, and to collect 
the revenue, relying for the rest on time, discussion, 
and the ballot-box. Of all that which a President might 
constitutionally and justifiably do in such a case, 
everything was forborne without which it was believed 
possible to keep the Government of foot. 46 
The conciliatory tone of the address was directed eapecially 
to allaying secession sentiment in Virginia, but the Richmond 
"Whig", a conservative paper, declared "the policy indicated 
45. Nlco-:[ay and Hay,~ cit., vol. 3, p. 376. 
46. Richardson, J. D., QQ. £!i., vol. 6, p. 21. Special 
Session Message, July 4,-r861. 
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towards the seceding States will meet the stern and 
unqualified resistance of the United sout~!47 The Ridhmond 
~ ~ " Enquirer, a secession paper declared that no action of our 
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Convention can now maintain peace".48 The Richmond IIDispatch" 
said "every Border State ought to go out of the Union in 
twenty-four hours. Dispatches from Stanton state that the 
inaugural was received with universal dissatisfaction. 
Resistance to coercion is the feeling of all parties. The 
inaugural creates intense excitement. The secessionists 
regard it as a declaration of war. The Union men say little, 
but evidently are disappointed".49From Goldsboro, North 
Carolina, a news dispatch declared, nThe inaugural was re-
ceived at this place and throughout this section with 
indignation. 50 The Baltimore "American" said, "The tone of 
the speech is pacific; that is to say, Mr. Lincoln avows his 
determination to preserve peace, so far as it may be done, 
in the performance of his duty as he understands it. It is 
perfectly evident, from t he whole tenor of his address, that 
he does not intend to be the aggressor, if peace may not be 
preserved. 51 No truer words could have been written than 
those of the last sentence. The Baltimore "Sun" denounced 
the speech as "sectional and mischievous" and added that "if 
it means what it says, it is the knell and the requiem of the 
Union, and the death of hope".52 The Baltimore "Exchange" 
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"Patriot" declared that Lincoln meant to avoid aggression, 
but added, "In the seceding States intense excitement was 
created by the reception of the address".54 The St. Louis 
"Democrat" remarked, "We can only say this morning that it 
meets the highest expectations of the country, both in 
point of statesmanship and patriotism, and that its effect 
on the public mind cannot be other than salutary in the 
highest degree".55 
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At the inaugural, on the platform with Lincoln, were 
Senator Stephen A. Douglas and President James Buchanan, men 
who had participated and been principal actors in the slavery 
and secession drama which was fast approaching its climax. 
\Vhen the reporters asked Douglas for his opinion of Lincoln's 
address, he at once said that it did not mean coercion. "He 
says nothing about retaking the forts", said Douglas. "He 
is all right".56 When Buchanan was asked for his opinion he 
replied "with a wretched leer": "I cannot say what he means 
until I read his inaugural. I cannot understand the secret 
meaning of the document, which has simply been read in my 
presence. tr57 Cautious Buchanan, slow of perception. A study 
made by Dr. D. L. Dumond supports the conclusion that at least 
the inaugural address was intended to announce the policy of 
the administration, and that from that policy, as then outlined, 
Lincoln never deviated. 58 
54. Ibid, 
55 • I'51'CT. 
56. LOUIsville Daily Courier, March 6, 1861. 
57. Louisville Daily Courier, March 6, 1861. 
58. Dumond, D~ L., The Secession Movement, 1860-1861, pp. 262,263. 




From Lincoln's original inaugural it might be concluded 
that he thought war inevitable, but that by a conciliatory 
tone he might hold off the secession of the border States, 
especially Virginia and Maryland, until Washington had 
troops to protect it • 
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CHAPTER VIII 





FORT SUMTER - LINCOLN'S PROBLEM 
We have reviewed Lincoln's attitude on secession and 
the Federal forts, and have seen that he was resolved to 
"run the machine" as it was, to defend, preserve and protect 
the Constitution as it was, and to hold the Federal forts 
and property not already captured by the forces of secession. 
We have also observed that in his original draft of the 
inaugural address Lincoln had announced his purpose to also 
retake the forts lost to the South, but he had omitted such 
a declaration in deference to the advice of Seward and 
Browning. We have also seen that before inauguration he had 
expressed a willingness to evacuate Fort Sumter in exchange 
for a guarantee that Virginia would stay in the Union, so 
great was his concern over the border slave States. It has 
also been observed that the inaugural expressed no purpose 
of making war on the South, but on the contrary, assured the 
South that no war could come without the ~outh being the 
aggressor. Now it remains to be seen how a policy of peace 
and conciliation was frustrated by the course of events. 
We have compared some aspects of Lincoln's policy as 
announced in his inaugural to the policy of Buchanan, but such 
a comparison is really unfair because of the accentuation 




The Southern historian POllard has said, "the separation 
had been widened and envenomed by the ambidexterity and 
perfidy of President Buchanan. The revolution in the 
meantime had rapidly gathered, not only in moral power, 
but in the means of war and the muniments of defense."l 
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Whatever other results might have followed in the wake of 
reinforcement of the forts in Charleston harbor in the month 
of November, 1860, it is quite certain that such an attempt 
would not have met a successful resistance. Then the South 
Carolina authorities had not the slightest military strength, 
but since the first report Major Anderson had made to the 
War Department after taking command at Fort Moultrie, he had 
almost daily reported the military preparations that were 
being made by ~outh Carolina. After the Confederate Govern-
ment assumed direction of these preparations in February, 
Major Anderson continued to report them. For example, Anderson 
reported to the War Department on March 1, 1861: 
I have the honor to report that nothing unusual occurred 
today, except the arrival from the city of a steamboat, 
fully loaded with troops, at Sullivan's Island. The works 
around us are being carried on with the same activity as 
heretofore. Yesterday some guns were fired from a battery 
on Sullivan's Island to the eastward of the Moultrie House. 2 
Nothing unusual except a boat fully loaded with Confederate 
reinforcements. On March 5, Major Anderson reported that 
parties were working on the mortar battery at Fort Johnson, 
which they were making higher and stronger, and on the Morris 
Island batteries, numbers 1, 9, and 10. 3 On March 5, also, 
Captain J. G. Foster of the Engineers reported: 
1. Pollard, Edward A, The First Year of the War, p. 40. 
Richmond, 'Nest and Johnson, l86~. 
2. Official Records, vol. 1, p. 188. 
3. Ibid, p. 190. 
"' - -.-- .... 
Yesterday three steamers landed troops and supplies on 
Cummings Point, and appearances indicated that preparations 
were making for immediate action in case the news from 
Washington exhi~ited a coercive policy on the part of the 
administration. 
The above quotations are not extreme cases, but typical of 
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the reports that were sent almost daily to the War Department6 
especially after Anderson's occupation of Fort Sumter on 
December 26, 1860. 
The policy of acting strictly on the defensive and 
granting concessions to South Carolina, had enabled the 
Confederacy by March 4, 1861, to complete, or have near 
completion the following armed positions: 
Sullivans Island: Five-gun battery east of Fort Moultrie, 
Battery, 2 guns, Mortar Battery No.2, two 10 inch 
Mortars, Fort Moultrie,.30 guns, Mortar Battery No.1, 
two 10 inch mortars, and Enfilade Battery, four guns, 
The Point Battery, one 9 inch Dahlgren and the Floating 
Iron-clad Battery, two 42 pounders and two 32 pounders. 
The Mount Pleasant Battery, two 10 inch mortars. 
Morris Island: Cummings Point Battery, two 42 pounders 
and three 10 inch mortars, Stevens Iron-clad Battery, 
three 8 inch columbiads, the Trapier Battery, three 10 
inch mortars. 
James Island: Fort Johnson, battery of 24 pounders; 
Upper Battery, two ten-inch mortars; Lower Battery, 
two ten-inch mortars, and the Mortar Battery.5 
On the 4th of March, shortly before Lincoln announced his 
purpose to hold the forts, a communication from~jor Anderson 
was received, declaring that such a policy, in regard to 
Fort Sumter, would be difficult. \Vhile President Buchanan was 
holding his last Cabinet meeting, Secretary Holt arrived very 
late, explaining that on that morning he had received 
"extraordinary dispatches" from Major Anderson. Anderson said 
4. Ibid. 




tl~t without a force of some twenty or thirty thousand men 
to capture the batteries which had been erected, he could 
not maintain himself at Fort Sumter. Holt told the President 
and Cabinet that he intended to communicate the dispatches 
at once to Lincoln. 6 On March 5, Holt, who performed the 
duties of the War Department for a day or two because of 
the illness of Simon Cameron, Lincoln's choice for Secretary 
of 'Nar, sent to Lincoln an extensive review of the Fort 
Sumter situation. Holt's summary justified the Buchanan policy 
and stated that the failure to reinforce Sumter was in part 
because of Anderson's confidence that he could hold his positionj 
Anderson had asked that no reinforcements be thrown in, and 
therefore the Secretary was taken by surprise tllat Anderson 





So long, therefore, as he (Anderson) remained silent 
upon this point, the Government felt that there was no 
ground for apprehension. Still, as the necessity for action 
might arise at any moment, an expedition has been quietly 
prepared and is ready to sail from New York on a few hours' 
notice, for transporting troops and supplies to Fort Sumter. 
This step was taken under the supervision of General Scott, 
who arranged its details, a nd who regarded the reinforcements 
thus provided for as sufficient for the occasion. The 
expedition, however, is not upon a scale approaching the 
seemingly extravaga.nt estimates of Major Anderson and Captain 
Foster, now offered for the first time, and for the dis-
closures of which the Government was wholly unprepared. 
The declaration now made by Major Anderson that he would 
not be willing to risk his reputation on an attempt to throw 
in reinforcements into Charleston harbor, and with a view 
of holding possession of the same, with a force of less than 
twenty thousand men, takes the Department by surprise, as 
his previous correspondence contained no such intimation. 8 
Curtis, ££. cit. vol. 2, p. 497 
Curtis, QQ. crt., vol. 2, pp. 498, 499. 
l£i£, p.~99;-Official Records, vol. 1, p. 197. 
-,. 
179 
This must have been a rude shock for Lincoln's pacific policy. 
On March 5, Lincoln transmitted the letter from Holt, 
with the accompanying documents received from Major Anderson 
on March 4, to General Scott, for his consideration and 
advice. On the same day they were returned by Scott, who 
gave his opinion on reinforcements. 9 Scott had reached a 
rather gloomy conclusion, saying, "Evacuation seems almost 
inevitable •• if indeed the worn-out garrison be not assaulted 
and carried in the present week tl • 10 Lincoln referred the 
papers back to General Scott for a more thorough investigation, 
and wrote orders for General Scott which were transmitted over 
the signature of the Secretary of War, Simon Cameron. Scott 
was directed by the President"to exercise all possible vigi-
lance for the maintenance of all the places within the military 
department of the United States, and to promptly call upon 
all the departments of the Government for the means necessary 
to that end" .11 On March 9, after having learned verbally 
from General Scott that he had given the subject a more 
thorough consideration, Lincoln addressed the General three 
questio~s, as follows: 
(1) To what point of time can Major Anderson maintain 
his position at Fort Sumter, without fresh supplies 
or reinforcements? 
(2) Can you, with all the means now in your control, 
supply or reinforce Fort Sumter within that time? 
(3) If not, what amount of means and of what description, 
in addition to that already at your control, would 
enable you to supply and reinforce that fortress within 
the time?12 
9. Lincoln's V;orks, vol. 2, p. 9 
10. Nicolay and Hay, .2.,E. ill., vol. 3, p. 378. 
11. Lincoln's Vrorks, vol. 2, p. 8. 
12. l£!£, pp. 9, 10. 
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On Saturday night, March 9, Lincoln held his first Cabinet 
meeting, and the crisis at StUnter, with the question of 
relieving the fort, were for the first time communicated to 
his advisers. The Cabinet members were surprised at the 
information. No decision was reached or asked for at this 
meeting. Lincoln's Attorney-General, Edward Bates, reported 
in his diary concerning this Cabinet meeting: 
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I was astonished to be informed that Fort Sumter, in 
Charleston harbor, must be evacuated, a nd that General Scott, 
General Totten, and Major Anderson concur in the opinion, 
that as the place has but twenty-eight days' provisions, it 
must be relieved, if at all, in that time; and that it will 
take a force of twenty thousand men at least, and a bloody 
battle, to relieve itll3 
Even if a relief expedition were successful, Bates thought 
it would be certain to begin civil war, and as Charleston 
was of little importance as compared to the chief points in 
the Gulf, he was willing to evacuate Fort Sumter and strengthen 
the forts in the Gulf so as lito look down all opposition.1t14 
At this time Lincoln did not disclose any purpose of his own. 
He followed a policy of asking questions and getting all the 
information possible. To understand Lincoln's position on 
the question of evacuating or reinforcing Fort Sumter at 
this pOint, we must consider his declaration as he gave it 
later, in his message to the special session of Congress, 
July 4, 1861. He then declared: 
13. Nicolay and Hay, ~. ~., vol. 3, p. 380, Bates' Diary. 
14. Ibid, p. 381 
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In a purely military point of view this reduced the duty 
of the Administration in the case to the mere matter of 
getting the garrison safely out of the fort. It was believed, 
however, that to so abandon that position under the circum-
stances would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under 
which it was to be done would not be fully understood; that 
by many it would be construed as a part of a voluntary policy; 
that at home it would discourage the friends of the Union, 
embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter 
a recognition abroad; t~t, in fact, it would be our national 
destruction consumated. 
On March 12, General Scott added to Lincoln 1 s perplexity 
by the following discouraging answer to the three questions 
put by Lincoln a few days before: 
I should need a fleet of war vessels and transports 
Which, in the scartered disposition of the Navy (as understood), 
could not be collected in less than four months; 5,000 
additional regulars and 20,000 volunteers; that is, a force 
sufficient to take all the batteries, both in the harbor 
(including) Fort N.ou1trie), as well as in the approach or 
outer bay. To raise, organize, and discipline such an army 
(not to speak of necessary legislation by Congress, not now 
in session) would require from six to eight months. As a 
practical military question the time for succoring Fort Sumter 
with any means at hand had passed away nearly a month ago, 
Since then a surrender under aSi~u1t or from starvation has 
been merely a question of time. 
On the same day that General Scott outlined the huge and 
immediately impossible plan to relieve Fort Sumter, Montgomery 
Blair, Lincoln1 s Postmaster-General, telegraphed his borther-
in-law, Gustavus V. Fox, to come at once to Washington. Fox 
had already formed a plan to relieve the fort under Buchanan's 
administration, but had never had an opportunity to try it. 
Blair told Fox that Anderson's fame would be nothing as com-
pared to his if he succeeded. After explaining to Fox the 
situation as it had developed, Blair took him to Lincoln, to 
whom he explained his plan of relief.17 Fox maintained that 
15. Richardson, J. D., 2£. cit., vol. 6, p.21 
16. Official Records, vol. r;-P. 197. 
17. Smith, William Ernest, The Francis Preston Blair Family 
In Politics, vol. 2, p. 11, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1933. 
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General Scott exaggerated the force necessary, and that a 
naval force propelled by steam, could pass any number of 
guns there, because the course was at right angles to the 
line of fire, and the distance, thirteen hundred yards, too 
great for accurate shooting at night. Fox declared that the 
President agreed to his plan if he could get the consent of 
the Secretary of War and General Scott. 18 Fox proposed to 
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put troops on board a large sea-steamer, and hire two or three 
powerful light-draught New York tug-boats, having the necessary 
stores on board. These were to be conveyed by the United 
States steamer Pawnee, and the revenue cutter Harriet Lane. 
At night, two hours before high water, with half the force on 
board each tug, within relieving distance of each other, he 
was to run in to Fort Sumter.19 
On March 15, Lincoln held a Cabinet meeting and put the 
following question to his advisers: 
Assuming it to be possible to now prOVision Fort Sumter, 
under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it? Please 
give me your opinion in writing on this question. 20 
Lincoln was not asking an opinion on sending reinforcements, 
but. merely on the provisioning of the fort. The answers were 
accordingly given on March 15 and 16 in rather long documents, 
that of Seward being the longest.2l Lincoln's Cabinet included 
four former Democrats, Salmon p. Chase, Secretary of Treasury, 
Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, Montgomery Blair, Postmaster-
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ing three were former Wnigs, W. H. Seward, Secretary of State, 
Caleb Smith, Secretary of Interior and Edward Bates, Attorney-
General. 22 Of these only two answered in the affirmative. 
Blair was for it unconditionally, and Chase was for it with 
reservations. Said Blair: "To the connivance of the late 
administration, it is due alone that this rebellion has been 
enabled to attain its present proportions. It has from the 
beginning, and still is treated practically as a lawful pro-
ceeding, and the honest and Union-loving people in those States 
must by a continuance of this policy become reconciled to the 
new Government, and, though founded in wrong, come to regard 
it as a rightful Government".23 Blair said that Mr. Buchanan's 
policy had rendered collision almost inevitable, and that a 
continuance of that policy would not only bring it about, but 
would go far to produce a permanent division of the Union. 
Blair believed that Fort SUmter could be provisioned and re-
lieved by Captain Fox with little risk, and he added,"you 
should give no thought for the commander and his comrades in 
this enterprise. They willingly take the hazard for the sake 
of the country, and the honor which, successful or not, they 
will receive from you and the lovers of free Government in all 
lands".24 Chase said that the probable political effects of 
the measure allowed room for much difference of opinion, and 
he had not reached his conclusion without serious difficulty. 
Said Chase, "If the proposed enterprise will so influence 
civil war as to involve an immediate necessity for the enlist-
22. Macartney, ~ cit., p. 14 
23. Crawford, ££. cit. p. 359. 





ment of armies and the expenditure of millions, I cannot, in 
the existing circumstances of the country, and in the present 
condition of the national finances, advise it." But as he 
thought that civil war would not follow an attempt to feed a 
starving garrison, in which the Government would be discharging 
a plain duty, he said, "I return, therefore, an affirmative 
answer to the question submitted to me. n25 
Cameron advised no, seeing that no practical benefit 
would result to the country, and basing his opinion on that 
of the army officers, that an attempt to provision would be 
disastrous. Welles advised no, saying that he entertained 
doubts. Smith advised no, saying that giving up Fort Sumter 
would cause surprise and complaint. but that it could be 
explained and understood. Bates advised no, saying that he 
was willing to evacuate Fort Sumter. 26 The opinion of Seward 
has been reserved to the last for discussion, because of his 
important position and his peace policy of long standing. 
Seward had for months been determined on a peaceful settlement 
of the crisis. He was under even greater delusions than 
Buchanan had been in his reliance on the saving of the border 
slave States for the Union, on the basis of which the seceded 
States might be persuaded to come back into the Union. Charles 
Francis Adams, whose father was very close to Seward and 
shared his views on conciliation and peace toward the South, 
has left in his autobiography his estimate of Seward's policy 
at this time. Charles Francis Adams was a frequent visitor at 
Seward's home at the period under discussion, and he said of 
Seward: 
25. Ibid, p. 361. 




He had been of great service, during the interim period l 
holding things together and tiding over dangerous shoals. 
This he had done; but he had done it under an entire mis-
apprehl"lnsion of the real facts of the situation and with 
an absolutely impossible result in view. As I have said l 
he believed in the existence of a strong underlying Union 
sentiment in the South; he looked forward with confidence 
to a sharp reaction of sentiment there, as soon as the 
people of those States realized that no harm was intended 
them; and he nourished the delusive belief that a recourse 
to force could be avoidedj that, if it was avoided or 
postponed, the secession movement would languish, and grad-
ually die out. 27 
Seward's abhorrence of civil war led him into other 
misapprehensions. His scheme for a foreign war to knit the 
sections together did not dawn on him suddenly, when on April 1 
he included such a scheme in his famous "views for the 
~residentts consideration". As early as the 26th of January~ 
1861, Seward had remarked to the minister from the Republic of 
Bremen; IfIr the Lord would only give the United States an 
excuse for war with England, France, or Spain; that would be 
the best means of reestablishing internal peace". And in a 
conversation with the same minister, Rudolph Schleiden, on 
February 10, 1861, Seward had complained that there was no 
foreign complication which offered an excuse to break with a 
foreign power. 28 Seward's confidence in the breakdown of 
secession if a collision could be avoided naturally caused him 
to oppose the provisioning of Fort Sumter. In a conversation 
with General M. C. Meigs, Seward had said that for his part, 
his policy had been all along to give up Sumter as too close 
to Washington. It would give a temptation to Davis to relieve 
27. Adams~ Charles Francis, AutobiOgraphy, p. 104 
New York, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916. . 
28. Annual Report, American Historical Association, 1915, p. 210 
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it by an attack upon Washington; that he wished to hold 
Fort Pickens, to make the fight there and in Texas, and thus 
make the burden of the war fall upon those who by rebellion 
provoked it. 29 
In answer to Lincoln's question of March 15, Seward was 
consistent with his policy of long standing. Seward said 
that if it were possible peacefully to provision Fort Sumter 
"it would be both unwise and inhuman not to attempt it". He 
was certain, however, that such an attempt would initiate 
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civil w~r, and was therefore opposed to it. It might have been 
Buchanan's words when Seward said: 
I have felt that it 1s exceedingly fortunate that to a 
great extent the Federal Government occupies thus far not 
an aggressive attitude, but practically a defensive one, 
while the necessity for action, if civil war is to be 
initiated, falls on those who seek to dismember and to 
subvert the Union. 
Then Seward identified the policy of the Republican party with 
that of the Buchanan administration, thus: 
Partly by design, partly by chance, this policy has been 
hitherto pursued by the late administration ••• and by the 
Republican party in its corporate action. It is by this 
policy, thus pursued, I think, that the progress of dismem-
berment has been arrested after the seven Gulf States had 
seceded and the border states yet remain, although they do so 
uneasily, in the Union. 
It is to a perseverance in this policy for a short time 
longer, that I l)ok as the only peaceful means of assuring 
the continuance of Virgibia, Maryland, North Carolina, Kentucky, 
Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas, or most of these States, 
in the Union. It is through their good and patriotic offices 
that I look to see the Union sentiment revived, and brought 
once more into activity in the seceding States, and through 
this agency, those States themselves returning into the Union. 
29. American Historical Review, XXVI, 1921 1 ~. 300 





Suppose the expedition successful. We have then a 
garrison in Fort Sumter that can defy assault for six months. 
\Vhat is it to do then? Is it to make war by opening its 
batteries and attempting to demolish the defenses of the 
Carolinians? Can it demolish them if it tries? If it cannot l 
what 1s the advantage we shall have gained? If it can l 
how will it serve to check or prevent disunion? In either 
case, it seems to me that we will have inaugurated civil war 
by our own act, without agoadequate object, after which 
reunion will be hopeless. 
It was but natural that such an unfavorable opinion of the 
Cabinet, with the Secretary of State so emphatically opposed 
to provisioning Fort Sumter, should have caused Lincoln to 
doubt its wisdom. It was certainly the opinion of the Cabinet 
that Sumter should be evacuated. Blair was convinced that 
Lincoln had resolved to evacuate the fort. He was so strong 
in his desire to reinforce as well as to provision Fort Sumter 
that he wrote out his resignation on March 15. The account 
of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, tells us that Blair 
had become aware of an understanding which Seward had had with 
the members of Mr. Buchanan's administration, or was suspicious 
of it, and observing that the President, with the acquiescence 
of the Cabinet, "was about adopting the Seward and Scott policy", 
he wrote his resignation, determined not to continue in the 
Cabinet if no attempt were made to relieve Fort Sumter.3l 
Said Welles: 
30. Crawford,.2ll • .£it. pp. 349, 350, 351, 352, 353. 
Lincoln's Works, vol. 2, pp. 11 - 14. 
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Before handing in his resignation# a delay was made at the 
request of his father# the elder Mr. Blair sought an inter-
view with the President, to whom he entered his protest 
against non-action, which he denounced as the offspring of 
intrigue. His earnestness and indignation armoused and 
electrified the Presidentj and when in his zeal# Blair 
warned the President that the abandonment of Sumter would be 
considered by the people# by the world, by history, as 
treason to the country, he touched a chord that responded to 
his invocation. The President decided from that moment that 
an attempt should be made to convey supplies to Major Anderson# 
and that he would reinforce Sumter. This determination he 
communicated to the members of the Cabinet as he saw them# 
without a general announcement in Cabinet meeting.32 
The story of Francis p. Blair# the father of the Postmaster-
General# was that Lincoln said the matter had not been fully 
determined, but that the Cabinet were almost a unit in favor 
of evacuation, "all except your son"# and that such would 
probably be the result. Blair reminded Lincoln that if he 
followed such a course impeachment would probably follow. The 
elder Blair claimed that he persuaded Lincoln to change his 
course and relieve Sumter. 33 
On February 15, the Confederate Government had appointed 
three commissioners to go to Washington to settle all questions 
of disagreement between the two Governments, to obtain a 
recognition of independence, and especially to obtain the 
evacuation of the forts in the South. These commissioners were 
Martin J. Crawford# A. B. Roman, and John Forsyth, who received 
their instructions on February 27# 1861. These commissioners 
were accredited to the Buchanan administration, but with 
instructions to negotiate with the Government of the United 
States. Thus they were authorized to deal with the Lincoln 
32. Ibid. 
33. ~rawford,~. ~.# p. 364 (Francis P. Blair to author) 




administration also.34 Martin J. Crawford was the only 
commissioner to reach Washington before the end of Buchanan's 
administration, arriving on March 3. The commissioner reported 
that he would not attempt to open negotiations with Buchanan, 
as he was lIincapable now of purpose as a child".35 On March 12, 
the commissioners sought an unofficial interview with Seward, 
making their request through Senator Hunter of Virginia. The 
Secretary of State declined to grant the unofficial interview, 
"upon exclusively public consideration".36 It seems that it 
was the secret purpose of these commissioners to play for time, 
and that they had secret instructions to that effect from the 
Confederate Government. 37 In a conversation with John Forsyth, 
one of the commissioners, S. W. Crawford was told that the 
secret instructions from Montgomery were "to play with Seward, 
to delay and gain time until the South was ready" .38 Two 
Justices of the Supreme Court, Judge Nelson, of New York, and 
Judge John A. Campbell, of Alabama, now intervened as inter-
m'diaries for the Confederate commissioners. The opinion of 
the two Judges was that the country would be better satisfied 
and the counsels of peace promoted, by the reception of the 
commissioners, without any recognition of them as officers of 
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But Seward was fir.m in his determ1nation not to receive 
the commissioners, even unofficially. When Nelson and Campbell 
went to Seward's office on March 15 to urge their views upon 
him, Seward said that not a member of the Cabinet would consent. 
In the conversation with Judges Nelson and Campbell, Seward 
revealed his belief that Fort Sumter would be surrendered. 
He evidently believed that Lincoln would follow the opinion 
of the Cabinet given on the same day. Said Seward to Campbell: 
"No, if Jefferson Davis had known of the state of things here, 
he never would have sent those commissioners. It is enough 
to deal with one thing at a time. The surrender of Sumter is 
enough to deal with".40 Campbell then told Seward that he 
was going to write to Jefferson Davis and asked what he should 
say on the subject of Sumter. Seward said: "You may say to 
him that before that letter reaches him (How far is it to 
Montgomery?)" 'Three days'. "You may say to him that before 
that letter reaches him the telegraph will have informed him 
that Sumter will have been evacuated".4l On the same day 
Judge Campbell took this assurance to the commissioners, without 
telling them his authority, but asserting that it was an 
authorized statement and they must accept his word for it. But, 
five days later, General Beauregard, commanding the Confederate 
forces at Charleston, reported to the commissioners that there 
was no indication that the fortwas to be evacuated, but on the 
contrary, Major Anderson was at work on the fortifications. 
40. Connor, H. G.,~. cit., p. 124. 




On March 21, Judges Campbell and Nelson again called on 
Seward for an explanation, and Seward, being very occupied, 
assured them that everything was all right, and that he 
would see them the following day. On the following day, 
March 22, the Judges again saw Seward, who said that "in 
reference to the evacuation of Sumter, the resolution had 
been passed and its execution committed to the Presidentj 
that he did not know why it had not been executed; that 
there was nothing in the delay that affected the integrity 
\\ 42 of the promise or denoted any intention not to comply. 
Judge Campbell continued to act as intermediary between 
Seward and the Confederate commissioners throughout March 
and the first two weeks of April. The whole story is a 
long and complicated one, but the important fact is that 
Seward did give assurances that Fort Sumter would be evacuated, 
and he held to this opinion until the very last moment. 
Although Francis P. Blair has claimed that Lincoln had made 
a decision to relieve Fort Sumter on March 15, it is clear 
that Lincoln was still weighing the matter throughout March. 
On March 21, Lincoln sent Captain G. V. Fox to Charleston to 
visit Anderson and report on the condition of the garrison. 43 
Governor Pickens allowed Fox to visit Fort Sumter, accompanied 
by a Captain Hartstene, an old comrade of Fox, a native of 
South Carolina, and formerly of the United States Navy, and 
now in the service of his State. Pickens thought the object 
of Fox was a peaceful one, and according to the reports of the 
42. 
43. 
~id, pp. 126, 127. . 
fficial Record~, vol. 1, pp. 208, 209 
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Confederate commissioners, thought Fox had been sent to 
prepare for evacuation. Fox had a conversation with Major 
Anderron, in which Anderson earnestly condemned any proposal 
192 
to send him reinforcements. He asserted that it was too late; 
he agreed with General Scott that an entrance by sea was 
impossible, and he impressed upon Captain Fox his belief that 
any reinforcements coming would at once precipitate a collision 
and inaugurate civil war. To this Anderson declared his 
opposition, and dwelt at length upon the political results 
that would follow. 44 The visit of Fox was short. A statement 
of the provisions on hand was furnished him, and it was under-
stood between Fox and Anderson that unless provisions were 
furnished the garrison, it could not hold out beyond the 15th 
of April at noon, even if the command were placed on short 
rations. For this Anderson said he would await the orders 
of the Government. 45 
After the Fox visit, Lincoln authorized his former law 
partner and bodyguard, Ward H. Lamon, to make a visit to 
Charleston and Fort Sumter. According to Lamon's account, 
Lincoln "believed it possible to effect some accomodation by 
dealing directly with the most chivalrous among their leaders; 
at all events he thought it his duty to try, and my embassy 
to Charleston was one of his experiments in that direction".46 
Lamon has stated that it was believed in the South that Mr. 
Seward had given assurances, before and after Lincoln's in-
auguration, that no attempt would be made to reinforce the 
44. Crawford, £2. £!i., pp. 369, 370, 371. 
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Southern forts, or to resupply l~ort Sumter under a republican 
administration. This, said Lamon, made matters embarrassing, 
as Mr. Lincoln's administration had, on the contrary, adopted 
the policy of maintaining the federal authority at all points. 
Mr. Seward opposed Lincoln's sending of Lamon to Charleston, 
fearing that he might be killed. "Mr. Secretary", replied 
Lincoln, "I have known Lamon to be in many a close place, 
and he has never been in one that he didn't get out of. By 
Jingl I'll risk him. Go, Lamon, and God bless you. Bring 
back a palmetto, if you can't bring back good news.rt47 
Stephen A. Hurlbut, of Illinois, accompanied Lamon on 
the trip. Some writers say that he was sent by Lincoln. 
According to Lamon, Hurlbut was anxious to visit a sister at 
Charleston, the place of his birth, and asked Lamon's per-
mission to accompany him. Lamon arrived in Charleston March 25. 48 
A chief object of Lamon's mission was to sound out possible Union 
sentiment in South Carolina, indicating that Lincoln was con-
sidering Seward's policy. The strange result of the mission, 
however, was to give the impression that Port Sumter was to be 
evacuated. Lamon did not have authority to commit the 
'Washington Goverrunent, but it is quite certain that he did give 
the impression that he had come to arrange evacuation. 49 It 
is quite possible that Lamon gave this impression to further 
his real mission. South Carolina authorities controlled all 




Lamon, £Eo cit.;=pp. 69, 70. 
Officiar-Records, vol. 1, p. 221. 
Ranaall, ££. £11., p. 237. 
, '. 
esc~'ts with those permitted to visit the fort. A note from 
Governor Pickens to Beauregard, March 25, indicated that 
Lamon had promised evacuation.50 Lamon gave Anderson the 
51 
impression that such was the purpose of his visit. 
The account of Nicolay and Hay conflicts with that of 
Lamon in regard to the part played by N~. Hurlbut in the 
above mission. According to Nicolay and Hay, on March 21 
Lincoln called Hurlbut to him, and explaining that Mr. Seward 
insisted that there was a strong Union Party in the South, -
even in South Carolina - , asked him to go personally and 
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ascertain the facts. Hurlbut's investigation gave no encourage-
ment to the belief that the Union might still be saved by 
virtue of a Union party in the South, especially in South 
Carolina. Hurlbut reported: 
By appointment I met Mr. Petigru and had a private con-
versation with him for more than two hours. I was at liberty 
to state to him that my object was to ascertain and report 
the actual state of felling in the city and State. Our 
conversation was entirely free and confidential He is now 
the only man in the city of Charleston who avowedly adheres 
to the Union. From these sources I have no hesitation in 
reporting as unquestionable that separate nationality is a 
a fixed fact, that there is an unanimity of sentiment which is 
to my mind astonishing; . that there is no attachment to the 
Union. There is positively nothing to appeal to. 52 
Lamonts report to Lincoln was equally discouraging. From the 
Governor of South Carolina he brought the following message 
to Lincoln: 
Nothing can prevent war except the acquiescence of the 
President of the United States in secession ••• Let your 
President attempt to reinforce Sumter, and the tocsin of war 
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About this time, ]~rch 23, the opinion of the correspondent 
of the London Times in Washington was that "the Southern 
leaders are forcing on a solution with decision and energy, 
whilst the Government appears to be helplessly drifting 
with the current of events, having neither bow nor stern, 
neither ,keel nor deck, neither rudder, compass, sails or 
steam".54 
Soon after March 5, when Secretary Holt had forwarded 
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to Lincoln his summary of the Fort Sumter situation, accompa-
nied by the recent dispatches from Major Anderson, Lincoln 
had called in the acting Secretary of War, and confidentially 
asked him if he had any reason to doubt the loyalty of 
Major Anderson. Holt assured him that he had no reason to 
doubt Anderson's loyalty.55 On March 10 Lincoln paid a 
surprise visit to the wife of Captain Abner Doubleday. 
Doubleday was second in command at Fort Suniter, and Lincoln 
explained to his wife that he wanted to see her husband's 
letters from t he fort, so that he might form a better opinion 
as to the condition there, particularly in regard to the 
resources. 56 Lincoln evidently had doubts as to the loyalty 
or wisdom of Anderson's conduct of the last few weeks. On 
March 25, the Senate had requested the President to communicate 
to it the dispatches of Major Anderson to the War Department 
since he had been in command of Fort Sumter, "if not incompa-
tible with the public interest". On March 26, Lincoln informed 
54. Russell, Sir William H., :My Diary North and South, p. 26 
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, \ the Senate that he had .. "with the highest respect for the 
Senate .. come to the conclusion that at the moment the 
publication of it would be inexpedient".57 But what of 
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Seward? Had he been playing with the Confederate commissioners? 
The correspondent of the London Times, who held frequent 
interviews with Seward .. referring to an assertion in a New 
York paper that orders had been given to evacuate Sumter, 
quoted Seward as saying on March 26: "That is a plain lie. 
No such orders have been given. We will give up nothing we 
have - abandon nothing that has been intrusted to us. If 
people would only read these statements by the light of the 
President's inau~al .. they would not be deceived~58 If 
Seward said the like he was not consistent with his true 
policy. 
To add to the confusion and difficulty of making a 
decision, when all the advice was against him .. General Scott 
reported an additional opinion on March 28 to Lincoln. 
Said General Scott: 
It is doubtful .. however, according to recent information 
from the South .. whether the voluntary evacuation of Fort 
Sumter alone would have a decisive effect upon the States 
now wavering between adherence to the Union and secession. 
It is known, indeed, that it would be charges to necessity, 
and the holding of Fort Pickens would be adduced in support 
of that view. Our Southern friends, however .. are clear 
that the evacuation of both the forts would instantly soothe 
and give confidence to the eight remaining slave-holding 
States, and render their cordial adherence to this Union 
perpetual. The holding of Forts Jefferson and Taylor on the 
ocean keys depends on entirely different principles, and 
should never be abandoned; and indeed the giving up of Forts 
Sumter and Pickens may be best justified by the hope that 
we should thereby recover the States to which they geograph-
ically belong by the liberality of the act, besides retaining 
the eight doubtful States. 59 
57. Lincoln's Works, vol. 2, p. 26. 
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On March 28, the same day Scott delivered his surrender 
opinion, Lincoln gave his first State dinner. Before taking 
leave that evening, Lincoln invited the members of his Cabinet 
into an adjoining room for a moment's consultation, and in-
formed them of Scott's advice. Blair charged Scott with 
playing politics, and his remarks were understood by those 
present to be aimed at Seward's peace policy which he had 
freely criticised. Without a formal vote, there was a unanimous 
expression of dissent from Scott's suggestion, and the President 
requested the Cabinet to meet in formal council the next day.60 
It seems, however, that Lincoln had almost made up his mind to 
provision Fort Sumter, for on that same day, March 28, he had 
ordered Captain G. V. Fox to prepare him a short order for 
the ships, men and supplies he would need for his expedition. 6l 
Fox immediately prepared the following order: 
Steamers Pocahontas at Norfolk, Pawnee at Washington, 
Harriet Lane at New York, to be under sailing orders for sea, 
with stores, etc., for one month. Three hundred men to be 
kept ready for departure from on board the receiving ships 
at New York. Two hundred men to be ready to leave Governor's 
Island in New York. Supplies for twelve months for one 
hundred men to be put in portable shape, ready for instant 
shipping~2 A large steamer and three tugs conditionally 
engaged. 
It may well be that Lincoln's hesitation to act throughout 
March had been because of his belief that the North would not 
support him in any war that might follow an attempt to relieve 
or supply Fort Sumter. There had been a rather large section 
of public opinion inclined to the policy of Greeley and scott, 
to let the "erring sisters" depart in peace. On March 23, 
60. Nicolay and Hay, ~. £!i., vol. 3, p. 394. 
61. Ibid, p. 433. 
62. OffIcial Records, vol. 1, p. 227. 
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w. H. Russelll correspondent of the London Times l recorded 
in his diary that very little was being done by New York 
to support or encourage the Gowernment in any decided policy; 
that the Journals were more engaged in abusing each other, 
and in small party warfare, than in the performance of the 
duties of a patriotic press. 63 The radical Republiaans were 
now pressing for a firmer policy. On March 28, Senator 
Trumbull offered a resolution declaring it the duty of the 
President "to use all means in his power to hold and protect 
the public property of the United States1and to enforce the 
laws thereof, as well in the States of South Carolina, 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana and Texas 
as within the other States of the Union ff • 64 The historian 
Rhodes has concluded that at the end of March there was a 
manifestation of public sentiment for a firmer policy, which, 
coupled with the protests of the radical Republican Senators, 
as well as a clearer comprehension of the public duty, 
influenced the President and some members of the Cabinet to 
adopt a more decided pOlicy.65 
After the State dinner guests had departed on the night 
of March 28, Lincoln did not sleep for the rest of the night, 
so absorbed and perplexed was he as to his course in regard 
to Fort Sumter. 66 The next day, I~rch 29, the Cabinet met 
as requested the night before, and Lincoln asked the Cabinet 
members for their opinions on the sending of an expedition to 
63. Russell, W. H.,.£E. cit., p. 27 
64. Congressional Globe,~rch 28, 1861, 36th Congress, Second 
Session, vol. 36, part 2, p. 1519. 
65. Rhodes, £2. £!i., vol. 3 1 p. 222. 










relieve Fort Sumter, peaceably, if possible. Mr. Seward wrote: 
The dispatch of an expedition to supply or reinforce 
Sumter would provoke an attack, and so involve war at that 
pOint. The fact of preparation for such expedition would 
inevitably transpire and would therefore precipitate the 
war - and probably defeat the object. I do not think it 
wise to provoke a civil war beginning at Charleston and 
in rescue of an untenable position. S~erefore I advise 
against the expedition in every view. 
Then Seward went on to put in a word for his own pet scheme 
of reinforcing Fort Pickens instead of Sumter. Said seward: 
I would call in Captain M. C. Meigs forthwith. Aided by 
his counsel, I would at once, and at every cost, prepare 
for a war at Pensacola and Texas, to be taken, however, 
only as a consequence of maintaining the possessions and 
authority of the United States. I would ~gstruct Major 
Anderson to retire from Sumter forthwith. 
Chase gave a much more determined answer than he gave on March 
15. Said he: 
I am clearly in favor of provisioning Fort Sumter. If that 
attempt be resisted by military force, Fort Sumter should, 
in my opinion, be reinforced. 69 
Smith wrote: 
Believing that Fort Sumter cannot be successfully defended, 
I regard its evacuation as a necessity, andI advise that 
Major Anderson's command shall be unconditionally withdrawn. 70 
Blair wrote: 
First - As regards General Scott, I have no confidence in 
his judgment on the questions of the day. His political 
views control his judgment, and his course as remarked on 
by the President shows that whilst no one will question his 
patriotism, the results are the same as if he was in fact 
traitorous. 
Second - It is acknowledged to be possible to relieve 
Fort Sumter. It ought to be relieved without reference to 
Pickens or any other possession. South Carolina is the head 
and front of this rebellion, and when that State is safely 
delivered from the authority of the United States it will 
strike a blow against our authority from which it will take 
us years of bloody strife to recover. 
Third - For my own part, I am unwilling to share in the 
responsibility of such a policy.71 
67. Lincoln's Works, vol. 2, p. 26. 
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It is my decided opinion that Fort Pickens and Key west 
ought to be reinforced and supplied, so as to look down 
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all opposition at all hazards - and this whether Fort Sumter 
be or be not evacuated. As to Fort SumterA I think the time 
is come either to evacuate or relieve it. 7G 
Mr. Welles wrote: 
I concur in the proposition to send an armed force off 
Charleston, with supplies of provisions and reinforcements 
for the garrison at Fort Sumter, and of communicating at 
the proper time the intentions of the Government to pro-
vision the fort, peaceably if unmolested. There is little 
probability that this will be permitted, if the opposing 
forces can prevent it. An attempt to force in provisions 
without reinforcing the garrison at the same time might 
not be advisable; but armed resistance to a peaceable at-
tempt to send pro isions to one of our own forts will 
justify the Government in using all the power at its command 
to reinforce the garrison and furnish the necessary supplies. 
Fort Pickens and other places retained should be 
strengthened by additional troops, and, if possible, made 
impregnable. 73 
There is no record of the opinion of the Secretary of uar, 
Mr. Cameron. He was not present at the Cabinet meeti~g.74 
Thus the Cabinet now stood two for and three against the 
evacuation of Sumter, Bates being "on the fence tt • 
After the Cabinet meeting Lincoln brought out the 
memorandum written by Captain Pox on the 28th, and on the 
bottom of it wrote an order on the Secretary of '!liar: 
Sir, I desire that an expedition, to move by sea, be 
got ready to sail as early as the 6th of April next, the 
whole according to memorandum attached, and that you 
cooperate with the Secretary of the Navy for that object. 75 
There is diffuculty in determining whether this order was with 
reference to Sumter specifically or not. The facts are not at 
72. Ibid. 
73. Nicolay and Hay, ~. cit., pp. 430, 431. 
74. Sandburg, ££. cit., vcr; I, p. 193. 




all clear, but the evidence indicates that Lincoln was at 
this time directing the sending of two expeditions, one to 
Sumter and another to Pickens. At least four Cabinet members 
wanted to relieve Pickens. 
The story of Fort Pickens is intricately bound up with 
that of Sumter. As early as March 5, Lincoln, in his orders 
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to Scott to "exercise all possible vigilance for the maintenance 
of all the places ll , had intended that Pickens should be rein-
forced. He made inquiries four days later and, to his surprise, 
found that nothing had been done. Assuming the omission had 
occurred through Scott's preoccupation about Sumter, Lincoln 
again on March 12, gave special directions to reinforce 
Pickens. 76 For some reason the orders again were not sent, 
and on March 30 Seward went to General Scott and told him 
that the President now ordered that Fort Pickens be reinforced 
and that he should issue the necessary orders. Scott replied: 
"Well, Mr. ;Secretary of State, the great Frederick used to 
say that, 'when the king commands, nothing is impossible'. 
The President's orders shall be obeyed, sir.fl77 Scott must 
have acted at once, for the orders to land the troops held on 
board ship, near Fort Pickens, since the Buchanan truce, reached 
the commander on March 31. 78 
Fearing another failure of the execution of orders as to 
Pickens, or believing that the troops held on ship there were 
not sufficient, Lincoln and Seward called on Captain M. C. Meigs, 
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reinforce Fort Pickens. This expedition was organized and 
sent with Lincoln's consent. 79 Because of a desire for 
the utmost secrecy, and because the only funds available to 
defray the cost were the secret service fund of the State 
Department, Seward took charge of the expedition over the 
heads and without the knowledge of the Secretaries of War 
and Navy.SO This expedition could not be organized and sent 
for several days. Thus two expeditions were being organized; 
the one intended for provisioning Fort Sumter, the other for 
the more determined purpose of reinforcing Fort Pickens. 
The orders issued by Scott on March 30, and which reached 
Captain Vogdes on March 31, were not obeyed. Captain Vogdes 
was in command of the Federal troops on shipboard off Fort 
Pickens. Vogdes asked Captain H. A. Adams, in command of 
the fleet, for immediate means to land. Adans refused, 
alleging that it was a violation of the joint order of Holt 
and Toucey made in consequence of the Pickens truce between 
Buchanan and certain Southern Senators on January 29. Adams 
held that Scott's army order could not supersede Secretary 
Toucey's navy order; he therefore sent an officer, April 1, 
to solicit the express commands of the Navy Department. 81 
Thus the attempt to reinforce Pickens before the Meigs expedition 
could sail was frustrated by Captain Adams. Adams' special 
messenger, asking for specific authority from the Navy Department, 
did not reach Washington until April 6. 82 
79. American Historic~l Reyiew, XXVI, 1921, pp. 287 - 299. 
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Lincoln's difficulty seemed to be in satisfying the more 
determined Northern public opinion in favor of upholding the 
Government's authority, and at the same time to avoid a con-
flict at Sumter in order to keep Virginia and the border 
slave States in the Union. The situation in Virginia was not 
improving for the Unionists. On April 3, Stanton wrote to 
Buchanan: "The rumors from Hicbmond are very threateningj 
secession is rapidly gainino0' strength there.,,83 ." H P 11 ;1. • ~1.us·se 
wrote in his diary: "It is stated, nevertheless, that Virginia 
is on the eve of secession, and will certainly go if the 
President attempts to use force in relieving and strengthening 
the federal forts. H84 It is true that Virginia was more con-
cerned over the Sumter case than that of Pickens. Although 
Lincoln had at last decided to at least attempt to provision 
Fort Sumter, he declared in his message to Congress of July 
4, 1861, that Sumter might have been evacuated had not the 
orders to reinforce Pickens miscarried. Concerning this 
point Lincoln said: 
Starvation was not yet upon the garrison, and ere it would 
be reached Fort Pickens might be reinforced. This last would 
be a clear indication of policy, and would better enable the 
country to accept the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military 
necessity. An order was at once directed to be sent for the 
landing of troops from the steamship Brooklyn into Fort 
Pickens. This order could not go by land, but must take the 
longer and slower route by sea. The first return news from 
the order was received just one week before the fall of 
Fort Sumter. The news itself was that the officer commanding 
the Sabine, to which vessel the troops had been transferred 
from the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi armistice of the 
late administration (and of the existence of which the present 
administration, up to the time the order was dispatched, had 
only too vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention), had 
83. 
84. 
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refused to land the troops. To now reinforce Fort Pickens 
before a crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter was now 
impossible, rendered so by the near exhaustion of pro-
visions in the latter-named fort. In precaution against 
such a conjuncture the Government had a few days before 
commenced preparing an expedition, as well adapted as 
might be, to relieve Fort Sumter, which expedition was 
intended to be ultimately used or not, according to 
circumstances. The strongest anticipated case for using 
it was now presented, and it was resolved to send it 
forward. 85 
The facts of the case tend to prove that Lincoln was 
mistaken or confused in the above statement. It seems from 
the evidence that there was no such close connection between 
the Pickens and Sumter expeditions. As we shall see in the 
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next chapter, on April 4, Lincoln told Fox, when the latter 
remarked that he had very little time to get to Sumter before 
the garrison would be starved out, that he would best serve 
his country by making the attempt. Lincoln was wrone in his 
statement to Congress when he said that it would have been 
impossible to relieve Fort Pickens before Sumter would have 
been forced to evacuate from lack of supplies. Major Anderson 
had told Fox that he could hold out until the 15th of April, 
at noon. Fort Pickens was actually reinforced on April 12.86 
It is the writer's opinion that, notWithstanding Lincoln's 
honesty, he made the best possible case for his conciliatory 
professions in his message to Congress. From Lincoln's own 
statement it seems that he was determined to attempt to 
prOVision Sumtel', independently of Fort Pickens. He probably 
thought war was ineVitable, and if it must come Sumter would 
furnish the best grounds for forcing the South into firing 
the first shot. 87 
85. Richardson, J. V., £E. cit., vol. 6, pp. 21, 22 
Lincoln to Congress, July 4,~61. 
86. Nic olay and Hay, QD., ill., vol. 4, p. 12. 
87. Crawford, QD, cit., p. 420. Lincoln to Fox 
CI-L-\PTER IX 
THE FALL OF FORT SUMTER 
CHAPTER IX 
THE FALL OF PORT SUMTER 
Having reviewed the development of a policy tm';ard the 
Southern forts through the month of March, we have seen that, 
according to one statement of Lincoln, there was doubt as 
to provisioning Sumter to the last moment. 'rhis assertion, 
however, does not seem to agree with the facts of the case. 
In his message to Congress, July 4, 1861, Lincoln asserted 
that the Sumter expedition would not have sailed, and that 
Sumter would have been evacuated, if news had not arrived 
on April 6 that Pickens r4d not yet been reinforced, and 
probably could not be reinforced before the garrison at Sumter 
was starved into evacuation. The writer has charged that 
Lincoln must have been wrong in his assertion, because, as will 
be shown in the presant chapter, he gave final orders on April 
4 for the dispatch of the Sumter expedition, before he re-
ceived the news on April 6 that Pickens had not been reinforced, 
and probably could not be before a forced evacuation of Sumter. 
Secretary of the Navy Welles has said that Lincoln told him 
and Seward that the Sumter expedition was more important than 
that for Pickens,l which agrees more with the facts than 
Lincoln's statement of duly 4, 1861. It is clear that two 
1. VJ e l1es, Gideon,...£E!..~' vol. 1, p. 25. 
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separate expeditions had been ordered, the one for Sumter 
without reference to that for Pickens. The Cabinet, however, 
was stronger for the reinforcement of Pickens than for the 
provisioning of Sumter. 
There is evidence, however, that Lincoln considered 
ordering the evacuation of Sumter just before the relief 
expedition sailed, not because of the Pickens situation, 
but because of concern over the possible action of the 
Virginia Convention. In the first week of April Lincoln 
sent a messenger to Hicbmond, requesting Judge George W. 
SUmmers to come to Washington for a conference. Summers was 
a Unionist member of the Convention" ilwcLf/t:Y.tlPlh,:6,At 'l'tY~O/N 
hfJJ,eJ r03ef -fire CONV'BN-f,'''N ttl dtl/fJVt-NJ SlNe ,,'e.) 
without passing an ordinance of secession. In exchange, 
Lincoln would agree to the evacuation of Fort Sumter. Summers 
Consulted with other members of the Convention and selected 
for the errand John B. Baldwin. 2 Baldwin's version of the 
conference with Lincoln, which took place on April 5, was 
that Lincoln complained that he should have come sooner, that 
he had had a proposition to make, but that now it was too late.3 
The testimony of John Minor Botts, an anti-secession Unionist 
of Virgin~a, who had a conversation with Lincoln on April 7, 
affirmed that Lincoln told him that he had proposed to Baldwin 
that the orders for the sailing of the Fort Sumter expedition 
would be recalled if the Virginia Convention would adjourn 
sine die, without passing an ordinance of secession. 4 ~nen 
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proposition to the Virginia Convention, Lincoln replied 
that it was now too late, that the fleet had already sailed. 
A special study of the Lincoln-Baldwin conference, made by 
~'Jv. L. 
F; 
Hall in 1914, confirmed the testimony of Botts.~ When 
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Botts asked Lincoln how Baldwin received his proposition, 
Lincoln, according to Botts, threw up his hands and said: "Oh, 
he wouldn't listen to it at all; scarcely treated me with 
civility.fr6 
It might have been that Lincoln had been influenced 
to make such a proposal to the Virginia Convention by the 
advice of Seward. In the "views for the President's con-
sideration "which Seward sent the President on April 1_ 
Seward urged Lincoln to change the question before the public 
from one upon slavery, or about slavery, for one upon union 
or disunion. For such a purpose Seward reiterated his advice 
for the evacuation of Fort Sumter in the following language: 
The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although 
not in fact a slavery or party question, is so regarded. 
Witness the temper manifested by the Republicans in the 
free States, and even by the Union men in the South. I 
would therefore terminate it as a safe means for changing 
the issue, I deem it fortunate that the last Administration 
created the necessity.7 
On the 30th of March_ 1861, Lincoln sent Captain Fox to 
New York with verbal instructions to make ready the expedition_ 
but not to incur any binding engagements. On the 2nd of April_ 
Fox, not having received the written authority which he had 
expected from the Government, returned to Washington. 8 Accord-
5. H&ll, 7lilmer L., "The Lincoln Interview With John B. Baldwin," 
South Atlantic Quarterlz, XIII, 1914, p. 269. 
6. Nicolay and Hay_ 2£. £!i., vol. 3, p. 425. 
7. Ibid, p. 446. 
8. '$iiIth~ W. E., .2,E. ill., vol. 2, p. 12. (Correspondence of 
G. V. Fox). 
---- -------
ing to Fox, delays which belonged to "the secret political 
history Itof the period, prevented a decision until the 
afternoon of the 4th of April, when the President sent for 
Fox and told him that he had decided to let the expedition 
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go. Lincoln said that a messenger would be sent to the 
authorities of Charleston, before Fox could get there, to 
notify them that troops would not be put into Sumter, provided 
the subsistence for the garrison was allowed to be landed at 
the Fort peacefully. Fox told the President that he would 
have but nine days in which to organize the expedition, after 
reaching New York, and to reach the destined point six hundred 
and thirty-two miles distant. This time limit was based on 
Anderson's report that he would run out of provisions by noon, 
April 15. Lincoln replied: "You will best fulfill your duty 
to your country by making the attempt. 1f9 
The orders of the Secretary of War to Captain Pox, issued 
April 4, were: 
It having been decided to succor Fort Sumter you have 
been selected for this important duty. Accordingly you 
will take charge of the transports in New York having the 
troops and supplies on board to the entrance of Charleston 
harbor, and endeavor, in the first instance to deliver the 
subsistence. If you are opposed in this you are directed 
to report the fact to the senior naval officer of the harbor, 
who will be instructed by the Secretary of the Navy to use 
his entire force to open a passage, when you will, if possible, 
effect an entrance and place both troops and supplies in 
Port Sumter.lO 
On the same date, April 4, the Adjutant-General, L. Thomas, 
gave Fox written orders which gave him authority to have any 
vessels which he might designate chartered for the expedition, 
9. Ibid, p. 13. 
10. ~cial Records, vol. 1, pp. 235, 236. 
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at such time and with such supplies as he might indicate. ll 
On April 3, an ice schooner, bound from Boston to 
Savannah, had mistaken the harbor of Charleston for that of 
Savannah and entered, flying the United States flag. The 
Confederate batteries on Morris Island had fired into it, 
and Major Anderson, just as in the case of the Star of the 
West, had failed to return the fire. 12 On April 4, Anderson 
reported to the War Department his reasons for not returning 
the fire. Let Anderson tell the story: 
The remarks made to me by Colonel Lamon, taken in connection 
with the tenor of newspaper articles, have induced me, as 
stated in previous communications, to believe that orders 
would soon be issued for my abandoning this work. Vfuen the 
firing commenced some of my heaviest guns were concealed from 
their view by planking, and by the time the battery was 
ready the firing had ceased. I then, acting in strict 
accordance with the spirit and wording of the orders of the 
War Department, as communicated to me in the 1ett~r from 
the Secretary of War dated February 23, 1861, dete'rmined not 
to commence firing until I had sent to the vessel and inves-
tigatedthe circumstances. 
The accompanying report presents them. Invested by a 
force so superior that a collision would, in all probability, 
terminate in the destruction of our force before relief 
could reach us, with only a few days! provisions on hand, 
and with a scanty supply of ammunition, as will be seen by a 
reference to my letter of February 27, in hourly expectation 
of receiving definite instructions from the War Department, 
and with orders so explicit and peremptory as those I am 
acting under, I deeply regret that I did not feel at liberty 
to resent the insult thus offered to the flag of my beloved 
country. 13 
The above report shows two important things. Anderson, while 
orders were in process of being issued for his relief, believed 
that he was to be withdrawn from Fort Sumter, and that he was 
still acting under the orders of the Buchanan administration. 
It also shows the lack of supplies and fresh orders to guide 
11. Official Records, vol. 1, p. 236. 
12. Ibid. 





Anderson. Major Anderson was so confident that he was to be 
withdrawn that he started packing up on March 29. 14 
On April 4, the Secretary of War, Cameron, sent a message 
to Anderson in answer to the above communication. Cameron 
told Anderson that.his letter had caused some anxiety to 
the President. According to the information of Captain ,Fox, 
obtained on the latter's visit of March 21, Cameron stated 
that it had been expected that Anderson could hold out until 
the 15th of April. "Hoping still", said Cameron, "that you 
will be able to sust8.in yourself till the 11th or 12th instant, 
the expedition will go forward, and finding your flag flying, 
will attempt to provision you, and in case the effort is 
resisted, will endeavor also to reinforce you. You will there-
fore hold out, if possible, till the arrival of the expedition.15 
In the same letter there was the type of order that Buchanan 
sent to Anderson on December 21, 1860, relieving him of the 
necessity to defend Fort Moultrie "to the last extremity". 
Cameron added: 
It is not, however, the intention of the President to 
subject your command to any danger or hardship beyong what, 
in your judgment, would be usual in military lifej and he 
has entire confidence that you will act as becomes a patriot 
and soldier, under all circumstances. 
Whenever, if at all, in your judgment, to save yourself 
and command, a capitulation becomes a necessity, you are 
authorized to make it. 16 
It is to be observed that in the original memorandum 
which Fox wrote at Lincoln's request, on March 28, Fox had 
named the steamers Pocahontas, Pawnee, and the Harriet Lane. 
14. Crawford, ££. cit., p. 373. 




17 He had not asked for the Powhatan. Later Fox decided 
that he would need the Powhatan. The Powhatan had recently 
returned to port and gone out of commission, was imrnediately 
recommissioned because Fox thought it would be unwise to 
put all the sailors and launches on board the Baltic, in 
addition to the army detacbment he had requested. In the 
opinion of Fox, "the Powhatan, with her disciplined crew and 
large boats, became indispensable to success".18 Accordingly, 
the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, on April 5, ordered 
Captain Mercer, commanding the Powhatan, to cooperate with Fox 
in the Fort Sumter Expedition.19 But Seward had other plans 
for the Powhatan. With the knowledge of the President, but 
acting over the heads of both the War and Navy Secretaries, 
and without their knowledge of it, Seward was busy planning 
20 his special expedition to reinforce Fort Pickens. The 
principals in Seward's secret Pickens expedition were M. C. 
Meigs, Lieut. David D. Porter, and Lieut. Col. E. VI. Keyes. 
Porter urged secrecy on Seward because the former thought 
there were many clerks in the Navy Department of secession 
sympathies, and if the orders went through the Navy Department, 
the news would be communicated and Fort Pickens would be 
taken by the secessionists forthwith. Porter also suggested 
to Seward that the Powhatan be fitted out for this expedition 
\1 
"by a secret order of the President. 21 
17. Ibftf; p. 227. 
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On April 1, Seward, Meigs and Porter had gone to the 
President, to whom Porter explained his suspicions of the 
clerks in the Navy Department, and told Lincoln if he would 
issue the orders, they would be promptly executed to the 
letter. aBut", said Lincoln, "is not this a most irregular 
mode of procedure7" "Certainly", said Porter, "but the 
necessity of the case justifies it". Then Seward said: "You 
aI'e the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and this is 
a case where it is necessary to issue direct orders without 
passing them through intermediaries tt • V'fuen Lincoln objected, 
"But what will Uncle Gideon say?", Seward replied, 1I0h, I 
will make it all right with Mr. Welles.,,22 Lincoln signed 
the orders detaching the Powhatan from the Fort Sumter 
expedition, without reading them. He told Welles that he 
did not have time to read them and if he couldn't trust the 
Secretary of State, he knew not whom he could trust. 23 
212 
On April 5, between eleven and twelve o'clock at night, 
Seward and his son Frederick, the Assistant Secretary of State, 
came to Welles' rooms at Willard's with a telegram from 
Captain I.ieigs at New York. The telegram stated that the 
movements of the Pickens expedition had been retar'ed by con-
flicting orders from the secretary of the Navy. 'Nelles asked 
for an explanation, for he could not understand the nature of 
the telegram or its Object. After it was made clear that there 
were conflicting orders for the disposition of the Powhatan, 
it was suggested that they should go see Lincoln. On the way 
22. 
23. 
Sandburg, QQ. cit., vol. 1, p. 199. 
Welles, GiMon, OPe ill., vol. 1, p. 18. 
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over to Lincoln .. Seward .. according to Welles .. remarked that 
old as he was, he had learned a lesson from that affair, 
which was that he had better confine his labors to his 
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own department. To this Welles cordially agreed. 24 Welles r 
account of this conference with Lincoln is worthy of 
quotation: 
The President had not retired when we reached the 
Executive Mansion, although it was nearly midnight. On 
seeing us he was surprised, and his surprise was not 
diminished on learning our errand. He looked first at one 
and then the other, and declared there was some mistake .. 
but after again hearing the facts stated, and again looking 
at the telegram .. he asked if I was not mistaken in regard 
to the Powhatan .. - if some other vessel was not the flag-
ship of the Sumter expedition. I assured him there was no 
mistake on my part; reminded him that I had read to him 
my confidential instructions to Captain Mercer. He said that 
he remembered tl~t fact and that he approved of them, but 
he could not remember that the Powhatan was the vessel. 
Commodore Stringham confirmed my statement, but to make 
the matter perfectly clear to the President, I went to the 
Navy Department and brought and read to him the instructions. 
He then remembered distinctly all the facts, and turning 
promptly to Mr. Seward, said the Powhatan must be restored 
to Mercer, that on no account must the Sumter expedition 
fail or be interfered with. Mr. Seward hesitated .. remonstrat-
ed .. asked if the other expedition was not quite as important 
and whether that would not be defeated if the Powhatan was 
detached. The President said the other had time to wait .. 
but no time was to be lost as regarded Sumter, and he directed 
Mr. Seward to telegraph and return the Powhatan to Mercer 
without delay. Mr. Seward suggested the difficulty of 
getting a dispatch through and to the Navy yard at so late an 
hour .. but the President was imperative that it should be done. 
The President took upon himself the whole blame .. said it 
was carelessness, heedlessness on his own part .. he ought 
to have been more careful and attentive.25 
So Seward couldnrt make it right with Mr. Welles. 
But the Powhatan had sailed on April 6 .. without waiting 
for a reply to Meigsr telegram to Seward. Porterrs orders to 
take command of the Powhatan had been Signed by the President, 







and insisted on telegraphing the Secretary of the Navy for 
instructions. Foote said to Porter: "Porter, these are 
ticklish times. How do I know that you are not going to 
run off with the ship? I must telegraph immediately to the 
Secretarytr.26 The Powhatan had hardly left to go down the 
harbor, April 6, 1:00 P. M. when a telegram from the 
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Secretary of State arrived for Lieutenant Porter. The comman-
dant of the Navy Yard at once dispatched an officer to employ 
a fast vessel in New York and go in pursuit. The POWhatan 
was overtaken and Porter was given the brief telegram: 
"Deliver up the Powhatan to Captain Mercer. - W. H. Seward.,,27 
Porter at once replied: "I have received orders from the 
President which I cannot disobey", and proceeded on his course. 28 
There had been qUite a delay in the arrival of the telegram. 
Seward was ordered by Lincoln to send the telegram on April 5, 
at midnight, but it was not sent until the next afternoon. Was 
Seward giving Porter time in which to get away? 
After all the assurance Seward had given Judge Campbell 
that Fort Sumter would not be reinforced, but evacuated, 
C~lpbell received a different story from Seward on April 1. 
On this date Campbell received a note from Seward in writing: 
trI am satisfied the Government will not undertake to supply 
Sumter without giving notice to Governor Picken;~29 According 
to Judge Campbell, Seward added verbally that the President 
might desire to supply Sumter but would not do so, and there 
26. Crawford, £E. cit., p. 412, (Porter to author.) 
27. Crawford, £E. cit., p. 415 
28. Ibid. 
29. Connor, Henry G., £E. ~., pp. 134, 135. 
was no design to reinforce. On April 7# Judge Campbell 
addressed a letter to Seward expressing alarm at the 
preparations the Government was making and asked him if 
his assurances were well or ill founded. Seward replied 
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to Campbell: "Faith as to Sumter fully kept. Wait and see."30 
Campbell believed that Seward had been lying all along, that 
his "faith as to Sumter fully kept" meant that there would 
be no attempt to supply or~einforce; but Seward must have 
been referring to the promise that Governor Pickens would 
be notified in advance of an attempt to supply the fort. 
It is true that Lincoln# toward the end of March, told Seward 
that he might tell Judge Campbell that no attempt to pro-
vision the fort would be made without giving notice to 
Governor Pickens. 
31 
On April 6, Lincoln sent a special messenger, R. S. Chew, 
to Governor Pickens with the promised notification. Chew 
arrived in Charleston April 8, sought an interview with 
Governor Pickens, and read to him Lincoln's notice of an 
attempt to supply Fort Sumter, as follows: 
I am directed by the President of the United States to 
notify you to expect an attempt will be made to supply 
Fort Sumter with provisions only; and that, if such attempt 
be not resisted, no effort to throw in men, arms, or 
ammunition will be made without further notice, or in case 
of an attack upon the fort.32 
But Lincoln's special messenger was preceded by a telegram 
to Charleston on April 6 from James E. Harvey, Seward's 
! , 
protege# who was soon after apPointed minister to Portugal. 
30. Ibid, p. 135 
31. Nicolay and Hay, ,2£. c it., vol. 4, p. 33. 




Harvey telegraphed to his friend Judge Magrath: 
Positively determined not to withdraw Anderson. Supplies 
go immediately, supported by naval force under Stringham 
if their landing be resisted.33 
On April 8, Crawford, one of the Confederate commissioners 
at Washington, telegraphed to General Beauregard: 
Accounts are uncertain, because of the constant 
vacillation of this Government. We were reassured yesterday 
that the status of Sumter would not be changed without 
previous notice to Governor Pickens, but we have no faith 
in them. The war policy prevails in the Cabinet at this 
hour. 34 
On April 8 also, L. p. ~'lalker, Confederate Secretary of ~Yar, 
telegraphed to Beauregard at Charleston: 
Under no circumstances are you to allow provisions to be 
sent to Fort Sumter. 35 
On the same date, Beauregard telegraphed to Walker: 
Anderson's provisions stopped yesterday. No answer from 
him. I am calling out balance of contingent troops.:56 
April 9, Walker telegraphed to Beauregard: 
Major ~i.nderson 1 s mails must be stopped. The fort must 
be completely isolated. 
And Beauregard, in answer to t he above, on the same day 
telegraphed ·.'ialker: 
"The mails have already been stopped".37 
The pressure was fast on Major Anderson. On April 10 
Walker, the Confederate SeCl"etary of War, telographed to 
Beauregard to demand at once the evacuation of Fort Sumter, and 
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replied that the demand would be made on April 11 at 12 
o'clock, whereupon Walker telegraphed back that unless there 
were special reasons connected with his condition, he should 
make the demand at an earlier hour. Beauregard replied 
that his reasons were special for twelve o'clock. 38 Accordingly 
Beauregard made the demand on Anderson. Beauregard sent 
three aides, Col. James Chestnut, Captain Stephen D. Lee, 
and Lieutenant-Colonel Chisholm, who arrived in a boat flying 
a white flag. As it happened, they were met by Lieutenant 
Jefferson C. Davis, who escorted them to the guard-room, 
where they met Major Anderson. In the name of Beauregard 
and the Confederate Government they demanded the evacuation 
of the fort. All propor facilities would be afforded for 
the removal of the garrison, with company arms and property, 
and all private property, to any post in the United States 
Anderson might name. The flag which "you have upheld so long, 
and with so much fortitude, under the most trying circumstances, 
may be saluted by you on taking it down~39 
A council of officers was called by Anderson. The whole 
subject of the position was gone over, and for the first time 
the confidential order of Buchanan and Floyd of December 21, 
1860, in which Anderson was told not to sacrifice his men by 
a useless resistance, wax shown to the officers. A decision 
was reached to refuse the demand to evacuate, which Anderson 
handed to Beauregard's aides, reading thus: 
38. Official Records, vol. 1, p. 297 
39. Crawford, 2£- ~., p. &23 
I, 
General: I have the honor to acknowled3e the receipt 
of your communication demanding the evacuation of this 
fort, and to say, in reply thereto~ that it is a demand 
with which I regret that my sense of honor, and of my 
obligations to my Government, prevent my compliance. 
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Thanking you for the fair, manly, and courteous terms 40 
proposed, and for the high compliment paid me, I am, etc. 
As the aides were leaving, Anderson asked if Beauregard would 
open his batteries without further notice to him. Colonel 
Chestnut replied that he would not. Anderson remarked that 
he would await the first shot~ but that he would be starved 
out in a few days an~vay.4l 
General Beauregard immediately telegraphed Anderson's 
answer to Montgomery. Secretary Nalker replied that it was 
not desired to needlessly bombard Fort Sumter. If Major 
Anderson would state the time at which he would evacuate, 
and agree that in the meantime he would not use his guns 
against Beauregard~ unless 3eauregard's were turned on 
Sumter, the effusion of blood was to be avoided. But '~'iaH~er 
added, "If this, or its equivalent, be refused, reduce the 
fort as your judgment decides to be most practicable~42 The 
lack of provisions at Sumter was so acute that when Major 
Anderson asked the Assistant Surgeon for his opinion as to 
how long they could hold out, the latter replied that the 
men could hold out for five days, but for the last three they 
would be entirely without food. 43 On April 11 Beauregard sent 
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he would, if provided with the proper and necessary means 
of transportation" evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th 
of April" unless he should receive prior to that time 
controlling instructions from the Government or additional 
supplies. 44 Beauregard' £" messen8ers considered this reply 
as rrmanife s tly futile II and promptly refused it. 45 'rhey 
had waited three hours for the answer" and at 3: 30 A. M., 
on the morning of April 12, Colonel Chestnut and Captain Lee 
handed Anderson the following notice signed by themselves: 
By authority of Brigadier-General Beauregard, commanding 
the provisional forces of the Confederate states, we have 
the honor to notify you that he will open the fire of his 
batteries on Fort Sumter in one hour from this time. 46 
The long-postponed action was no" to start at 4 :30 A. M., 
April 12. But what of the relief expedition under Fox? The 
steam sloop-of-vv'ar Pawnee, with Captain S. C. Rov/an commanding, 
wi th ten guns and two hundred me!l, sailed from rv'ashington, 
with sealed orders, on the morning of ..:'I.pril 6. The revenue 
cutter Harriet Lane" Captain J. Faunce commandin~" with five 
guns and ninety-six men, on Saturday, April 6, exchanged her 
revenue flag for the flag of the United States Navy flag, and 
on llpril 8 sailed suddenly with sealed orders. The Powhatan, 
which Capt. F'ox expected to be the flagship and main reliance, 
had eleven guns and two hundred seventy-five men, with most 
of the launches. As we have seen, Fox was deprived of the 
service of this ship because of Seward's meddling and the 
44. Official Records, vol. 1, p. 14. 
45. Crawford" 2£. cit., p. 425. 
46. Official RecordS; vol. 1, p. 14. 
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refusal of Lieutenant Porter to restore it to Captain Mercer. 
The steam transport Atlantic, with 358 troops, sailed on 
the morning of April 7. The Transport Baltic, with 160 
troops, sailed on the morning of April 9. The transport 
Illinois, with 300 troops, sailed on the morning of April 9. 
There were two steam tugs, the "Yankee" and "Uncle Ben". The 
tlYankee" left New York on the evening of April 8, and the 
"LTncle Ben lt left on the night of April 9. The launches were 
carried by the transports Atlantic, 3altic and Illinois. 47 
Because of haste and buncling the expedition was poorly 
organized, the ships leaving at different times. A storm 
also hindered the expedition. The Harriet Lane was the first 
ship to arrive at Charleston harbor at just about the time 
the Confederate batteries opened fire on Sumter. The Baltic 
was next to arrive with Captain Pox on board. The Pawnee 
came in about 6: 00 A. M., and was shortly after boarded by 
Captain Ii'ox, who informed its Commander, Rowan, of his 
orders from the Secretary of War, and requested him to stand 
in for the bar with him. This Howan declined to do. He 
said that his orders required him to remain IIten miles east 
of the light and await the Powhatan, and that he ViaS not 
" going in there to begin civil war. 48 The Baltic want in, 
followed by the Harriet Lane. As they approached the land, 
the firing of the guns at Sumter was heard, and the smoke 
of the batteries was visible. Corrnnander Rowan, having received 
his orders from the Harriet Lane, now came in with his ship, 
47. Moore, Prank, ,2E. cit., vol. 1, :uocuments, p. 49 
48. Crawford, ££. £!!.:-PP. 416, 417. 
and asked for a pilot, announcing his intention of running 
in and sharing the fate of the garrison. Captain Fox 
went at once on board and explained to Rowan that the 
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Government did not expect such gallant sacrificej the orders 
given did not require it.49 The 12th passed without the 
arrival of any other vessels of the fleet. Fox was still 
waiting for the arrival of the Powhatan during the night, 
and still ignorant of her change of destination, he returned 
in the Baltic and signalled for her all night. Neither the 
Pawnee nor Harriet Lane was furnished with the proper boats 
to carry in supplies to the fort. The Baltic steamed towards 
the harbor, ran aground on Rattlesnake Shoals, and was forced 
to anchor in deep water, several miles from the ships of war. 
The Pocahontas finally arrived at 2 :00 P. ~I:. on April 12" 
and it was only then that Fox learned that the Powhatan had a 
destination elsewhere. Although ?ox had not left New York 
on the Baltic until two days after the Powlllitan had been taken 
by Porter" he had not been informed of it. 50 The tug 
IIUncle Ben" had been driven by a storm into Wilmington, North 
Carolina and it had been seized by the rebels. The storm 
had driven the tug nYankee" to the entrance of Savannah. 51 
Thus the expedition failed, as almost every element that was 
essential to its success was wanting. The fleet remained 
outside the harbor he1pless. 52 
Fox felt very bitterly toward Seward for the detachment 
of the Powhatan. It was believed by Fox that the failure 
49. Crawford, ££. £hl." pp. 417" 418. 
50. Ibid, p. 418. 
51. lOIU, p. 419, Statement of Fox. 
52. Smith, W. E., .£.2.. ,ill., vol. 2" p. 14, (Fox Correspondence) 
of the Powhatan to appear with the launches and men was 
responsible for his failure. He wrote to his wife of 
Seward's meddling: 
l' .. !r. Seward got up this Pensacola expedition and the 
President signed the orders in ignorance and unknown 
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to the Department. The President offers every apology 
possible and will do so in writing. So do the Departments. 
I shall get it all straight in justification of myself 
and to place the blow on the head of that timid ','I. H. 
Seward, he who paralizes (sic) every movement from 
abject fear. 53 
The Blairs and SecI'etary of the Navy Welles actually charged 
that Seward's meddling was a mere continuation of his alleged 
complicity with the Confederates. 54 The President apologized 
to Fox for his failure to support him properly in his attempt 
to relieve Major Anderson, and immediately appointed him 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy.55 
Vie have noticed the reluctance of Major Anderson to do 
anything which would initiate civil war, his Southern 
sympathies, a nd the somewhat strange nature of his communications 
and conduct. We have also noted that Lincoln at one time was 
inclined to doubt his loyalty. He now had notice of the relief 
expedition, and also the orders of April 4 which authorized 
him to surrender in the face of an impossible situation. 56 
In the face of his oVvn feelings, and in the light of his past 
treatment at the hands of the Government, itis a confirmation 
of his loyalty to his Government that he refused to surrender 
without a fight. On April 10 Anderson reported to the War 
Department that his men were in fine spirits, but that the 
53. Sandburg, £E. cit., vol. 1, p. 199 
54. Smith, VI. E., .2.J2. • .£1l., vol. 2, pp. 14, 15. 
55. Ibid, p. 15, quoting Fox Correspondence, Lincoln to FOX, 
May 1, 1861. 
56. Official Records, vol. 1, p. 249. 
long confinement and excitement were telling on them; none 
of them could endure fatiguing labor for any length of 
time. 57 Anderson informed the men on the loth of the 
expedition of relief, and that he must cooperate with it 
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to the best of his ability. The preparations being made 
told the men that fighting was about to commence. According 
to one of their officers, the news acted like magic upon 
them. They had previously been drooping and dejected, but 
now they "sprung to their work with the greatest alacrity, 
laughing, singing, whistling, and full of glee". They were 
overjoyed to learn that their long imprisonment in the fort 
would soon be at an end. 58 
The firing of the Confederates commenced according 
to schedule at 4:30 A. M., April 12. The first gun was 
fired by Edmund Ruffin of Virginia, who has been called the 
father of secession, and who, when his cause failed, took 
his own life. The commencement of the bombardment has been 
graphically told by Captain Abner Doubleday: 
Almost immediately afterward a ball f rom Cummings Point 
lodged in the magazine wall, and by the sound seemed to bury 
itself in the masonry about a foot from my head, in very 
unpleasant proximity to my right ear. This is the one that 
probably came with Mr. Ruffin's compliments. In a moment 
the firing burst forth in one continuous roar, and large 
patches of both the exterior and interior masonry began 
to crumble and fall in all directions. Nineteen batteries 
were now hammer1ng at us, and the balls and shells from 
the ten-inch columbiads, accompanied by shells from the 
thirteen-1nch mortars which constantly bombarded us, made 
us feel as if the war had commenced in earnest. 59 
57. Ib1d. 
58. Doubleday, Abner, ££. c1t., p. 139 
59. Doubleday, Abner, ££. cit., pp. 143, 144. 
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It was not until 7:00 A. M. that Fort Sumter opened fire. 
Its entire armament consisted of forty-eight available guns 
in casemate and barbette, with five 8-inch and 10-inch 
Columbiads on the parade, and so mounted as to bear upon 
the city of Charleston, Fort ~/!oultrie and Cummings Point. 
The firing continued all day.60 
It is not the purpose of this paper to give a detailed 
~ccount of the bombardment of Fort Sumter, as space does not 
allow it, but some facts will be briefly noted. Tr~ee times 
during the first day's bombardment the officers' quarters 
were set on fire. At midnight the making of cartridges was 
stopped by Major Anderson, as nearly all the extra clothing 
and material from the hospital had been used. On the second 
day, every battery around the fort opened fire. Major Anderson 
forbade any further attempt to control the flames which had 
now spread in every direction through the wooden floors and 
partitions of the quarters. Because of the fire all but five 
barrels of the powder from the magazine were thrown into 
the sea. The men, almost suffocated as the wind carried 
the cloud of hot smoke and cinders into the casemates, threw 
themselves on the ground and covered their faces with wet 
cloths, or rushed to the embrasures, w here the occasional 
draught made it possible to breathe. 6l After the fort had been 
reduced to ruin, and the lack of men to man the guns and the 
lack of ammunition and supplies making the cause hopeless, 
60. 
61. 
Crawford, ~. cit., p. 429 
Ibid., pp.~35:-437 
Major Anderson agreed to terms of evacuation and surrender. 
At about 7:00 P. M. of the second day of bombardment, 
Beauregard sent his aides, Colonel Chestnut, Colonel Roger 
A. Pryor, Colonel William Porcher Miles, and Captain Lee, 
followed soon by 3eauregard's Adjutant-General Jones, 
ex-Governor Manning, and Colonel Alston, to Major Anderson 
under a white flag. The way had been prepared by the 
wholly unauthorized mission of Senator -;agfall, who had 
previously gone to the fort when he noticed the flagstaff 
shot down, and had arranged a truce with Anderson. It was 
T,Vigfall who waved the white flag under which the authorized 
agents came. 62 
Beauregard's aides took the following message from 
Anderson back to Beauregard: 
General: I thank 'you for your kindness in having sent 
your aides to me with an offer of assistance upon your 
having observed that our flag was down - it being down 
a few moments, and merely long enough to enable us to 
replace it on another staff. Your aides will inform you 
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of the circumstance of the visit to my fort by General 
Wigfall, who said that he came with a message from yourself. 
In the peculiar circumstances in which I am now placed 
in consequence of that message, and of my reply thereto, I 
will now state that I am willing to evacuate this fort upon 
the terms and conditions offered by yourself on the 11th 
instant, at any hour you may name tomorrow, or as soon as we 
can arrange means of transportation. I will not replace 
my flag until the return of your messenger.63 
Shortly after the recepit of the above, Beauregard sent to 
the following communication: 
62. Chadwick, French Ensor, ££. £!i., p. 339,Official Records 
63. Official Records, vol. 1, p. 15. vol. 1, pp. 23, 24 
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Apprised tlmt you desire the privilege of saluting 
your flag on retiring, I cheerfully concede it, in 
consideration of the gallantry with which you have defended 
the place under your charge. 
The Catawba steamer will be at the landing of Sumter 
tomorrow morning at any hour you may designate for the 
purpose of transporting you whither you may desire. 64 
Immediately Anderson sent back to Beauregard the following: 
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
communication of this evening, and to express my gratifi-
cation at its contents. Should it be convenient, I would 
like to have the Catawba here at about nine o'clock 
tomorrow morning. 65 
Not one fatality had resulted on either side from the 
hostilities, four of Anderson's men having been slightly 
wounded from fragments of concrete and mortar. The casualties 
resulted from the ceremony of aaluting the flag before 
Major Anderson removed his men from the fort. In this ceremony 
two men were killed by an accident, one severely wounded, 
and three more slightly wounded. The actual evacuation took 
place at 4:00 P. M., April 14, when the Confederates took 
possession of the fort. 66 Because of the accidents only 
fifty of the proposed one hundred guns were fired in saluting 
the flag. On April 18, from the steamship Baltic, off Sandy 
Hook, ~~jor Anderson reported to the War Department the fall 
of the fort and the result of a long Government policy of 
"muddling through". His report was a mixture of pathos and 
pride: 
Having defended Fort Sumter for thirty-four hours, until 
the quarters were entirely burned, the main gates destroyed 
by fire, the gorge walls seriously impaired, the magazine 
surrounded by flames, and its door closed from the effects 
of the heat, four barrels and three cartridges of powder 
64. IbId. 
65. !b1Q. 
66. Crawford, ££. £!i., pp. 446, 447. 
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only being available, and no provisions remaining but pork, 
I accepted terms of evacuation offered by General Beauregard 
(being the same offered by him on the 11th instant, prior 
to the commencement ·of hostilities), and marched out of 
the fort on Sunday afternoon, the 14th instant, with colors 
flying and drums beating, bringing away company and private 
property, and saluting my flag with fifty guns. 67 
On April 20, the Secretary of War sent Anderson the following 
message of approval and thanks: 
I am directed by the President of the United States to 
communicate to you, and through you to the officers and 
the men under your cormnand, at Forts Moultrie and Sumter, 
the approbation of the Government of your and their 
judicious and gallant conduct there, and to tender to you 
and them the tharu{s of the Government for the same. 68 
The period of inaction, delay, and conciliation was at 
an and. The firing on the fort by the Confederacy was to 
"strike the hornets' nest" of which the Confederate Secretary 
of State, Robert Toombs, had warned. Toombs had said to 
Jefferson Davis: "Mr. President, at this time it is suicide, 
murder, and you will lose us ever'y friend at the North ••• 
it puts us in the wrong; it is fatal". There has been much 
written to affirm that Lincoln had been thinking the same 
thoughts as Toombs. The Southern viewpoint has been that 
Lincoln did not expect the Fox expedition to succeed, but 
that he sent it in order to force the South into firing 
the first shot, thus putting the onus of starting the war on 
the South, thereby effecting a solid support of the North in 
a war which he thought inevitable. There is much evidence 
to support such a theory. Avery Craven, in a recent study of 
the coming of the Civil War, has stated that Lincoln told 
67. Ibid.; p. 449, Official Records, vol. 1, p. 12. 
68. Official Record~, vol. 1, p. 16 
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O. H. Browning, a close friend and adviser, that he himself 
conceived the idea of sendine; supplies to Sumter without 
an attempt to reinforce. Said Lincoln: "The plan succeeded. 
'rhey attacked Sumter. It fell, and thus did more service 
than it otherwise could".69 
The ;Southern historian, Pollard, writing in 1861, 
charged Lincoln with a deliberate design to initiate war, 
throwing the responsibility on the South. Said Pollard: 
The fact was that the President had long ago calculated 
the result and the effect, on the country, of the hostile 
movements which he had ordered against the sovereignty of 
South Carolina. He had procured the battle of Sumterj he 
had no desire or hope to retain the fort. The circumstances 
of the battle and the non-participation of his fleet in it, 
were sufficient evidence, to every honest and reflecting 
mind, that it was not a contest for victory, and that lithe 
sending of provisions to a starvins garrison" was an 
ingenious artifice to commence the war that the Federal 
Government had fully resolved upon. 70 
The fact that Lincoln knew that the relief expedition would 
initiate hostilities and throw the responsibility on the 
South might be inferred from his letter of consolation to 
Fox. On May I, 1861, Lincoln wrote Fox a letter in which 
he clearly indicated that some other beneficial result had 
accrued from an attempt to supply Sumter. Said Lincoln to 
Fox: 
You and I both anticipated that the course of the country 
would be advanced by making the attempt to provision 
Fort Sumter, even if it should failj and it is no small 
consolation now to feel t hat our anticipation is justified 
by the result.7l 
Nas the result of which Lincoln spoke the forcing of the 
69. Craven, Avery, The comin~ of The Civil War, p. 481 
Browning1s Diary, vol. 1, p. 75. New York, Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1942. 
70. Pollard, ££. £!i., p. 49 
71. Crawford, £E. £!i., p. 420. 






South to coro~ence the war? It seems that it was, according 
to what Lincoln told Browning. 
Craven, in his recent study, has declared t hat Lincoln 
did not deliberately choose to plunge the nation into such 
a war as resulted from his acts. According to Craven, 
Lincoln did not understand the situation, overestimated the 
strength of the Union forces in the South, and counted too 
heavily on controlling the border States; that he most 
certainly felt the pressure of radical Republican opinion 
for firm action, but hoped to save his party and escape war. 
Craven is probably right in asserting that an excellent case 
can be made out, on supportable evidence, for Lincoln either 
as an aggressor or as a conciliator, Craven thi~~s that 
Lincoln suffered heavily from the bad habit of "double talklf 
such as appeared in the inaugural. 72 .ii Southerner, ..&rchibald 
Rutledge, in a study made in 1935, charged that Lincoln used 
precisely the same policy that Bismarck later employed. 
Although making the fatal move himself, Lincoln managed for 
the moment to make it appear that the South was the aggressor. 73 
But in all the mass of conwent on the real purpose of Lincoln 
in sending the Fox expedition, it must not be forgotten that 
Lincoln was only seeking to maintain the Federal authority 
as he had pledged to do in his inaugural. 
On April 13, while Fort Sumter was being bombarded, a 
committee of three delegates from the Virginia Convention 
waited on Lincoln to learn his policy in regard to the 
72. Craven, 2£. cit., p. 480 
73. Rutledge, Archibald, "Abraham Lincoln Pights The Battle 
of Fort Sumter", South Atlantic Quarterly, XXXIV, Oct. 1935, 
p. 370. 
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Confederate States. It might be well to quote his answer 
to this committee. Said Lincoln: 
In answer I have to say that, having at the beginning 
of my official term expressed my intended policy as plainly 
as I was able, it is with deep regret and some mortification 
I now learn that there is great and injurious uncertainty 
in the public mind as to what that policy is, and what course 
I intend to pursue. Not having as yet seen occasion to 
change, it is now my purpose to pursue the course marked 
out in the inaugural addr~ss. I comnend a careful consider-
ation of the whole document as the best expression of my 
purposes. 
As I then said, and now repeat: tiThe power confided to 
me will be used to hold, occupy and possess the property 
and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the 
duties and imposts; but beyond what is necessary for these 
objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force 
against or among the people anywhere". By the words, npro-
perty and pL>.ces belonging to the Government", I chiefly 
allude to the military posts and property which were in the 
possession of the Government when it came to my hands. 74 
"\~atever might be said of Lincoln's hidden purposes, his 
attempt to supply Sumter certainly was in accord with his 
inaugural declaration of an intention to hold and possess 
the Federal forts, and the resistance on the part of the 
Confederate forces fulfilled his promise that the South could 
have no war without being themselves the aggressors. 
It is the writer's opinion that Lincoln had come to the 
Presidency wit h a much firmer policy than he followed after 
the inaugural. Like Buchanan, he hesitated to use firmness 
because of a desire to avoid civil war and to hold the border 
slave States in the Union. His concern over the Virginia 
Convention had persuaded him to agree to evacuate Fort Sumter 
provided Virginia would not pass an ordinance of secession. 
74. Lincoln's Works, vol. 2, pp. 32, 33. 
He was also prevented from taking firm measures for some 
time because of a belief that Northern public opinion 
would not support him. As soon, however, as Northern 
yublic opinion had been consolidated in his support, as 
it had been by March 29, 1861, and when the radical 
Republican Senators demanded stronger action, he decided 
to send the expeditions to both Sumter and Pickens. From 
Lincoln's own statements, the writer believes that he 
had come to view civil war as inevitable if the Union was 
to be saved, and his decision to attempt to supply Sumter 
was in order to throw the onus of initiating war on the 
South. The South was forced to make the choice. 
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